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2ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to present the fundamental philosophical
positions of Early German Romanticism, focusing on the three following writers:
J. C. F. Holderlin, Novalis, and F. Schlegel. Chapter 1 begins with an
examination of the first-philosophical, or ontological foundations of
Romanticism and discusses its appropriation and critique of the work of Fichte,
arriving at an elucidation of Romantic ontology as an ontology of differencing
and production. The second chapter looks at how epistemology is transformed,
in the hands of the Romantics, and due to the attention they paid to language,
semiotic theory, and the operations of irony in discourse, into poetology - a
theory of knowledge, into a theory of poetic production. In the third chapter a
confrontation between the philosophical positions of Romanticism and those of
the main currents of German Idealism (Schelling, Hegel) is undertaken; through
this confrontation, the essential trait of Romantic thought is arrived at, namely
the thought of an incomplete Absolute, as opposed to the absolute as totality in
Idealism. The final chapter considers the avenue left open by the notion of the
incomplete Absolute, and the Romantics' chief legacy, namely the theory of
literature; literature is thus seen as coextensive with philosophy, and analysed
under three conceptual categories (the theory of genre, the fragment, criticism)
which all betray their provenance from the thought lying at the core of
Romanticism: the incomplete Absolute. Finally, in the conclusion a summation
of this exposition of romanticism is presented, alongside a brief consideration of
the relevance of the Romantic project in contemporary critical/philosophical
debates.
3INTRODUCTION: EXPOSING ROMANTICISM
Romanticism is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as " a
movement or style during the late 18th and early 19th centuries in Europe marked
by an emphasis on feeling, individuality, and passion rather than classical form
and order, and preferring grandeur or picturesqueness to finish and proportion".
This is indeed what most people would understand by Romanticism, but I need to
make it clear from the start that this is not what this thesis will be concentrating
on, despite having the title "exposing Romanticism". Clearly the OED definition
is correct when applied to Romanticism in its utmost generality, and, like many
such definitions of ideas or concepts that are necessarily historically
circumscribed, manages to be too vague at the same time as relying on a simple
binary opposition. Thus, Romanticism as the OED defines it is a term that can
well be applied to most of the artistic production of the "long" 19th century,
4which would thus include the end of the 18th and even possibly part of the 20th!.
Equally, the OED's definition sets Romanticism in a relation of essential
opposition with classicism, "individuality and passion" pitted against "form and
order". Even from this meagre material, that is to say from a seemingly
expansive chronological positioning alongside an 'essential' definition resting
entirely on a supra-historical binary opposition, it is entirely possible to
formulate a claim that Romanticism should therefore simply be defined as
modernity, as "the modem" - in opposition to "the classical", and spanning
modem European history quite possibly until the catastrophe of the First World
War.
My own concerns, however, are with defining quite another 'kind' of
Romanticism, and one which is thankfully both historically much more tightly
limited, and definitionally not so vague, or great, as to be solely defined as part
of a binary opposition. To begin with I am only concerned with Romanticism in
Germany, not England, France, or any other European country. What is more, as
German historiography of ideas is itself quite meticulous in distinguishing
between "early" and "late" Romanticism, between Novalis and Heine, Schlegel
and Nietzsche, Holderlin and Morike, I find no difficulty in curtailing the
vagueness of "Romanticism" by stating that I will only be dealing with the
Fruhromantiker, the earlier category. Indeed, from a chronological perspective,
the texts I shall be dealing with do not span a period longer than 6 years, from
I For fear of deserting my own remarks here in the same position of vagueness as I am charging
the OED with in relation to its definition of Romanticism, I am compelled to add the following
brief comments. Romanticism is generally taken to be born in the late 18th century so that figures
such as William Blake or even, in some accounts, Jean-Jacques Rousseau can be determined as
Romantic. Equally, within the field of literature, the early work of someone like W.B. Yeats can
be classified as Romantic, even in the early years of the 20th century. To allow for temporal sub-
categories such as "post-romanticism" would be to confuse matters more, when the general thrust
of the argument, drawn out by what I see as the historical vagueness of the OED definition, is
51794 to 1800. And, to make matters even more limited, I will not be dealing
with the traits that the OED defines as "romantic", for the simple reason that,
even though there may be ample scope to claim that such traits are in evidence in
the literary works of the figures I shall be discussing, I will only concern myself
with philosophical and literary-theoretical writing. Thus, when the word
"Romanticism" is used, from this point onwards, readers could do well to forget
the OED definition altogether, for "Romanticism" in the next two hundred pages
or so means something quite different.
What, then, is meant, in the context of this thesis, by "Romanticism"? As
anticipated by the title, it is the actual task of the thesis to give the full answer to
this question. I aim to show what Romanticism, Early German Romanticism,
and in particular the philosophy and literary theory of Early German
Romanticism "mean". I aim to undertake an exposition of the theory of Early
German Romanticism, to present (in a sense which may be complicated later on
in the course of the 'presentation') the philosophical and literary-theoretical
positions of (Early German) Romanticism. Nevertheless, as an introduction to,
and a first exposition of the problem, I propose to circumscribe the limits of
"Romanticism" even further, and to demonstrate why it is that "Romanticism"
should be a problem, an area, or a field of research worthy of treatment on the
level of a PhD thesis (and well beyond it). To begin with, my thesis is concerned
primarily with the work of three men, three proper names: Friedrich Schlegel,
Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), and Friedrich Holderlin. "Romanticism"
therefore is designated expressly as an umbrella description for what unites the
work of all of them, and, as I will have the chance to discuss further, what
that Romanticism thus defined pretty much circumscribes the artistic production of the entire 19th
6differentiates them from other names who might or might not equally merit the
appellation "Romantic", thinkers such as Fichte, or Schelling.
An issue immediately arises: why do I take it that I can deal with
Schlegel, Novalis, and Holderlin all together under the same rubric of
Romanticism? Are there no problems, conceptual and methodological alike, in
ascribing a common 'identity' to three individual thinkers? Are there no
differences of thought, circumstantial or essential, between these three proper
names? It would be foolish to claim otherwise. Throughout the course of the
thesis I shall have the opportunity to bring the thoughts of these three different
men into relief both individually and in connection with each other, and I am not
in the least attempting to flatten possible differences between them, not in the
least contending that Schlegel, Holderlin, and Novalis are to be taken as identical
with each other in their thought. The reasons are obvious, and need no further
elaboration except to say that, among the possible connections that I will attempt
to forge, or among the possible identifications that I will aim decisively to avoid,
one appears more strenuous than others. One can relate the thought of Schlegel
to that of Novalis with relative ease, and for good reasons: they were close
friends, lived for a good while during the years here under consideration in the
same city, Jena, and worked together in the hope of creating what they termed
themselves "symphilosophy", This cannot be taken to mean that their thoughts
are identical, but it legitimises the drawing of critical connections between them.
But Holderlin? Holderlin also lived in Jena between 1794-1795, where he met
Novalis once, in the house of Immanuel Niethammer, alongside the philosophical
century, and beyond.
7mentor of both, Fichte2• This is not enough to tie him to the Athenaum circle,
and I am not suggesting that he should be so tied. Among the chief critics and
commentators on Romanticism (and this, by now, means Romanticism as I mean
it), Waiter Benjamin often draws significant parallels between Schlegel and
NovaIis, on the one hand, and Holderlin on the other'; Peter Szondi argues for
the congruence between Schlegel's and Holderlin's theories of genre"; but
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy argue quite forcefully, after
Maurice Blanchot, for "Holderlin's irreversible withdrawal from a
"constellation" to which he never really belongs'",
Before attempting to give a brief answer to the question of Holderlin's
inclusion in the concerns of this thesis, I want to return to the larger issue of the
grouping of all three of the proper names figuring in these pages under the
general heading of "Romanticism". Having already admitted that their individual
positions necessarily allow for the formation of specific differences, my
contention is that these three proper names can, and should be placed alongside
2 For this meeting, see Holderlin: Essays and Letters on Theory, translated by Thomas Pfau, New
York: SUNY press, 1988; cf. Dieter Henrich: The Course of Remembrance and other Essays on
Holderlin, Stanford: Stanford university Press, 1997.
3Walter Benjamin, Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik, in Gesammelte
Schriften, I-I, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Herman Schweppenhauser, Frankfurt; Suhrkamp, 1974.
English translation in Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings Volume 1, ed. Marcus Bullock and
Michael W. Jennings, Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1996.
4 Szondi, On Textual understanding and other Essays, trans. by H. Mendelsohn, Manchester
University Press, 1986.
S P. Lacoue-Labarthe & J.-L. Nancy, L 'absolu litteraire: theorie de la litterature du romantisme
allemand', Paris, Seuil, 1978. English translation: The Literary Absolute, trans. by P. Barnard and
C. Lester, SUNY, 1988, p. 28, n.4. This is not quite the place for a detailed explanation of why it
is Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy think that Holderlin does not "belong" to a "constellation" which
he nevertheless certainly has connections to, seeing as they are referring not simply to
Romanticism (Schlegel and Novalis) but also to German Idealism (Hegel and Schelling). I shall
have the opportunity to discuss Holderlin's 'belonging' to the Idealist constellation later, in
chapter 1. Their objection seems to me to hinge inexorably upon their own admission that they
"bear Heidegger's observation in mind" in discussing Holderlin's relations with German Idealism
(ibid.). Thus, and this is something worthy of being further demonstrated not within the confines
of this thesis but in future research, it would appear that Holderlin's belonging or not belonging
among the Romantics or among the Idealists is a question with fundamental import on the
Heideggerian version of the history of philosophy, and on the particular weight the figure of
Holderlin bears in Heidegger's thought.
8each other in a continuum - which is what I will be doing in what follows. The
'story' I aim to tell, and as I hope to render evident, is not a story based on the
unity or the identity of the ideas discussed, but rather on their coextensive ness,
their belonging together in a kind of metonymic chain, if you wish, as opposed to
a metaphorical unified stratification. In other words, I am not aiming to show that
Romanticism, as the umbrella term I am here utilising, is a vertical accumulation
of self-same, or metaphorically corresponding, ideas; rather, I propose to view
Romanticism as an expansive, 'progressive' (in the quintessentially Romantic
sense which I will be treating later) succession of concepts and conceptions. The
'overall' picture, the unity of Romanticism as a whole is something that
Romanticism itself does not allow, and I believe that, had I attempted to draw
such a unifying, totalising picture and had I not had recourse to the equivocation
and resistance to closure that Romanticism always presents itself with (and as), I
would have done grave injustice to the insights of all three of these proper
names, and also to the continuum, the loose "constellation" they form together.
If this appears counter-intuitive, even paradoxical, I would suggest that
this appearance would be due to the eccentricity and, at least in some cases,
paradoxicality of what constitutes Romanticism. Ultimately, the aim of this
thesis is to 'present' Romanticism as precisely such an essentially eccentric
enterprise, to demonstrate, in other words, that Romanticism, the philosophical
and theoretical Romanticism of Holderlin, Novalis and Schlegel marks a radical
departure for philosophy and literary theory. Without wishing to pre-empt the
arguments of the following pages, I ought summarily to indicate where this new
departure lies. Once again, it is not here a question of claiming that the radical
departure or the eccentric path of Romanticism has not been detected in the past,
9as the mere mention of the work of Walter Benjamin, Lacoue-Labarthe and
Nancy, or Manfred Frank would suffice to disprove. My own contention is that,
however indebted I am to their (and others') work, the exposition of
Romanticism here undertaken has not been attempted in this particular way, and
that, consequently, some of the eccentric force and radical nature of the
Romantic project has still gone unnoticed.
In the first instance, I aim to present Romanticism as having origins that
are distinctly and incontrovertibly philosophical, or, as I will be claiming later,
that Romanticism is grounded in ontology. This ontology, furthermore, is an
ontology with no conceivable parallel among the Romantics' predecessors or
contemporaries. It is a dynamic ontology of differencing, an ontology which is
heavily based upon notions of ontological production. Production is indeed, as I
will maintain, an essential trait of Romantic philosophy, and it is carried over, so
to speak, from ontological to epistemological concerns. Thus, in the second
instance, Romanticism presents us with an epistemology which is a theory of
production, and, as I will have the chance to explain, of production with the
significant inflection of Poiesis, so that my contention will be that Romantic
epistemology is in fact poetotogy, no longer the theory of knowledge related to
the (empirical or transcendental) subject, but the theory of poetic production as
an 'expression' of ontological production, Poiesis mirroring Being. Finally, the
theory of literature which is born out of Romanticism also mirrors and extends,
along Romanticism's metonymic chain, their ontological and epistemological
concerns and will be examined as being a part of the continuum of Romantic
ideas.
10
This sketch, meant as a 'preview' of the main arguments of the thesis, is
inadequate as an exposition of what makes Romanticism truly unique in the
history of philosophy, at least up to the 20th century", I believe this could be
summed up in one expression, and since the expression already appears in the
thesis' title, I must turn to it. Romanticism's chief legacy then, its essential trait
and the point of connection between its ontological, epistemological, and
literary-theoretical concerns as well as the thread connecting all the points
alongside its continuum is the notion of the incomplete Absolute. At the heart of
Romanticism lies the notion that the Absolute is not, as it is conceived in
Idealism, a unity, a totality as one-ness, but essentially incomplete and always
admitting further, infinite proliferation. This is what the entirety of the thesis, in
one way or another, chiefly addresses. And it is this notion of an incomplete
Absolute which finally will have allowed me to treat the umbrella term
"Romanticism" as continuum and not as unity, both from the "thematic"
perspective roughly corresponding to three out of four chapters of the thesis
(ontology, epistemology/poetology, the theory of literature), and from the
perspective of the proper names attached to it. Despite differences between
Holderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel which I fully admit, the Romantic notion of an
incomplete Absolute to which they are all, albeit in different ways, committed,
6 I will be concerned primarily with an exposition of Romanticism in its 'proper' historical
context, as I believe that its philosophical importance can only be ascertained when it is placed in
comparison and, as I will be expressing it in chapter three, confrontation with the major
philosophical routes from which it is a divergence. Nevertheless I will endeavour to indicate, at
appropriate points in the thesis' development, where and how Romanticism's eccentric path may
lead in more recent philosophical developments, to show what Romanticism may be anticipating.
As I explain in the conclusion, a more detailed and closely argued demonstration of such
Romantic bequests, of the role Romanticism may have to play in 20th century philosophical
arguments will remain, for the time being, a project for future research. Nevertheless, I must
state from the outset that if I did not think Romanticism has a role, and an often unacknowledged
or under-researched role to boot, to play in contemporary philosophical debates, there would be
little point in attempting its exposition in the first place. For what it's worth, Romanticism still
11
allows these three names to be placed not quite together perhaps, but alongside
each other. So, and to counter objections about Holderlin only, his text Seyn,
Urtheil is indispensable for the establishment of what I take as Romantic
ontology, just as crucial as Novalis' Fichte-Studien; similarly, his poetological
theories of the Homburg years are just as essential as those of Schlegel for the
transformation, as I see it, of epistemology into poetology.
There is, however, one more step to take, and that is to offer a corrective
of sorts to the idea I have just made use of, the idea that Romanticism could be
summed up in and by the notion of the incomplete Absolute. It should become
clear in the course of the thesis that this 'summation' cannot be taken to mean
that the incomplete Absolute somehow gathers together all the potentially
disparate elements of Romanticism, all the possibly divergent thoughts of
Schlegel, Holderlin, and Novalis. As I have been arguing, the only idea of unity
that Romanticism, and consequently perhaps also a thesis on Romanticism, may
allow is that of a continuum, a metonymic chain, held together only by its own
incompletion, by the fact that its 'summing up' or its addition will always
necessarily allow for the possibility that it be added to. The very 'summation' of
a title, therefore, or of an introduction for that matter, is only ever a heuristic,
temporary one. Romanticism, as I will have the chance to show, theorises this
condition as the condition of the work as fragment. The introduction, each
chapter, the conclusion, even the title of this thesis therefore, if it is ever to do
justice to Romanticism and pay tribute to its full radical force, ought to be taken
in the guise of a fragment. I cannot possibly contend that my exposition is in any
way accomplished, and this not for reasons of modesty. "In-accomplishment" is
represents, for me, even after the completion of the thesis, an immensely rich and immensely
12
the very 'essence' of Romanticism; the incompleteness of the Absolute is its very
absoluteness.
provocative body of work out of which material for several more theses can easily be drawn.
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CHAPTER ONE: ROMANTIC METAPHYSICS - or
GROUNDING ROMANTICISM IN ONTOLOGY.
Introduction.
Romanticism is not customarily discussed as an instance of the
philosophical, as a philosophical moment. In the few cases where it is, it is taken
for granted that Romanticism simply represents a moment, however important, in
the genesis of German Idealism, a solely preparatory moment, on the way
towards the mature systems of Schelling and Hegel? My aim in this chapter is to
present what Manfred Frank has called the 'philosophical foundations' of
Romanticism, and to present them in such a way as to make clear that the
philosophical impetus of thinkers such as Holderlin and Novalis is singularly
undervalued if seen only as a precursor to the greater things to come with
Idealism. Even if it is conceded, at this point, that the texts generally taken to be
7 An exception must here be made for the work of Manfred Frank who, as I will have the chance
to discuss during the course of the thesis, has been instrumental in kick-starting what can
confidently be called a new understanding of the philosophical import of early German
Romanticism.
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the prime theoretical examples of the Romantic movement (the Athenaum
fragments, Novalis' notebooks of 1797-98,Holderlin's theoretical writings of the
Homburg period) are not philosophical stricto sensu (and this is only a temporary
concession, intended to be retracted in the following chapters), Romanticism is
simply inconceivable without philosophy - to repeat the words of Philippe
Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, "Romanticism IS rigorously
comprehensible (or even accessible) only on a philosophical basis, in its proper
and in fact unique (in other words, entirely new) articulation with the
philosophical.,,8
In order to understand the importance of Romanticism's 'articulation with
the philosophical', it is necessary to retreat a few years from the 'mature'
writings of 1797-1800, and examine the Romantics' writings in a period which
can justifiably be called that of their philosophical formation: the years between
1794 and 1796. The key texts are Holderlin's fragment Seyn, Urtheil, and
Novalis' Fichte-Studten', but neither of them is comprehensible without a prior
discussion of the work of Fichte, a figure who, though not a 'Romantic', was
certainly the most important philosophical influence on the Romantics. The
focus is here on what can be called, after Aristotle, 'first philosophy', or
metaphysics, and it can be no coincidence that the beginning of the theoretical
trajectory undertaken by Novalis and Holderlin finds them writing and thinking
about metaphysics; more precisely, their beginnings as thinkers are immersed in
8 P. Lacoue-Labarthe & J.-L. Nancy, L 'absolu litteraire: theorie de la litterature du romantisme
allemand, Paris, Seuil, 1978. English translation: The Literary Absolute, trans. by P. Barnard and
C. Lester, SUNY, 1988, p. 29. References to this work shall always be to the English translation.
9 In this chapter only, exception is made of Schlegel, whose published writings in that period are
entirely philological, and whose philosophical notes in the years under consideration are scant.
Yet there can be no doubt that he was also engaging in the same philosophical readings (Kant,
Fichte, Spinoza) as the other two, as his correspondence with Novalis amply shows. In the next
chapter I will try to discuss some of Schlegel's more 'mature' fragments from the Athenaum
period as an 'articulation with the philosophical'.
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the thought of Being, or ontology. What emerges from an investigation of
Holderlin's and Novalis' 'responses' to Fichte is a thought of Being which,
though consistent with the philosophical vocabulary, methods, and concerns of
the time is also a radical departure from the 'classical' historical articulation of
the path leading from Kant to Hegel. Taking their 'cues' from Fichte's
Wissenschaftslehre, and in particular developing his nascent dialectical method,
and further elaborating on the transcendental framework erected by Kant, the
texts here under consideration are novel and important, particularly as they
attempt to begin philosophy, as Hegel will also do several years later, by taking
hold of the concept of Being. Furthermore, the thought of Being here seen as the
core of Romantic metaphysics is one that has no likeness in any of their more
philosophically established contemporaries' works and systems. The
ontological concerns outlined and discussed here, concerns with production,
difference, and representation, make it entirely possible to stake a claim for the
Romantics not having a true parallel until the arrival, more than a century later,
of Heideggerian 'differential ontology'. Thus my aim is not simply to show that,
contrary to conventional opinion, Romanticism is, in its very beginnings, at the
moment of its birth, as it were, already grappling with fundamental metaphysical
issues, not simply to show that Romanticism is 'grounded' in ontology, but also
to show the truly radical nature of this ontology. If, as has often been noted,
Romanticism as a movement in general (and by this, one chiefly means: as a
literary movement, in theory and in practice) was not of its time, this is also due -
even, I would suggest, primarily due - to the fact that its 'philosophical
foundations', its ontological/metaphysical bedrock, was also quite ahead of 'its'
time.
16
I.Fichte: Being, Activity, and Difference.
Any attempt to investigate what would constitute a 'Romantic
metaphysics' has to start with an examination of the system of Fichte's
Wissenschaftslehre. The reasons for this are numerous, and they range from the
biographical-incidental (the fact that lena in the mid-1790s, where Fichte first
took the post of professor of philosophy, was where Schlegel, Novalis, and
Holderlin all lived and studied, in the proximity and under the undeniable
influence of the newly-arrived professor), to the textual (Fichte is mentioned in
the correspondence of all three, as well as being the subject of a lengthy study by
Novalis, the immediate 'target' of one of Holderlin's first theoretical pieces, and
the object of praise from Schlegel well into the Athenaum years). If there is a
Romantic metaphysics, it is only an appropriation, a rearrangement, and, at
times, a disavowal of the Fichtean transcendental philosophy. In what follows, I
will single out the elements of Fichte's philosophy which Schlegel, Novalis, and
Holderlin took up and transformed into their own metaphysical doctrines.
Fichte's project in the Wissenschaftslehre is a foundationalist one, trying
as it is to establish the transcendental grounds upon which the edifice of the
'science of knowledge' is to be built. It should be noted from the start that if the
Romantics found something of use in the foundationalist project, that was its
17
failure. For Holderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel alike, the attempt to ground
philosophical knowledge, and thus every other science, on a set of axiomatic
principles from which everything else is to be deduced holds little appeal. This
can be partly explained by the philosophical climate of the time, as Fichte was
conceived to be going against the tide of gradual disaffection with the
foundationalism pioneered by his predecessor in the Jena professorship, K.
Reinhold. Similarly, one cannot doubt that the works of all three would have
been influenced by the reawakening of interest in Spinoza's philosophy brought
about by Jacobi's treatise.l'' However, as Schlegel's Athenaum fragment 216
attests, "Fichte's philosophy" was thought of as one of the "greatest tendencies
of the age", and it is only when this is taken into account along with the Spinozist
influences and anti-foundationalist drive of the Romantics that we can arrive at a
better understanding of their properly philosophical project.
Fichte's foundationalist task is to "discover the primordial, absolutely
unconditioned principle of all human knowledge"." This principle is the logical
formula "intended to express that Act which does not and cannot appear among
10 These two progenitors of Romantic metaphysics are singled out as such by Manfred Frank in
his 'Philosophical Foundations of Early Romanticism', in Ameriks & Sturm a, eds. 'The Modern
Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy' (SUNY, 1995). Frank takes it
for granted that Fichte's project is a deeply foundationalist one, but there are growing dissenting
voices on that matter among Fichte scholars. See in particular Tom Rockmore's
'Antifoundationalism, Circularity, and the Spirit of Fichte', in Breazeale & Rockmore, eds.,
'Fichte: Historical Contexts / Contemporary Controversies', (Humanities Press, 1994). The
volume also contains two 'responses' to Rockmore's position, in articles by D. Breazeale, and A.
Perrinjaquet. It needs to be noted that Rockmore's antifoundationalist reading of the 'spirit' (as
opposed to the foundationalist 'letter') of the Wissenschaflslehre is precisely the reading of the
Romantics, Schlegel and Novalis in particular, even though Rockmore makes no reference to
them. His radical double reading of a "foundationalist idea of grounded system and an
antifoundationalist idea of ungrounded system" (op.cit., p. 110) is then short-circuited by his own
insistence that it is a matter of deciding in favour of the antifoundationalist idea, on the dubious
grounds of its being at one with contemporary concerns. Without wanting to anticipate too much
of the discussion which follows later in this chapter, I wish simply to quote, in response,
Schlegel's Athenaum fragment 53: "It is equally fatal for the mind to have a system and to have
none. It will simply have to decide to combine the two."
II Fichte, The Science of Knowledge', trans. P. Heath & J. Lachs (Cambridge, 1982), p. 93. All
Fichte quotations, unless otherwise stated, are taken from this volume, and hereafter will be
abbreviated as W.
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the empirical states of our consciousness, but rather lies at the basis of all
consciousness and alone makes it possible."(W., p.93). From this alone one
understands that Fichte's purpose, as he more or less admits in the first
introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre, was to take one step beyond Kantian
transcendental epistemology and to establish the 'absolutely unconditioned'
transcendental principle which grounds consciousness - in Holderlin's words,
from a letter to Hegel dated January 1795, "he wants to move in theory beyond
the fact of consciousness" .12 Thus, with reference to Kant and his own
establishment of the transcendental conditions for experience, Fichte may be
seen as setting out the same conditions, but treating them, unlike Kant, as
themselves unconditioned. Leaving aside, for the moment, Holderlin's rather
disapproving tone and his re-interpretation of Fichte's principle only a couple of
lines later, what needs to be noted is that this principle as it is finally formulated
will haunt Romantic thinking for the years to come, precisely because, in a
certain Romantic reading, it dares to go "beyond the fact of consciousness" and
'reach out' to the unconditioned, the Absolute, as the Romantics will come to
call it, itself. The Romantics, as I will show, are interested in the Fichtean 'leap'
into the unconditioned or Absolute and its possible presentation. It is this leap
which can be said to give cues for an antifoundationalist reading of Fichte, if one
understands the unprovability of the unconditioned first principle as an explicit
denial of foundationalism. However, if potentially the foremost Fichtean advance
on Kantianism is that the Wissenschaftslehre can be thought of as attempting to
go beyond the conception of the transcendental subject as inherently limited,
Fichte's system is ultimately unable or unwilling to leave the domain of
12 Holderlin, 'Essays & Letters on Theory', trans. T.Pfau (SUNY 1988), p. 124.
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subjectivity, insofar as this is the domain of the transcendental, even if rendered
unconditioned and unlimited. Already an area of contention between an
'orthodox' Fichtean reading of the Wissenschaftslehre and a 'radical' Romantic
one begins to arise, in that what Holderlin tries to articulate as a 'beyond', what
Schlegel and Novalis will both interpret as a possible presentation of the
Absolute, is, for Fichte, merely a 'fuller', more faithful presentation of the
Kantian, transcendental realm. That "the entire Science of Knowledge, as a
transcendental science, neither can nor should go beyond the self' (W., p.218) is
already evident in the fact that Fichte's principle is also the foundation for the
Fichtean take on the transcendental subject: 1=1. How this subject differs from
Kant's is here of no immediate concern; for the Romantics, as Holderlin's letter
goes some way to show, what is at stake in Fichte's unconditioned principle is
both an opening up of Kantian metaphysics which would ultimately lead to the
mature systems of German idealism, in the formation of which Holderlin,
Novalis and Schlegel played no small part,13and also the fact that this opening
up will be read, counter to Fichte' s own programme, as a move beyond concerns
with consciousness and the subject. Holderlin's critique of Fichte, as 1will show
later, is based on the assumption of an Absolute removed from any notion of the
13 For the, by now undisputed, role Holderlin's thought played upon the formation of Hegel's
speculative idealism see D.Henrich, 'The Course of Remembrance and other Essays on
Holderlin'(Stanford, 1997). For Novalis, see Manfred Frank's comment (in Ameriks & Sturm a,
op.cit., p. 74) that "these reflections [Novalis' Fichtestudien] open up nothing less than an
independent course of idealist speculation." Though Henrich treats Holderlin's early theoretical
fragments as part of the 'royal route' to the mature idealism of Hegel and Frank is keener to see
Novalis as carving an eccentric path away from Hegel and Schelling, both interpretations finally
fail to give an account of exactly how eccentric and 'independent' the Romantics truly were, and
this possibly because their radical reworking of Fichteanism is not fully considered. In Frank's
case, I would like to note, without wanting to pre-empt the discussion which follows in this
chapter, that even though there are considerable critical advantages in considering the progeny, or
the 'foundations' of early Romanticism to lie with the post-Kantian, and anti-Fichtean (at least as
Frank explicitly reads it) anti-foundationalist drive, imbued with a renewed interest in Spinozism
announced by Jacobi, to claim that Romanticism therefore represents a trend away from and
against Fichte is simply misguided. It is more the case that HOlder lin, Novalis, and Schlegel alike
transformed Fichteanism into their own metaphysics, as the rest of this chapter aims to show.
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subject, and Novalis' and Schlegel's fragments are applying Fichte's concepts
and methodology whilst disregarding Fichte's dictate that the Science move not
beyond the subject.
Moreover, the most important trait that the Romantics discerned in
Fichte's principle, what they saw as a radical leap from foundationalist
epistemology and transcendental subjectivity alike, was also something Fichte
himself would not, could not have allowed - it can be called the ontological turn.
Fichte is clearly at pains to demonstrate that, within the system of the
Wissenschaftslehre, Being can only be related to the unconditioned principle 1=1,
that there is no more fundamental way of thinking Being than Being-I, and
consequently he reduces the ontological import of the system to the
establishment of absolute subjectivity, yet the principle itself is posited as the
ground for all consciousness in so far as it posits itself. "To posit oneself and to
be are, as applied to the self, perfectly identical. Thus the proposition, 'I am
because I have posited myself can also be stated as: 'I am absolutely, because I
am"'.(W., p.99) Considering that the entirety of the system is 'applied to the
self, it is clear that what is stated in the above proposition is the proposition of
Being itself, of being as positing, and of being as positing-I. In other words,
Being, for Fichte is dramatically reduced to the positing of BeingJor and oJthe I.
As Werner Hamacher writes, "Fichte's proposition is the thesis of
ontotheseology't.l" This, in a sense, is only following from Kant who famously
identified Being with positing in, inter alia, The One Possible Basis of Truthfor
a Demonstration oj the Existence of God.IS Yet Fichte's contribution to, and
divergence from the history of 'ontotheseology' is that Being is established as
14 Werner Hamacher, 'Position Exposed' in Premises, (Stanford, 1996), p 231.
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positing, as positing-I, and as 1- positing its own identity with itself. I am, in so
far as I posit myself as identical to myself. From Kant's ontotheseology, we
have now arrived at onto-theseo-tautology, and Being is thus established not
merely as positing but as positing of self-identity. As will be shown later, it is
from this complex ontological structure that the Romantics will diverge in order
to extract their own ontology, but for the moment it is enough to note that for
Holderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel, albeit in slightly different ways, the Fichtean
unconditioned principle is an ontological principle, the unconditioned given, and
given-as-posited, of Being.
Another aspect of Fichte's philosophy which will be indispensable for an
understanding of Romantic metaphysics is his method of deriving his
fundamental principles from each other and then deducing the subsequent
categories of knowledge in the Wissenschaftslehre. In most of the literature on
the matter it is conceded that Fichte's method was pivotal in the development of
what would become the idealist dialectical method'", insofar as the
Wissenschaflslehre moves in an almost dialectical fashion from thesis to
antithesis to synthesis in the presentation of its principles. Nevertheless it is
necessary to note another element, which will become indispensable to the
movements of thought within Romantic metaphysics, and which signals an all-
important difference from Hegelian dialectics. Where the movement from thesis
to antithesis to synthesis is paramount and unbroken throughout the dialectical
exposition of both the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Logic, the
Wissenschaflslehre finds its beginning in an already synthetic proposition, the 1=1
IS See Hamacher, op.cit., footnote to p.231.
16Detailed explorations of this point can be found in R.Makkreel, "Fichte's Dialectical
Imagination"and T. M. Seebohm, "Fichte's Discovery of Dialectical Method", both in Breazale
& Rockmore, op. cit. Seebohm's article is particularly useful for the analysis which follows.
22
as principle of identity, and then proceeds to analyse it into the two principles for
which it serves as foundation, "the principle of opposition" or -I is not = 1 and
"the grounding principle" of divisibility (W., p.120). Both the second and third
of the fundamental principles find their ground in the synthetic, unconditioned
first principle, but the analysis also shows the third principle of divisibility to be
the grounding principle inasmuch as it is what makes the opposition constitutive
of the second principle possible, and is thus indirectly presupposed by the
synthesis of the first principle.!" As early critics of Fichte, among them
Holderlin, pointed out, the movement is oddly circular in that it shows both
analysis and synthesis presupposing each other. Moreover, this circularity can be
said to be disabling for any foundationalist claims made for the first principle
which, though unconditioned, is an unconditioned synthesis of necessarily
divisible elements. IS Fichte's 'first' principle is not simply'!' but '1=1', and
Fichte himself necessarily introduces the concept of analysis (though, it has to be
noted, the word 'analysis' is not, in this instance, used by Fichte - it is the
process whereby the synthetic principles are shown to be conditioned on one
another that 1 call 'analysis') as a movement of thought co-dependent with that of
synthesis. As it will be shown, Holderlin's starting point in his critique of Fichte
is precisely the circular logic of analysis and synthesis within identity, whereas
for Novalis and Schlegel, the 'grounding' principle of divisibility serves as the
key methodological tool propelling their own movements of thought.
17 Following the rigorous formal-logical analysis of the exposition of the principles by T.M
Seebohm, one can even arrive at the conclusion that the second principle (of opposition) is
already presupposed by the first: "the second principle was, from the very beginning, implied in
the discovery of the first principle"(Breazeale & Rockmore, op.cit., p. 27).
18 On circularity and the threat it poses to the epistemological foundationalism of the
Wissenschaftslehre, see the articles by Breazeale, Perrinjaquet, and Rockmore in Breazale &
Rockmore,op.cif.
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The fundamental unconditioned principle 1=1 is a principle of identity
directly parallel to the logical Aristotelian proposition of identity, or A=A, which
is, Fichte writes "a judgment ... an activity of the human mind" (W., p.97). Since
this activity is grounded on the positing of an I, a human mind, it follows that the
I is posited, and it is posited as existing, and its existence is posited as the ground
for the judgment of identity. In Fichte's words: "The selfs own positing of itself
is thus its own pure activity. The self posits itself, and by virtue of this mere self-
assertion it exists; and conversely, the self exists and posits its own existence by
virtue of merely existing" (W., p. 97). The absolute self-positing of the self as
existing, in other words ontotheseology, is what yields the tauto-logical principle
of identity, which then applies to the existing self. Within Fichte's framework,
the absolute positing of existence entails the positing of identity in that which
posits, is posited, and exists; ontotheseology is dependent upon tautology; the
meaning of the copula, as Fichte states boldly himself (W., p.94) is identity, or in
other words, Being = Being identical. Yet if this is truly to become a
foundationalist epistemology and a 'science' of consciousness and self-
consciousness, Fichte must allow for a not-I, an object-world to the I-subject, and
this he does with the principle of opposition and the principle of divisibility. The
former states that ~I is not = I, and it is posited as absolutely as the first principle.
The contradiction between the two principles when applied to the self could not
be more obvious: on the one hand, the I is posited absolutely as identical with
itself, and on the other, the not-I is posited absolutely as its opposite, which is to
say as the opposite of the same absolutely posited I. In order to resolve the
opposition through synthesis, it is necessary to mobilise the concept of a limit, of
24
both I and not-I, imposed respectively to one another by one another.l" This
concept in itself entails that I and not-I are inherently divisible and capable of
being limited, although still being posited absolutely. In Fichte's words: "In the
self I oppose a divisible not-self to the divisible self' (W., p.ll 0). The circular
argument proves that the establishment of the absolute identity of the 1=1 is
dependent upon the logically at least co-existent establishment of divisibility
within that identity. Furthermore, Fichte argues that the absolute positing of I and
not-I is not affected by the principle of divisibility, as they are both posited
absolutely, and posited as absolutely divisible. What this means is that the
establishment of Being as posited is also the establishment of Being as posited-
divisible, absolutely.
However what is at stake here is more than the absolute posited-ness of
Being, or the absolute divisibility of the self. For what the tautological
proposition of ontological identity, the 1=1must necessarily allow for is its self-
limitation, its divisibility, ultimately the analysis of the tautology into its
synthetic parts. In this sense, the copula of identity expresses far more, and far
less, than the simple logical symbol '=' allows. It expresses the necessity for the
analysis and separation of identity in its two identical parts. For the I to be = to
itself, it must also be analysed, broken down to the two "Is" on either side of the
copula, it must become the other of itself as itself in order to be identical with
itself. This is pivotal to the whole mechanism of the movement of thought in the
Wissenschaflslehre, but it is an indication that within the very movement
establishing identity as the fundamental ontological principle there lies the
opening up (in John Sallis's term borrowed from Jacques Derrida, the spacing)
19 It is worthy of note that this is precisely, albeit in admittedly grander scope and greater detail,
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of a difference. What I will maintain is that the single most important rubric
under which Romantic metaphysics may be placed stems directly from this
Fichtean 'discovery'j", and this can be called a metaphysics or an ontology of
differenctng", It is some irony that the philosopher most closely associated with
the concept of self-identity should end up as an originator of a philosophy of
difference, but there can be little doubt that it was this inaugural opening to
difference within the same that the Romantics appropriated from the
Wissenschaftslehre, in ways which will be analysed in what follows. Fichte
himself, allowing for the absolute self to be absolutely divisible is a means to
making possible that the I be determined by something outside it, and thus that
the I be seen as theoretically limited. His boldest formulation of the difference
immanent in identity comes towards the end of the treatise:
"[T]he self must originally and absolutely posit in itself the possibility of
something operating upon it; without detriment to its absolute positing of itself, it
must leave itself open, as it were, to some other positing. Hence, if ever a
difference was to enter the self, there must already have been a difference in the
self as such; and this difference, indeed, would have had to be grounded in the
absolute self as such."(W., p.239-240)
the movement of thought of the beginning of Hegel's Logic, which goes some way towards
showing the Fichtean origins of the speculative dialectic.
20 It is not a discovery as such, of course. If anything, it is the rediscovery of one of the oldest
metaphysical 'puzzles', that of the Heraclitean 'en diaferein eauto', and its reappropriation from
within the contemporary standpoint of transcendental ontology.
21 The neologism will be clearly explained later, in the section on Novalis. For the moment it is
used simply to differentiate between the ontology at stake here, and the Heideggerian thought of
the ontico-ontological difference which is more commonly cited as an 'ontology of difference'.
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Some years later, when Fichte re-writes the Wissenschaftslehre with a 'new
method' ("nova methodo") of presentation, he calls this the "original duality
(ursprungliche Duplicitaet) of the subject-object't''', given that we understand his
term 'subject-object' to designate the absolute I of the first version of the book.
For the Romantics however, original duality becomes a dominant theme,
evidenced both in the early theoretical writings of Holderlin, and in Novalis'
Fichtestudien, and it will become the theoretical bedrock upon which Schlegel
will establish his philosophical and, what is more, his poetological theories.
The same duality can be said to inhere in Fichte's most original concept,
that of the Tathandlung, the active deed, or, as he defines it, the "Act (... ) [the]
pure activity which presupposes no object, but itself produces it, and in which the
acting, therefore, immediately becomes the deed." (W., p.42). The Tathandlung
is the foundational act of self-consciousness whereby the absolute I comes to be
posited in its identity, as both subject and object of (self-) consciousness.
Nevertheless, it is also the act wherein the I performs the same doubling as in its
unconditioned principle of identity; it is action (Handlung), and deed (Tat) at the
same time, the doing and the deed done, at once the positing self and the self
being posited. The Act is clearly a synthetic one, and a foundational synthesis as
such, since without it none of the subsequent logical movements of the
Wissenschaftslehre would be possible, but, following Fichte' s own logical
schema of presentation of concepts, it necessarily allows for analytic treatment.
This is pivotal, for it will allow Fichte to introduce the concept of reflection, and
22 Fichte, 'Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) Nova Methodo',
trans. D. Breazeale, (Cornell, 1992) p.365. The transitions between the different re-writings of
the Wissenschaftslehre , and its Introductions, throughout the 1790s cannot be ana'lsed in detail
here, although the crucial introduction of the term 'Intellectual Intuition' in the 2" Introduction
of 1797 is taken up later, in the section on Holderlin in this chapter. For more details on the
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consequently to manipulate its usage in two distinct areas, that of theoretical and
practical knowledge. The Acts of the I in both cases will always be synthetic,
but "the reflection which postulates them is analytic." (W., p.121). The
Tathandlung establishes the I as synthetically united with the not-I in the
inaugural act of self-consciousness, but for the distinction between theoretical
knowledge, where "the I posits itself as determined by the not-I", and practical
knowledge, where "the I posits itself as determining the not-I" (W., p.218) to
take place, the reflection, that is the analysis of the synthetic Act into its
components, must be limited by a check (Anstoft) in the former case, and must
remain unlimited in the latter. The I of theoretical knowledge, itself the product
of reflection on the originary synthetic act, reflects analytically upon the acts of
knowing the world around it as object or not-I, but must be checked so that the
existence of that world, and its activity of determination upon the I itself be
established both as real and as objective (otherwise Fichte's would be a
solipsistically idealist system). The I of practical knowledge on the other hand,
and in conformity with Kant, must remain limitless in the face of its advancing
synthetic (moral) Acts, so that the concept of the I's absolute freedom is secured.
The confusing but necessary reciprocal duality of theoretical and practical
knowledge is perhaps better elaborated in the Wissenschaftslehre Nova Methodo
of 1796-1799where Fichte manages to express, in GiZoller's words, "the mutual
requirement of practice or action and theory or cognition'v''' What remains
crucial is that the very inaugurating self-activity of the I, the Tathandlung, is a
synthetic act that yields to the necessary movements of analysis by reflection, a
concept that the Romantics will inherit from Fichte but will alter considerably.
Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo see G.Z6I1er, 'Original Duality: the Ideal and the Real in
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If the Tathandlung is the original synthetic act which yields the absolute
subject and establishes the principle of identity, it should clearly share the
principle's ontological determination. In a certain reading, therefore, the
Tathandlung designates the original act which founds Being as being-posited and
being-identical. However the Tathandlung is not the mere act of positing, and
thus not merely a cypher for ontotheseology, but rather designates the active
deed of positing, the activity and the product of the activity of positing. Most
importantly, the Tathandlung also becomes the foundational establishment of
Being in Fichte's system since there is no moment of Being available to the I
which would be prior to this foundational Act. Being, then, for Fichte, is Act.
John Sallis has argued that "that the I means act means, ... , that it is distinct
from being, that it has no being proper, that it is not something which is active,
not an active being.,,24In this sense, and Fichte goes some way in arguing this,
the I as Tathandlung is not a being, or quite simply is not. Yet, though this is
true on an ontic level, insofar as the I as Tathandlung does not 'possess' being, is
not (yet) a being, on an ontological level what the Tathandlung names is Being
as Act, the Being-Act of the absolute I without which nothing can be granted
being, without which there are no beings. The Tathandlung then, is Being as
verb, and as verb-Act, not being as a noun, a determinate entity. Thus, in a
certain reading espoused by the Romantics but which is not something Fichte
would himself allow, Being in the Wissenschaftslehre is not so much established
as the positing of identity, as it is disclosed as the Act of the I producing itself.
What for Fichte still needs to be ontologically circumscribed as the positing of
Fichte's transcendental theory of the subject' in Ameriks & Sturma, op.cit.
23 Ibid., p.121.
24 John Sallis, op.cit., p.49.
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Being of the I and for the I, becomes, for the Romantics, an understanding of
Being as such as self-production, as the Act that produces itself.
This further ontological mark of the Wissenschaftslehre is of paramount
importance to Romantic metaphysics, insofar as, I will maintain, the latter is a
metaphysics, or an ontology, of production. Fichte himself touches upon the
issue of production mainly in relation to the work of the productive imagination,
and this will be taken up by Novalis' radical reconfiguration of the ontological
horizon of the Wissenschaftslehre. It is when it comes to the knowledge of the
practical that Fichte speaks of the "absolute productive power" of the I (W.,
p.195), a power which is essential to the possibility of the presentation of the I by
itself as infinite activity, what Fichte calls the striving I. This bears some
similarity to the founding act of the Tathandlung - the I is capable of arriving at
a presentation of itself in (non-immediate) self-consciousness only because it is
Tathandlung, it is the Act of Being-produced. Yet this should not be taken as an
indication that the I of the Tathandlung is merely a product; it is, at once, the
producing and the product, the activity and the deed which it enacts and
produces, always already doubled into producer and product, and always already
synthetically reunited in the activity and the deed of production. Indeed, if the
Romantics took anything from Fichte's repositioning of Being as activity, and
from the concept of the Tathandlung, it is surely the notion of the doubling of
this activity, which Fichte elaborated into the distinction between the activity of
the positing I in theoretical and that of the striving I in practical knowledge, or, to
follow the terms of the Wissenschaflslehre Nova Methodo, between the ideal and
the real activity of the I. This doubling can also be seen as the necessary
reciprocation between, on the one hand, reflection in the theoretical sphere
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(where reflection means analysis of synthetic principles with the aim to establish
an objective reality, and for the Romantics at least, infinite analysis of synthetic
principles as sheer potency of thought), and production in the practical sphere
(where production designates the infinite activity - of the I for Fichte though not,
as will be shown, for Schlegel and Novalis - the activity which has its end in the
realisation of practical freedom). In any case, it is only after such a reading of
Fichte, a reading emphasising the 'original duality' of the unconditioned
principle of identity and of the Tathandlung, the founding Act-of-Being alike, a
reading which allows for the opening of a difference endlessly proliferating itself
in reflection, on the one hand, and endlessly producing its own form as
production, on the other, that we can start to investigate Romantic metaphysics in
all its radical philosophical eccentricity.
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II. BeyondFichteI: Holderlm's Seyn, Urtheil.
It is not without significance that the first text in the line of Romantic
metaphysics proper would be fragmentary, and mysterious. Written in the spring
of 1795, it has been attributed to Holderlin (first by Friedrich BeiBner, in the
Grope Stuttgarter Ausgabe where it was first published), though not without
arousing concerns about its authorship.f under the title Urtheil und Seyn. It
consists of two fragments on opposite sides of a single sheet of paper, one on
Seyn, and one on Urtheil, and, in the Grope Frankfurter Ausgabe their order has
been switched over, with its title becoming Seyn, Urtheil. It is the section on
judgment which represents, as all commentators agree, the critique of Fichte
which I take to be the earliest written specimen of Romantic metaphysics.i"
Such a critique is already being voiced in a letter of Holderlin's to Hegel,
in January 1795:
25 For a detailed, and by all accounts persuasive exposition of those concerns and for their
eventual 'resolution', see Dieter Henrich, "Holderlin on Judgment and Being: a Study in the
History of the Origins of German Idealism", in op.cit., pp. 71-89. I am not here concerned with
problems of authorship and chronology, and I take the word of experts such as BeiBner and
Henrich as given. I only wish to draw attention to the fragmentary, mysterious and disputable
nature of the text for reasons which, as I hope will become clear, are connected to the essentials,
and the form, of Romantic thinking in general. For a reading of those disputes which, in its
attention to the doubling of intentions, decisions, and concepts in the 'debate' and in the fragment
itself, remains suggestive, even perhaps Romantic, see Andrzej Warminski, 'Readings in
Interpretation: Holderlin, Hegel, Heidegger' (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1987),rr 4-11.
I wish here to make a claim for the fragment being 'Romantic metaphysics' as well as, though
curiously also instead of 'the Origin of Idealism', as Heinrich reads it. He argues, convincingly,
that the fragment is indispensable in the history of thought leading up to Hegelian dialectics, and
I am in no way denying this. Yet to me it is more important to see the fragment as the bedrock of
Romantic metaphysics both because of its critique of Fichte which, though it cannot be claimed
that Novalis and Schlegel were directly informed by it, still remains fundamentally their critique
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"[Fichte's] absolute I (= Spinoza's Substance) contains all reality; it is
everything, and outside of it there is nothing; hence there is no object for this' I',
for otherwise not all reality would be within it; however a consciousness without
object cannot be thought, and if I myself am this object, then I am as such
necessarily restricted, even if it were only within time, hence not absolute;
therefore within the absolute 'I' no consciousness is conceivable; as absolute 'I' I
have no consciousness, and insofar as I have no consciousness I am (for myself)
nothing, hence is the absolute I (for me) nothing.'.27
Though it can be said that Holderlin here admirably captures the
movement of (self-) limitation which will give Fichte's absolute I its
determination as consciousness, and it can even be argued that, from Fichte's
perspective, there is a fundamental flaw in thinking the absolute I as
consciousness", those Holderlinian criticisms, which, broadly speaking, are
coming from a Kantian heritage, are made extraordinary by the simple equation
in parenthesis: "= Spinoza's Substance". It is this thought of the unlikely
combination of Fichtean and Spinozist principles, and their transformation by
each other, that will be the crux of much of Romantic metaphysics. This is not to
say that Holderlin criticises Fichtefrom the perspective of a Spinozist. It is to say
that he views Fichte's absolute I, if it is to remain absolute, as nothing other than
the old dogmatist's prime concept. In Seyn, Urtheil itself, there is no talk of
of Fichte too, and because of the reading of the concept of Being which follows, again pivotal for
Novalis and Schlegel's thoughts on the matter.
27 Holderlin, op.cit., p. 125.
28 This has been argued by, amongst others, Thomas Pfau, in his introduction to Holderlin, op.cit.
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Spinoza, but it is here that Holderlin's critique of Fichte's absolute 1comes to the
fore. For Fichte, and specifically the Fichte of the Grundlage of 1794, the
absolute 1 is the site of absolute unity and identity, as is the case with the
fundamental principle of identity 1=1;this expresses the necessary and originary
connection between subject and object in the sphere of the absolute I, what
Fichte will come to call, in the Wissenschaftslehre Nova Methodo of 1797, the
"subject-object". For Holderlin in 1795, however, the connection between
subject and object is seen in a twofold manner, and a distinction made between
two opposed types of connection corresponding to the Being and the Judgment of
the (editorially imposed) title. On the one side of the fly-leaf:
"Being (Seyn) - expresses the connection between subject and object.
Where subject and object are simply, in a word (schlechthin), and not only in part
united, that is, united in such a manner that no separation could be performed
without violating the essence of what is to be separated, there and nowhere else
can one speak of simple Being (Seyn schlechthin), as is the case with intellectual
intuition."
And, on the other side:
"Judgment (Urthei/), in the highest and strictest sense, is the original
separation of object and subject which are most deeply united in intellectual
intuition, that separation through which alone object and subject become
possible, the originary division (Ur-theilung)."
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So, on the one hand, Being would be what expresses the connection
between subject and object in such a manner that they cannot be thought of as
separated, the absolute connection without the possibility of division; whereas,
on the other hand, Judgment is the connection between subject and object insofar
as this connection necessarily allows for the separation of the two, or insofar as
this connection is originally and necessarily a disjunction. And Holderlin's
critique of Fichte consists precisely in pointing out that the 1=1is categorised as
the exemplary form of disjunction, of judgment. The section on Being continues:
"If I say: I am I, the subject ("I") and the object ("I") are not united in such a way
that no separation could be performed without violating the essence of what is to
be separated; on the contrary, the 1 is only possible by means of this separation of
the I from the I." In the section on Judgment, on the other side of the sheet of
paper, Holderlin goes on to write: " "I am I" is the most fitting example of this
concept of originary division (Ur-theilung)". As a critique of Fichte, therefore,
the fragment can be read in two non-opposed ways: firstly, as indicating that
Fichte's absolute first principle is not absolute nor first, since, for Holderlin, the
proposition of identity expresses a disjunctive connection between subject and
object and not the synthetic originary identity Fichte requires; and secondly, that
the originary conjunctive relation between subject and object, a relation where it
would make no sense to speak of subject and object as separated, is to be sought
elsewhere, in Seyn schlechthin, simple Being. What transpires from the first
reading is, in some senses, an extreme faithfulness to Fichte's own insights on
the absolute divisibility of the 1=1, his own third, and grounding, principle of
divisibility. Furthermore, it is an insight which Fichte himself will make
systematic in the future presentations of the Wissenschaftslehre, where he will
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speak of the 'original duality' of the 'I am I' - though there is no reason even to
suspect that Fichte ever glanced at Holderlin's fragment. What transpires from
the second reading is, perhaps, what Holderlin, in the same letter to Hegel, sees
Fichte as doing - that is going 'beyond the simple fact of consciousness'. A
controversial statement when used about Fichte, it is perhaps less so when one
considers what Holderlin means by Seyn schlechthin, and in any case throws into
precise relief the 'ontological turn' operated on the Wissenschaftslehre by the
Romantics.
One cannot ascertain from the fragment's own words whether Being, in
Holderlin's sense, is indeed beyond consciousness altogether; one can, however,
easily infer that it is beyond the consciousness defined as the consciousness of an
I as subject and as object, as this is the exemplary instantiation of the realm of
Urtheil. One can also infer, consequently, that the position of subject and object,
as always already separated from one another, is only possible from within
Judgment - or, in other words, whenever there is talk of subject and object qua
themselves, we are always already within judgment. Yet Holderlin complicates
the relation between connection and separation, for he asserts: "In the concept of
separation, there lies already the concept of the reciprocity of object and subject
and the necessary presupposition of a whole of which object and subject form the
parts." Before examining what form this 'whole', the plenitude of Seyn
schlechthin, can take, the implications of such an ontological position for
philosophical method have to be examined. What is undoubtedly true if one
follows Holderlin is that subject and object are positions possible only from
within the realm of separation and judgment. Yet, at the same time, the very
realm of separation from which subject and object become possible is itself only
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made possible when thought as presupposing the realm of absolute connection,
Seyn schlechthin. The question, which cannot be answered purely by examining
the fragment itself, and which consequently allows for a certain interpretative
decision, is the following: does that schema of connection and separation, and of
reciprocal co-implication of Being and Judgment allow us to think of Being as a
pre-originary position which somehow turns into the originary separation of
Judgment? Or, does it give grounds to thinking that Being is somehow present,
perhaps even approachable from within the always already separated realm of
objects and subjects? To put it in different terms, is Holderlin here telling us a
story which will later be told all the more forcefully in the dialectical moves of
Hegelian logic? Or is he providing us with Being as the transcendental condition
of possibility for judgment, subject, and object alike, which would make him
more faithfully, though not in the least straightforwardly, Kantian? The question
can only be adequately broached after a careful reading of what it is that
Holderlin means by Being; yet a preliminary remark is here necessary, and it
constitutes one answer to the question posed above. Whatever Being turns out to
be, the fragment is firm in stating that it is a necessary presupposition, a
condition of possibility for the activities classed under judgment, and that
includes the positions of subject and object. Consequently, from within those
positions, Being as pre-originary connection is indeed presupposed, yet at the
same time it is in the strictest sense unapproachable, since these positions are
necessarily classed under the concept of originary division. For a subject (and in
an object), Being is presupposed both as the condition of possibility for said
subject (or object)'s ground, and at the same time presupposed in a manner
which makes direct access to this ground of the subject (or object) impossible -
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save for the possibility of an "intellectual intuition". For the subject and for the
object alike, Being turns out to be a quasi-transcendental.
There is, however, a 'case' (Fal!), where one can speak of Seyn
schlechthin, there is, indeed, a possible third answer to the question "what is
Being" - intellectual intuition, where "object and subject are most deeply
united". Intellectual intuition is, in the strictest sense, the intuition of Seyn
schlechthin, or, which is the same thing, Seyn schlechthin is the 'object' of
intellectual intuition, its given. Yet the term is far from unambiguous, and in
some senses creates more problems for the interpretation of this text than it
resolves. The notion of intellectual intuition has a troubled history, starting from
mediaeval theology, and adopted into rationalism by Leibniz29• With Kant, the
term comes to designate an impossibility. In contrast with sensible intuition of
objects as phenomena, a (hypothetical) divine intuition which would produce the
objects it intuits'", or intellectual intuition, is the intuition of a noumenon
understood 'positively' as "an object of non-sensible intuition", and if we were to
assume it, Kant asserts, "then we assume a special kind of intuition, .., which,
however, is not our own, and the possibility of which we cannot understand"!'.
Kant's intellectual intuition, therefore, is impossible for us precisely because it
would mean going 'beyond the fact of consciousness'. When Fichte introduces
the term in the second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre, in 1797, it comes
to designate the originary intuitive act which forms "the only firm standpoint for
all philosophy. From thence we can explain everything that occurs in
consciousness; and moreover, only from thence" (W., p.41). Fichte explains his
29 These elements on the history of the term are primarily taken from Thomas Pfau's Introduction
to Holderlin, op.cit., pp.22-23.
30 Kant, Critique of Pure reason, trans. P. Guyer & A. Wood, Cambridge 1997, B 145. All
references to the CPR are to this edition and will be made according to the German pagination.
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position vis-a-vis Kant in the following way: "The intellectual intuition alluded
to in the Science of Knowledge refers, not to existence at all, but rather to action,
and simply finds no mention in Kant" (W., p.46). Fichte is not concerned with
the possibility of the existence of things-in-themselves; rather, he is grounding
the whole enterprise of the Wissenschaftslehre on his own definition of
intellectual intuition as nothing other than the Tathandlung itself: intellectual
intuition is "the immediate consciousness that I act, and what I enact; it is that
whereby I know something because I do it. We cannot prove from consciousness
that this power of intellectual intuition exists, nor evolve from them what it may
be. Everyone must discover it immediately in himself."(W., p.38) Fichte's
intellectual intuition is the intuition acting out, and acted out by, the
Tathandlung, it is not provable within the conceptual confines of consciousness,
but it grounds consciousness; it does not refer to the existence of a thing in
consciousness but rather is the action which produces consciousness. Thus
Fichte goes 'beyond the fact of consciousness' not into Being or existence, but
into action, the Tathandlung as foundation and ground for consciousness.
For Holderlin, intellectual intuition is neither impossible nor, strictly
speaking, grounding. If it is the intuition which would yield Being, it cannot be
the intuition of a subject, since the position of a subject is only possible from
within judgment and separation. As the intuition of a 'whole' that cannot be
thought of as separated, intellectual intuition is not a part of judgment, and
consequently cannot be sought in the subject. There is evidence that Holderlin
did indeed think such an intuition possible, even necessary. In a letter to
Niethammer of February 1796, he writes of wanting "to discover the principle
31 CPR, B 307.
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which explains to me the divisions in which we think and exist, yet which is also
capable of dispelling the conflict between subject and object", and all this "in
intellectual intuition'v" The tenor of the letter at this point is decidedly Fichtean,
Holderlin expressing the same wish to 'discover' the fundamental principle of
human knowledge as Fichte does at the beginning of the Grundlage. Yet
nowhere does Holderlin attribute this intuition to a subject, transcendental or,
even less so, empirical. The Fichtean notion of intellectual intuition as
Tathandlung is also an impossibility for Holderlin, since it presupposes, or rather
it is nothing other than, the intuition of the 'I am I', and thus falls within the
realm of judgment. It would appear that intellectual intuition, for Holderlin,
could be something akin to the Kantian regulative ideal, a necessary possibility
and presupposition (as the intuition of Being) for every judgment, yet not, it
would seem, itself approachable from within the realm of judgment, and thus
consequently not the intuition of a subject. In the end, the most that can be said
with any certainty about Holderlin's notion of intellectual intuition is that it is the
intuition of Seyn schlechthin, the 'of to be read as a curiously disjunctive double
genitive. It is the intuition which yields Being (objective genitive) - in which
case it is not the intuition of an empirical or a transcendental subject, and we
would be hard pushed to imagine who or what 'possesses' it. It is the intuition of
Being (subjective genitive) - in which case what intuits is the pre-originary,
indivisible connection of subject and object and all it can presumably intuit is
itself, which makes no room for object or subject.
Perhaps it would be better to attempt to determine what Seyn schlechthin
means for Holderlin, Yet, any positive determination of Being is inexorably
32 Holderlin, op.cit., pp. 131-132.
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caught up in the bind of intellectual intuition, since this is the only means of
directly approaching it. It is unclear from the fragment itself that Holderlin
thinks that intellectual intuition actually occurs rather than being hypothesised as
a regulative ideal. If a reading of the fragment decides that Holderlin takes
intellectual intuition as actually occurring, then a positive and direct approach to
Seyn schlechthin has been found; if, however, one does not make this decision,
and decides rather to leave the possibility of intellectual intuition as ambiguous
as it appears, as I am doing here, then the route to such a determination or
definition of Holderlin's Being is, of necessity, negative. The fragment itself
provides a significant cue to such a determination, as the section on Being closes
off with the formulation: "Identity is not = to Absolute Being", an idea which lies
at the core of Romantic metaphysics in general. Identity, which since Fichte
must be seen as exemplified in the fundamental principle I = I, is classified under
Urtheil, a product of an originary division, and a concept whose use only reigns
over the already divided subject and object. Identity, more so the exemplary
identity of Fichte's fundamental principle, is a concept designating the
connection of subject and object only insofar as this connection presupposes, and
emanates from within, the originary separation of subject and object, and in this
way it clearly becomes a secondary concept. Being is the sphere where the
originary separation does not apply, and identity consequently is not a concept
capable of approaching it. Again, we must ask: what is Being? The prevalent
interpretation of the fragment is Dieter Henrich's':', who reads Spinoza into
Holderlin and thinks of the Being spoken of here as, fundamentally, a variation
on Spinozist substance, thus at least tacitly deciding that intellectual intuition is
33 In Henrich, op.cit., pp. 71-89.
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postulated in the fragment as possible, and as actually occurring": Being, in
Henrich's reading, is not identity because it is rigorously pre-identical, both
logically and temporally. Henrich's analysis of the intricate net of mutual
presupposition between original separation (Urtheil), and pre-original connection
(Seyn) tilts the balance towards the primacy of connection, and of Being. In his
celebrated reading he makes much use of Isaak von Sinclair's Philosophische
Raisonnements of 1796, reading them back into Holderlin's earlier fragment,
coming up with a Spinozist conception of Being as pre-identical, and a-thetic.
Being cannot itself be posited, for all positing results from division and Ur-
theilung; it is thus not to be found in the Fichtean schema of positing and
identity, and must be (pre)supposed to come before consciousness - in which
case, as Henrich asserts, "if philosophical reasons should arise for assuming an
absolute prior to all consciousness, one must then distinguish it from all
consciousness. One would therefore do well not to call it misleadingly'!' and to
give it unequivocally the function of Spinoza's substance.,,35As a highlighting of
the Holderlinian 'critique' of Fichte, this reading cannot but be right;
nevertheless, the Being Henrich leaves us with may come before identity, but its
designation as "a-thesis", or "peace" is merely an interpretative decision on
Henrich's part, and one which is clearly made to fit with the Spinozan reading he
undertakes. Moreover, Henrich seems to be ascribing to Holderlin a type of
'ontological foundationalism' which not only appears as 'stronger' than that of
Fichte, but which seems to decide that access to Being is directly and actually
possible through intellectual intuition whereas, without intellectual intuition, the
34 An interpretation which also runs along similar lines (and acknowledges Henrich's precedent)
is Frederic Beiser's, in his chapter on Holderlin in his German Idealism: the Struggle against
Subjectivism, Cambridge, Mass; Harvard University Press, 2002.
35 Henrich, op.cit., p.86.
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very ground of judgment is paradoxically only accessible indirectly (and
negatively) through judgment. In other words, Henrich's designation of
Holderlin's Being as "a-thetic" bypasses what in my reading I termed the 'quasi-
transcendental' character of Being, making Holderlin's Being into a 'simple'
ground for the operations of judgment, or a mere pre-originary 'position' before
judgement and before identity.
There is, however, as I have already indicated, another possible reading
of Holderlin's notion of Being, one that does not take "not = to identity" as
meaning before, or only before identity. For this one must take a closer look at
the exact letter, which is to say the rhetoric, of the fragment, rather than having
to make the interpretative decisions that Henrich makes on the basis of the
shadowy status of intellectual intuition. What the section on Judgment begins
with is a straightforward definition of its subject, complete with a copula:
"Judgment ... is the original separation... ". What the section on Being begins
with is not a definition: "Being expresses the connection of subject and object"
("Seyn druckt die Verbindung des Subjects und Objects aus"). As A. Warminski
writes: "Whereas Judgment is, Being expresses, means, signifies, names".36
Being cannot itself, in the strictest sense, be the connection of subject and object,
since the very presence of subject and object can only be determined from within
the purview of Judgment, separation. If Being is the connection between subject
and object, it can only be so in the hypothetical and ante-thetical situation where
subject and object are united in such a way as for them to be indivisible - that is,
not subject and object as we understand them from within the realm of Urtheil.
Yet this realm of division is the only realm from which judgments, principles,
36 A W . ki . 8. anmns I, op.cit., p. .
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propositions are possible. Reading intellectual intuition as merely akin to a
Kantian regulative ideal and not as actually occuring, Being can only ever be
approached from within the realm of separation which presupposes it - and as
such, the connection between subject and object that Being names is not, it can
only be expressed. 'We', the subjects of philosophy, are always already situated
within division, the division in which subject and object find themselves
connected only through the relation of the one to the other, as connection, as
identity. The already divided fraction which is the I for the I is the necessary
precondition for all judgment, as it carries with it the originary separation that
judgment is. For 'us', then, Being expresses, names, the connection of subject
and object - which is not to say that Being is simply expression, or much less so
representation itself. It is rather to say that Being can only ever be approached,
can only ever be thought, from within judgment, as that which judgment itself
presupposes but can never really reach. And from this, the establishment of the
inexorable realm of division, though the fragment goes no further, it is a small
step to an ontology of expression, representation, and signs. This, in part, is
where we get to with Novalis.
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III. Beyond Fichte II: Novalis' Fichte-Studien.
Novalis' Ftchte-Studien is a collection of notes written from the autumn
of 1795 to the autumn of 1796 which indeed seems to support its editorially
imposed title in being a sustained exploration of problems posed by the first
presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre", Yet it can be argued that, though
Novalis begins the notebooks in direct engagement with Fichte's concepts and
terminology, he fundamentally alters the application of these concepts and also
radically transforms their synthesis, to the extent that the philosophical positions
that can be extracted from them are uniquely his own. They, furthermore,
present perhaps the single richest textual source for an investigation into
Romantic metaphysics.
There is no evidence to suggest that Novalis had read Holderlin's
fragment, and yet there is a lot to suggest that both as a critique of Fichte and as
an autonomous philosophical endeavour, the Fichte-Studien share with Seyn,
Urtheil ...a great deal of their positions, and the core of thought which constitutes
them both as Romantic metaphysics. The notebooks are a vast array of thoughts,
some of which take their departure directly from the Wissenschaftslehre and
37 The studies themselves are not presented as a reading of the Wissenschafislehre alone, and it
has to be noted that, at least judging from what texts of Fichte's could have been available to
Novalis at the time of writing the Fichte-Studien, there is chiefly one other Fichtean treatise
which is directly addressed by Novalis - this is Fichte' s essay on the origin of language (Von der
Sprachfahigkeit und dem Ursprunge der Sprache). Novalis' linguistic theories will be discussed
more thoroughly in the following chapter.
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some where Fichte's concepts have undergone such a complete transformation as
to warrant calling the results decidedly non-Fichtean. Moreover, there is no
denying that there are confusing reprises, even straight contradictions in the
fragments, so extracting a unitary philosophical position, or even a semi-
systematic thought from them is strictly speaking impossible. I aim to present a
picture of the metaphysics explored in the fragments, but this picture is far from
the systematic exposition of concepts found in the Wissenschaftslehre, and, due
to the fragments' multiplicity, it is also going to be very different from the
sustained engagement with Holderlin's single sheet of paper of some 500 words.
However, the horizon of thought opened up by Holderlin's fragment is one
which Novalis expands into his own. This horizon is made up of elements of
both appropriation of, and disengagement from Fichtean positions. Novalis
builds his ontology on the Fichtean notion of the originality and primacy of
activity, and his philosophy is one which takes seriously the Fichtean claim to
ground the freedom of the moral subject. Novalis' notion of imagination is a
productive reading of Fichte's and one of the pivotal points of his ontology.
Moreover there is little denying that it is Fichte's painstaking dialectical method
which Novalis truly makes his own, and that the complexity of dialectical
relations between determinations of concepts in the fragments is parallel to that
of Fichte and only lacks Hegel's notion of progressive systematic development.
But, to return to Holderlin, Novalis also departs from certain Fichtean
conceptions. As with Holderlin, there is a basic disavowal of the Fichtean
foundationalist, thetic drive, a mistrust which is expressed in the relegation of
identity from a primary, unconditioned, fundamental principle to a secondary
concept; and, as with Holderlin, commensurate to this, there is an opening up of
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the sphere of inquiry, an opening up to a notion of Being more originary than,
and radically different from the self-positing of identity of the Fichtean 'I am I'.
The concept of identity, even the Aristotelian law which is the basis of
Fichte's unconditional first principle, is one which comes under severe critical
scrutiny, even from the very first entry in the notebooks.
"The statement a is a is nothing but a positing, a differentiating, and a
linking ... In order to make a more distinct, a is divided ... The essence of identity
can only be put forward as a pseudoproposition (Scheinsatz). We leave the
identical in order to represent it.,,38
From the Fichtean origins of positing, differentiating, and linking
through division, which correspond with the three fundamental principles of the
Grundlage, Novalis arrestingly claims that the resulting proposition or principle
is but a proposition-in-appearance, not the unconditioned first principle. Nothing
in the fragment, apart from that Scheinsatz of course, can be said to come from
outside the principles set by Fichte, and yet Novalis manages to extract the
fundamental character of identity, i.e., that it is the product of a division, in such
a way as already to suggest that the very grounding of the Wissenschaftslehre is
amiss. Where Fichte takes the proposition 1=1to be the only certain foundation
for philosophy, Novalis sees identity as something already left aside in
representation, and seems to suggest that nothing but a pseudoproposition will
38 Novalis, Schriften, ed. Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim Mahl, Gerhard Schulz, Vol II, p. 104.
All references to Novalis' Schriften shall hereafter be given by volume number, page number,
and fragment number - in this case, II, 104, 1. All translations are my own, though available
translations of selected fragments have been consulted. The full translation of the fragments
under the title Fichte Studies, translated by Jane Kneller, Cambridge; Cambridge UP, 2003 has
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result from the attempt to posit it as absolute ground. Like Holderlin, Novalis
sees identity as a strictly secondary concept: "Identity is a subaltern concept.
That which is being-posited (das Geseztseyn) in general cannot be identical". (II,
187, 247). Novalis also, in a manner very much like Holderlin's, states, "Being
does not express identity"(II, 247, 454). On a first, yet uncomplicated reading
therefore, Novalis' metaphysics is already a radical critique of Fichte's, insofar
as it makes the Fichtean unconditioned first principle into a pseudoproposition,
and views identity as a secondary determination presupposing division and
separation. Furthermore, and even more radically, Navalis directly goes against
Fichte's primary thesis in asserting that being-posited (Geseztseyn) is not being
identical. If the Fichtean I posits itself and posits itself as identical to itself, for
Novalis the very being of being-posited cannot be subsumed under the category
of identity.
If the Fichtean first principle is almost derided as a pseudoproposition'",
this should not be taken to mean that Novalis has arrived at a firmer, more solid
and inexorable first principle but rather that his position on the very possibility of
a first principle is far more guarded. He still uses the language of the first
principle, of foundational ism, but what he proposes is a far cry from Fichte. In
one fragment, he states: "A kind of proposition of reciprocal determination, a
pure law of association seems to me must be the supreme grounding proposition
- a hypothetical proposition"(II, 176, 234). The 'supreme grounding
proposition' consists of the pure law of association (Associations-gesetz),
only been made available during the very last days of the preparation of this thesis and it has
therefore been impossible to consult it.
39 A caveat should immediately be added here. If there is a sense in which the word Scheinsatz,
to the degree that it means 'pseudo-proposition', takes on a discernible derisory tone, Novalis'
further elaborations of the notion of Schein as 'appearance' and 'illusion' in the notebooks point
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obtained by the primacy of relationality in reciprocal determination
(Wechselbestimmung), and not by the secondary determination of identity, and,
what is more, the proposition is no more a proper proposition than is that of
identity. Where the proposition of identity was a pseudoproposition, this highest
proposition is paradoxically only a hypothetical proposition. Novalis seems
altogether reluctant to admit that the supreme principle would amount to a
proposition proper, and is content to have it be simply a hypo-thesis, less and yet
more than Fichte's thesis. In other words, being-posited (Geseztseyn) is thought
of as both more primary than the pro-position of identity and yet as less primary
than the 'pure law of association'. The 'hypo-thesis' of Wechselbestimmung is
conceptually anterior to being-posited, or to pure thesis; the law of association is
thus not yet a being-posited, a thesis, and at the same time it is that which being-
posited presupposes, its hypothesis. In any case, another fragment tells us, "The
supreme principle must absolutely be nothing given, but rather something made
freely, something fabricated, something invented, in order for a metaphysical
system which starts from, and moves towards, freedom to be grounded."(II, 273,
568). Again, on the one hand, this statement seems to want to be faithful to some
of the basic tenets of Fichteanism, namely the enterprise of grounding
metaphysics on the concept of freedom, and yet it goes completely against the
foundationalist grain of the Wissenschaftslehre to assert that the supreme
principle is not an a priori given. What the exact ramifications of Novalis'
position vis-a-vis Fichte are remains to be fully grasped but suffice it to say, for
the moment, that it seems clear that for Novalis the fundamental, supreme
principle does not take the form of identity, the form of a proposition, the form of
towards a more fundamental, and more directly positive determination, which is further analysed
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thesis. If anything, the cited fragments suggest that its form is to be sought in
reciprocal determination, (Wechselbestimmung), in a hypo-thetical relationality
presupposed by any proposition.
Novalis does not, as Holderlin does, make explicit the contradistinction
between identity and Being, but the entries are littered with pronouncements
suggesting that Being, as it is conceived of here, is indeed what lies beyond and
before the order of identity. Firstly, and most fundamentally, it is Being which is
consistently related to the relationality of change, the Wechsel which lies over
and against identity as the supreme principle. This cannot be taken to mean that
Being is itself that principle, if by that one understands a Fichtean foundational
principle; as the previous fragments implied, the very notion of such a
foundational principle is radically undermined by what is at stake here. Being,
for Novalis, comes to designate that which comes before, or that which goes
beyond positing (and also, commensurately, beyond being-posited: Seyn before
the Geseztseyn)40 and beyond identity in that Being is thought of as the primacy
of relation and change. Whereas for Fichte, Being is commensurate, identical
with positing, Novalis thinks of Being as the condition of possibility for any such
positing or being-posited, and consequently also as the condition of possibility of
identity. Like Holderlin's, Novalis' ontology is one where Being is assigned a
space 'outside' identity and which identity, propositions, judgment in general
presupposes, but unlike Holderlin's, this is an ontology which leaves no doubt as
to its dynamic, kinetic character. Being for Novalis comes before the positing of
identity because it is the movement of relation which makes identity possible,
later in this section.
40 If this is true, as the ensuing analysis hopes to show, then it would not be altogether premature
to suggest that the Fichte-Studien are nothing less than a precursor of the Heideggerian ontico-
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and there is no clearer marker of the radically new ontology mobilised here than
its conception of Being as the originary productive relation, the movement which
yields fixed determinations of concepts such as identity". Novalis' ontology is
nothing if not relational.
"1 am - means 1 find myself in a general relation, or I change."(II, 247,
455).
"Being expresses the relation of whole to part, and of part to whole". (II,
194,276).
"Being does not express an absolute constitution - rather only a relation
of essence to a property in general - an ability to be determined. It is an absolute
relation. Nothing in the world merely is; Being does not express identity."(II,
247,454)
Being for Novalis is that which comes before any determination and
which makes for the possibility of any such determination; Being is absolute
relation, the relation of part to whole without which neither part nor whole would
have any determination. It is the movement of relation, or change, which is itself
never arrested in a fixed determination but which alone makes possible every
determination.
ontological difference, although the terminology of positing, of setzen and the Geseztseyn is the
terminology of Fichte and not that of Heideggerian ontology.
41 Curiously, this brings Novalis closer to Hegel's own conception of Being as the inauguration of
a relational (dialectical) movement which yields categories and determinations of concepts in his
Logic. I aim to show in the course of this section (but see also chapter 3) how Romantic
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Perhaps the most daring and the most metaphorically precise designation
of Being in the Fichte-Studien occurs in a group of sustained ontological
explorations of the Fichtean absolute I towards the end of the notebook's run,
and names Being (seyn) as hovering (schweben).
"All being, being in general, is nothing other than being free - hovering
between extremes that must necessarily be both united and divided. All reality
radiates from this luminous point of hovering - everything is contained within it.
Object and subject exist because of this luminous point, and not the other way
around."(II, 266, 555)
And: "Being, being I, being free, and hovering are synonyms."(II, 267,
556)
This hovering is the precise metaphorical determination of the relation
which is Being, it is the Wechselbestimmung that forms the law of the supreme
principle, and yet, in the strictest sense, it is not a determination but the
determining power, or determining activity which produces determinations by
uniting and separating extremes or oppositions. The correspondences with
Holderlin's fragment are striking. Being is conceived of as the hovering relation
which yields the determinations of subject and object, performing both the
connecting relation and in this case explicitly also the dividing one, the relation
Holderlin names judgment. Itmay seem at first that therein lies a difference, that
Holderlin's being only expresses the relation of connection between opposites,
ontology, despite the common emphasis on relationality, is fundamentally at odds with the
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where for Novalis Being brings about both separation and connection. It is worth
remembering, however, that for Holderlin, Being has a quasi-transcendental
status as that which is presupposed by the separating relations of judgment. For
Holderlin, Being is the direct source of the connecting relation but also,
indirectly, the source of the dividing relation since it is presupposed by the direct
source, which is judgment. I do not wish to claim that Novalis collapses the
distinction between connection and division, and therefore collapses judgment
into Being for, as I will show later, the distinction is operative on another level in
the Fichte-Studien - but at this moment it is important to note that Novalis
stresses the absolute relationality and hovering productivity of Being: Being is
the absolute relation, only secondarily can the relation itself be determined as a
connecting or a dividing one. Being therefore is not identity, nor is it determined
difference since it is presupposed as the activity of hovering which produces all
determinations of difference and identity. Being as hovering can be called not
difference, but differencing'", the activity which produces fixed determinations
of difference and identity by endlessly hovering in between oppositional
extremes, by creating and occupying the space between difference and identity.
This is how the Romantic ontology of hovering is also, therefore, an ontology of
differencing as verb/activity presupposed by difference as noun/determination -
and in this there can be little doubt that the Romantics were on their own.
Fichte's metaphysics is but a point of departure for such an ontology; equally,
Schelling's later move towards a philosophy of indifference seems a far cry
from the Being-as-differencing of Novalis; and, even more so, the ontology of
progressive becoming mobilised by Hegel, also stands at a distance from an
Hegelian project.
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ontology emanating from the 'luminous point' of hovering, of infinite productive
differencing that is at stake here.
Nevertheless, what the notion of Being as hovering brings to the fore,
despite the evident departure from Fichte, is the conceptual debt to Fichte which
is paramount in the notebooks. Hovering is a designation of Fichte's for the
power of the productive imagination, and this, as I will show later, is Novalis'
radical appropriation and expansion of Fichte's term. What is more, Novalis'
Being is unthinkable without Fichte's absolute I, with which Novalis constantly
equates it. Firstly because the absolute I is absolutely free, both in Novalis and
in Fichte. Novalis echoes a lot of the Fichtean pronouncements on the primacy of
the ethical, free lover the determined empirical I of cognition. For Novalis,
"morality must be at the heart of our existence, if it is to be what it wants to be
for us."(U, 266, 556) yet the absolutely free I of moral agency is such only in so
far as it is equated with Being and hovering, only insofar as "Being, being I,
being free, and hovering are synonyms."(U, 267, 556) Whereas for Fichte the
absolute freedom of the moral I is juxtaposed to the relative limitation and
determination of the empirical I, Novalis situates freedom at the level of
differencing, the activity of Being, and for him the I is but the infinite striving
(itself a notion of Fichtean origin) towards Being: "An infinite realisation of
Being would be the I's destiny and determination. It would strive evermore
towards Being."(II, 267, 556). This comes from the same fragment that
nonetheless told us that Being, Being I and being free are synonyms. What is at
stake here is (and this would be in keeping with Holderlin's frustration with the
Fichtean I being at once absolute and yet able to determine itself as empirical) an
42 The term is taken from David Farrell Krell, Contagion: Sexuality, Disease and Death in
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implied distinction between the freedom of the striving I as it approaches "the
ideal of Being" on the one hand, and the absolute freedom of Being as hovering
between extremes, a freedom which is constituted purely by the designation of
Being as relation and as differencing. The infinite realisation of Being's freedom
is always on the way for the striving I, it is its destiny and determination - but
Being qua hovering, Being as relation is always already realised freedom in the
activity of differencing, before and beyond any determination.
Yet possibly the greatest debt to Fichte is the conception of the absolute I
not as substance, but as activity, the dual activity of the Tathandlung, at once
action and the deed done, at once producer and product. For Novalis the
Tathandlung is important not as an act which secures the positing of the I, and
the positing of the I as identical, as it was for Fichte, but as a constitutive
operation of Being itself. Activity (Tatigkeit) in the Fichte-Studien stands in an
inexorable relation with Being. Firstly, Being, insofar as it is designated as
hovering, is linked precisely to infinite differencing activity, the activity of
hovering between extremes, the productive activity which yields determinations.
Furthermore, Novalis sets the wheels of his dialectical thinking in motion and
connects activity to both the notions of essence and of property through Being.
Here is part of the fragment in question:
"Activity is the originary property (Eigenschaft) of essence (Wesen),
Being the originary essence of property. Activity only allows itself to be shown
through Being, Being through activity."(II, 238,438)
German Idealism and Romanticism, Indiana University Press, 1998, p. 175, n.l.
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For Novalis essence and property stand dialectically opposed to each
other, so that when activity is designated as the originary property of essence,
and Being the originary essence of property, the link between Being and activity
becomes itself a dialectical one, such that, not that one is or becomes the other in
sublation, but that one is only ever thinkable from within the horizon of the other.
Essence is not to be confused with Being itself, as it is a concept, like property,
applied by the understanding, and not, by implication, the differencing activity
which makes understanding possible in the first place. We read on:
"We know nothing of essence other than that it is that which is opposed
to property in general. However, we can only determine properties through
properties, and indeed this can be shown only through an examination of these
properties, which are opposed to one another - for here we find the simple
activity of essence - which appears in its opposing itself to itself."(II, 239,438).
Novalis is here giving his own version of Holderlin's distinction
between Being and Judgment: from within our empirical standpoint, the
standpoint of theoretical cognition, we are only ever dealing with properties of
given objects, which properties appear to be opposed to each other; the essence
of an object lies in the simple activity of opposition, the differencing of properties
and can only appear to us as the opposition of essence to itself. The originary
property of essence is therefore activity, the activity of self-opposition and
hovering; similarly the originary essence of property is Being, that is Being as
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differencing, the Being producing the ever-changing properties.Y From within
our horizon entirely constrained by the activity of essence producing opposing
properties, we conceive of activity as the originary property of essence, and we
conceive of Being, Being as differencing, as the originary essence of property. It
can be argued that this is Aristotelian metaphysics only, to use one of Novalis'
favourite expressions and methodological tools, ordine inverso, in reverse: the
essence of a thing is what appears to us as ever-changing activity, whereas its
properties, its accidents appear as the opposing determinations yielded by the
differencing activity of Being.
Essence and property are of course concepts pertaining to the object of
cognition, but the situation gets, if anything, even more complicated when the
focus is on the subject of cognition, and on consciousness. Novalis asserts:
"Consciousness is a being outside of being which is nevertheless within
being."(U, 106, 2) This can only be made comprehensible if considered as a
rendition of the Fichtean problematic of self-consciousness as the interrelation
between the Absolute I and the empirical I of cognition. Consciousness is able to
cognise its own being though it still forms part of it, or, in other words, to be
(self-)conscious is to know myself as an object of cognition whilst remaining
within myself as a subject. That Novalis recasts the question in terms of Being,
something which Fichte himself would not be able or inclined to do, is already an
auspiciously daring beginning, but more follows: "But what is that? Outside-of-
43 Richard Wo Hannah, in his The Fichtean Dynamic of Nova lis . Poetics, (Peter Lang, Bern 1981)
conducts a similar analysis of the dialectical opposition between essence and property and links it
to the Fichtean distinction between substance and accident, coming to conclude that "the
substances of the mediate, empirical realm are the accidents of the absolute substance" (p, 96)0 I
do not wish to dispute the plausible link with Fichte here, yet it should be remarked that
collapsing the opposition essence-property all too squarely onto the opposition substance-
accident not only simplifies the dialectical movements of the Fichte-Studien, but also allows for a
thinking of the Absolute as substance, which mayor may not be appropriate with regard to
57
being need not be a proper being. An improper being outside of being is an
image - thus, outside-of-being must be an image of being within being.
Consciousness therefore is an image of being within being." (II, 106, 2) This
marks Novalis' opening of epistemology, the theory of consciousness and self-
consciousness to a generalised theory of representation from within his original
ontology." It maintains that consciousness is always already caught up in a
schema of (re)presentation, what he will elaborate as a theory of the sign.
Knowledge and consciousness are only ever possible from within the schema of
(re)presentation, only ever conceivable as an image of being within being. What
is implied here is similar to Holderlin's assertion that cognition is only ever
possible from within the perspective of judgment and separation. Being in itself
is only ever approachable from within (re)presentation, which is why being is
Fichte, but is certainly inappropriate for Novalis' conception of an absolute Schweben that cannot
be subsumed under a category as rigid and static as substance.
44 This, the second fragment in the notebooks, is the first elaboration of a sustained semiotic
theory in the Fichte-Studien and beyond. I will have the chance to mobilise it again, in the
chapter which follows and which treats 'semiotics' as a major development in Romantic
epistemology. For the moment I am content in looking at the fragment from the point of view of
a theory of representation. Wm. Arctander 0' Brien, in his study Novalis: Signs of Revolution
has painstakingly argued for the importance of the fragment, and he has argued it from the
perspective that Novalis' semiotics are a break from traditional theories of representation. For 0'
Brien, even the opening gambit of the Fichte-Studien, the attempt by Novalis to analyse the
Scheinsatz of identity A=A, has little to do with representation (Vorstellung) but rather with
presentation (Darstellung), even to the degree that this presentation is shown to establish a loss in
presentation: "the presentation of identity in language involves not a re-presentation, but a loss
that only seems to establish or present an identity already lost in the act of presentation"(p. 84).
There can be no doubt that, in these first pages of the notebooks the concept in question is that of
Darstellung - yet to assert that presentation only results in a loss of presentation in the act of
presentation is, I want to maintain, equivalent to suggesting that presentation (at least in its
English usage) is always already re-presentation, the 're-' being the marker of the difference
between what is sought to be presented and what is in fact presented through the act of
presentation. Ultimately, what O'Brien is concerned to show, that Novalis' moves offer a radical
break from, and within the presentation of identity, is exactly concomitant with what I wish to
uphold, namely that Novalis' 'discovery' of semiotics is precisely the discovery of a horizon, like
that of Holderlin's judgment, that is inescapable for the empirical subject, a horizon which,
moreover, is bound up with re-presentation. To highlight the necessary complicity of
presentation as Darstellung, with representation as I have just defined it, I will hereinafter refer to
Darstellung as (re)presentation. For another interesting reading of Novalis' semiotics see Geza
von Molnar, Romantic Vision, Ethical Context: Novalis and Artistic Autonomy (University of
Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 29-56.
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said to express connections, and why even the very designation hovering is a
representation, a metaphor for Being, and never Being itself.
Novalis has another general designation for this process of
(re)presentation from which (and from which alone) Being can be 'approached'
by consciousness - he calls it, in various fragments dotted near the beginning of
the notebooks, Schein, a word which carries the meanings of 'appearance' and
'illusion' together, and which had already been used in connection with Fichte's
'pseudo proposition' (Scheinsatz) of identity. Schein is connected by Novalis to
seemingly all the most important words/concepts governing any philosophical
investigation: to truth, and to mind, or spirit (Geist) in one fragment ("Truth -
fiction or Schein", "Schein is Geist", II, 179, 234); in the same fragment, to
thought ("All thought is thus an art of Schein", II, 181, 234 ); and, in another, to
Being itself: "Schein is the reality of all Forms. Being is the reality of all matter
[...] No Being, no Schein - no Schein, no Being." (II, 183, 236). Schein is thus
undoubtedly a key notion, since it designates something which is in theory
opposed to Being, yet which lies underneath any 'approach' (by way of 'truth',
'mind', or 'thought') to Being, inextricably linked with it as form to matter. This
last, seemingly Aristotelian, conception of Schein as 'form' is in effect anything
but, since what takes the role of form is not only appearance but also, just as
well, illusion. Furthermore, the gordian knot tied between Schein and Seyn
entails that Being is not conceivable, knowable, 'approachable' in any other way
than through Schein, or, in other words, that the absolute realm of Being as the
hovering, differencing activity producing individual determinations is only ever
approachable through its appearance (which at the same time is always, and of
necessity, an illusion - a 'fiction'), through (re)presentation in general. In this
59
case we are dealing with a general theory of (re)presentation or Schein, as Schein
effectively forms the only possible horizon from which Being can be thought, in
a manner strikingly reminiscent of Holderlin's Judgment, and clearly not with a
concept of representation, or one of appearance drawn out of the
classicallPlatonic conception of mimesis.
Yet representation also has a more particular, or localised, meaning, as
Vorstellung. The dialectic of representation (Vorstellung) in the Fichte-Studien is
incredibly complex and passes through numerous determinations of opposites
within representation. There is however a basic and crucial distinction to be
made, and that Novalis makes by marking the "difference between representing,
and representing something"{II, 226, 330). The latter is the purview of
consciousness, the representation of objects or of the subject as object. The
former is the sheer activity of representation thought in the absence of a
represented object. This activity is the activity of the productive imagination,
which, for Novalis and Fichte alike, is the power which produces representations
of objects. The productive imagination in Fichte is already linked with the power
to hover between extremes of representation in the act of representation, but with
Novalis it becomes explicitly the synthesising activity of differencing. "The
imagination is the connecting copula (Mittelglied), the synthesis, the power of
change."(II, 186, 246) The imagination is therefore not so much a faculty as it is
the activity which at once yields the represented object and its own activity as a
representing, a power of change, a hovering, and a differencing. It is not so
much a part of consciousness as that which makes consciousness possible in the
first place, it is the imagination which produces the 'image of being within
being', for the activity of the imagination is the same as the differencing and
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hovering of Being. It is the same absolutely free activity which the striving I
takes as its destiny in the realisation of Being; it is absolutely free insofar as it is
sheer representing, hovering between opposites, or differencing, yet it has the
productive capacity to form represented objects for intuition and consciousness.
It is not to be thought of as a faculty of the subject insofar as it is that which
makes the subject, which is itself only a representation, an image of being within
being, a "simple idea and nothing more", possible. It is not itself equated with
Being but its activity of hovering and differencing is the same as the activity of
Being, the one producing representations for consciousness, the other ontological
determinations of itself.
What lies at the core of the ontology of the Fichte-Studien, and of
Romantic metaphysics in general, is a conception of Being as the activity of
hovering or differencing, as an originary productive relation. The products of
this relation are fixed determinations which can become, through representation
(Vorstellung), objects of consciousness, including the subject as object of self-
consciousness. The determinations of subject, object, consciousness, essence,
property, proposition, principle, identity, difference, are all products of this
infinite activity of differencing and hovering. Though we are firmly caught
within the sphere of (re)presentation as Schein and determination, for that is the
very essence of the differencing activity: to produce determination and to make
itself appear as Schein, Novalis was perhaps the first to lay the ontological stress
not on any of the various determinations such as identity, but on the sheer
activity of production that makes them possible. (Re)presentation may be the
only horizon possible from within which such an activity may be grasped, and as
such it can never be grasped in itself, yet Being as this activity, as differencing, is
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not a transcendent notion - along with every determination of being, along with
every representation of the imagination there lies, undetermined, un-represented,
perhaps one should say unexpressed, the mark of the very activity which
produces them. Furthermore, it is crucial to stress once again at this point, that
this activity of differencing which underwrites, as it were, all possible
ontological determinations, is equated, within Novalis' work and, by extension,
throughout Romantic metaphysics, with the primary relationality of the
Wechselbestimmung, what I earlier discussed as the ontological hypo-thesis.
Thus, Romantic ontology takes the guise of an absolutely originary relationality,
where Being itself, in its designation as hovering and differencing is productive
and relational absolutely. As I will have the chance to discuss further later, this
can only amount to a notion of the Absolute which, unlike the Absolutes of
Idealism (in Schelling or Hegel), or indeed unlike any such notions of the
Absolute, at least before the advent of Heideggerian differential ontology, is
entirely and consistently paradoxical: the Absolute, in this case Being as that
which lies prior to any further ontological (or epistemological) positions, prior
therefore to subject, object, essence, property, consciousness, et ai, is a relational
Absolute, which can only (re)present itself within the horizon of Schein. A
further investigation of the horizon of (re)presentation, the horizon of Holderlin' s
Judgment and Novalis' Schein, amounts to an investigation into the ways with
which the activity of differencing, the productive relation that is Being can be
thought, 'approached', made knowable - in other words, it becomes a matter of
epistemology, which is the concern of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO: ROMANTIC EPISTEMOLOGY:
FROM THEORIA TO POIESIS.
Introduction.
Novalis, in the crucial fragment from the Fichte-Studien where he
introduces the central concept of Being as hovering (schweben), also writes this:
"all production approaches Being, and Being is hovering", or
"alles Hervorbringen geht aufs Seyn, und Seyn ist schweben"(II, 267,
556).
Production here refers to the activity, the operation of the I as it "strives" in its
approach towards Being. This approach of the I, already delineated in Fichte's
Wissenschaftslehre, is what constitutes the concerns of epistemology.
Epistemology is usually understood as a term denoting the theory of knowledge;
if ontology asks the question "what is Being?", epistemology follows by asking
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"how can I know Being?", which can subsequently be glossed as "how can I
know the world and/or myself?", inasmuch as "the world" and "I" are imparted
with Being. With the Romantics, the question of epistemology is unquestionably
framed by the Kantian notion of transcendental modes of cognition, and more
particularly by their elaboration into what can be called a subjective
transcendental framework in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. Thus, epistemology for
the Romantics begins its operations in Fichte's manner, asking, "how does the I
come to know the not-I (the world) and itself?" The Romantics, as I showed in
the previous chapter, took the Fichtean conception of the I as activity (the
Tathandlung) seriously; their epistemology therefore seeks to chart the activity of
the I as it approaches Being in cognition, and is thus eminently dynamic in
character. In this respect it can be shown to be related to the dynamic
epistemological stories of the development of consciousness and cognition found
in the 'mature' texts of German Idealism, in Schelling and Hegel. However,
where Schelling or Hegel present fully elaborated, complex and complete
epistemological systems, where the aim is to present the full picture of a subject's
way towards the cognition of both the world and itself, Novalis, Schlegel, and
Holderlin are nowhere near as systematic in their endeavours". Romantic
45 Here, I will have to allow a possible exception, Schlegel's lectures on
Transcendentalphilosophie, which he gave upon his return to Jena from Berlin in 1800-180 I. The
lecture course itself is now lost, and what remain are notes taken by a student - with an irony that
would not have been lost on Schlegel, his earliest (though not his only) attempt at the creation of
a system is itself in fragments. I will not be dealing with Transcendentalphilosophie at any
length and this because, although it arguably represents Schlegel's most complete elaboration of
his philosophical positions, it adds little to what can already be glimpsed in the published
Athenaum fragments and in his notebooks. As I hope to make clear later (viz. Chapter 4) the
fragment as a form of writing is of cardinal importance in Romanticism, and it seems to me that
more justice is being done to Schlegel in particular, and to Romanticism in general, if attention is
focused on what can be derived from the fragments. After all, Schlegel himself was decisively
ambivalent towards philosophical systematicity, as witnessed in the following extraordinary
paradox, published as Athenaum fragment 53, and which I cannot resist quoting again as a
response: "It is equally fatal for the mind to have a system and to have none. It will simply have
to decide to combine the two."
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epistemology, just like everything else Romantic, is in fragments - but that
should not mean that it not be taken seriously.
Novalis, to return to the Fichte-Studien, is quite specific when he writes
"all production approaches Being", and in this he offers us a glimpse of what
Romantic epistemology has at its heart: a theory of production. This is a direct
result of what I analysed as the Romantics' ontological notions, since Being
itself is, for them, a differencing, hovering activity which produces ontological
determinations. Yet, even though it can be argued, as I tried to do, that Fichte's
epistemology is also such a theory of production, the Romantics take production
one step further. What I want to assert chiefly in this chapter is that for
Romanticism, epistemology becomes a theory of production with a very
particular and radical new configuration - as the theory of the production of
poetry. Obviously, Holderlin and Novalis are renowned primarily as poets, and
Schlegel certainly had aspirations to become, ifnot a poet, a novelist, with his iU-
fated Lucinde, but it is not their personal literary aspirations that drive all three of
them to such a position in their theoretical writings. Epistemology becomes
poetology, or the theory of poetic production, in their hands, for reasons which
are purely philosophical, and it is in this that they represent an altogether new
and radical moment and position in the history of philosophy, and of German
Idealism in particular.
Investigating this philosophical impetus driving Novalis, Schlegel, and
Holderlin towards an epistemology which serves, equally at the same time, as
poetology, has to begin with the ontological foundations of Romantic
philosophy, and more precisely, with the notion that Being, Being as such, (what
could also be called the in-itself, following Kant) even in its understanding as
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differencing activity and as hovering, is, strictly speaking, inaccessible to the
subject. In Seyn, Urtheil Holderlin asserted that every subjective position is
already caught up in the 'arche-separation' of judgment, and in the Fichte-
Studien Novalis takes the recognition one step further, arguing that Schein, as
appearance and also as illusion, is intricately linked with Seyn, and is in fact the
only way in which Being comes to be (re)presented for the subject. In the
discussion which follows, I am using the term (re)presentation in precisely this
manner: it is not mimetic representation, insofar as the Platonic legacy of
mimesis is necessarily thought of as a completely secondary 'moment', a false
epistemology'"; (re)presentation with the Romantics, and as I am using it here, is
the only possible, necessarily oblique yet straightforwardly necessary, means of
access to the inaccessible realm of Being. Even though, for the most part, the
German word here at stake is Darstellung, and even though its ordinary meaning
is presentation, and not representation, what becomes apparent in the Fichte-
Studien (but also, as I intend to show, in Schlegel and in Holderlin) is that
presentation as Darstellung necessarily entails representation. This is entirely
due to the transcendental framework the Romantics are working with. The act of
presentation, and more particularly the act of presentation which occurs as
language, thought transcendentally, involves two moments: the presentation of
that which is to be presented (the object of cognition, the referent, or, as Novalis
will say, the signified), and, always and at the same time, the presentation of the
act of presentation itself, which I am here attempting to highlight by writing
(re)presentation. Novalis introduces the idea of a 'transcendental schema', which
is the bearer of the presentation of the act of presentation, that which allows all
46 This Platonic concept of representation as a false theory of knowledge can be seen throughout
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linguistic-semiotic presentation to happen whilst, at the same time, always
marking a particular presentation with the stamp of its transcendental condition
of possibility. This double presentation takes on the form of reflection, already
theorised as an epistemological 'tool' by Fichte, and, for Schlegel in particular,
the form of the dominant Romantic trope, irony. For Novalis, the Darstellung of
Being entails a remarkably modem conception of semiotics, a theory of language
centred on ''the transcendental schema", as well as the extraordinary, but far from
casual, remark that knowledge is itself a sign. In this way, Romantic
epistemology becomes semiotics, caught within the signification processes of
language as the only possible epistemological horizon.
Yet, this is not all. In his Monolog, written some two years after the
completion of the Fichte-Studien, Novalis dramatically postulates a further,
second aspect by which all language, all signification, is governed. On the one
hand language prevents, necessarily, access to the Being of that which it puts into
words, which is what Novalis means when he asserts that we do not "speak for
the sake of things"; on the other hand, the very act of putting things into words,
the very act of linguistic Darstellung, the act which prevents access to things, is a
marker, a sign for language's "efficacy", resulting in what Novalis calls
"enthusiasm" by language. Couched in epistemological terms, what this means
is that the act of understanding, of knowing, the process whereby an object may
be (re)presented as a comprehensible and communicable word or concept is
doomed to failure; but, equally, that very doomed act, if isolated as the
transcendental-reflexive moment of the (re)presentation of (re)presentation is the
Plato's work, but particularly in The Republic, book VII (the simile of the cave), and book X (the
expulsion of the poets from the Republic).
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only possible chance for understanding in Schlegel's terms,
incomprehensibility is the only chance of understanding.
Having arrived at such an epistemological double bind, the Romantics
still hold on to a notion of epistemology as a theory of production. But, since the
epistemological double bind has been identified as essentially a semiotic,
linguistic one, production takes the meaning of linguistic production, linguistic
creation - poetry. Crucially, as will become clear in the course of the chapter,
this poetry is not a 'simple' versification, mere 'imaginative literature',
Dichtung, but a concept of poetic creation, Poesie. In Schlegel and in Holderlin
alike, the process of poetic creation is nothing other than the process of the
creation of concepts, the process whereby the poetic subject or "spirit" produces,
in a manner which will come to resemble the epistemological stories of German
Idealism, the moments of its own creation. Holderlin's long essay on the
operations of the poetic spirit, and Schlegel's famous fragments on
transcendental, or Romantic, poetry both testify to the Romantic reconfiguration
of epistemology as poetology, the theory of poetic production. It is this, perhaps
even more than their ontology of differencing, that sets the Romantics quite apart
from the traditional philosophical route. With the Romantics, the age-old
Aristotelian distinction between theoria, epistemology as theory of knowledge,
and poiesis, the practice of creating poems, is totally transformed. This is not to
suggest that the Romantics collapse the difference between theory and practice",
47 Practice, in the Aristotelian sense of praxis utilised by the Romantics' predecessors and
contemporaries (Kant, Hegel), is, as should be obvious, yet a different matter. Novalis, Schlegel,
and Holderlin all concern themselves with practical matters, insofar as they also, after Kant, have
a conception of 'practical reason', or ethics. It is not, however, my own concern in this thesis to
deal with this aspect of Romanticism. The distinction which I take to be crucial is therefore that
between theoria and poiesis.
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philosophy and poetry - but it is to say that a theoria of poiesis, a poetology, is
for them the only theoria, the only epistemology.
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I: Epistemology and Signification in Novalis' Fichte-Studien.
Nowhere is the Romantic assumption of semiotic theory as the chief,
indeed the only theory of knowledge available to the subject made more directly
apparent than in the second fragment of Novalis' Fichte-Studien (II, 105-106, 2).
Here, Novalis begins by stating that "consciousness is the sphere of knowledge",
and this would be in keeping with the Fichtean terminology of the notebooks.
Yet, in the first of many extraordinary moves performed in the space of a single,
rather short fragment, Novalis goes on to equate knowledge with consciousness
by giving them the exact same definition: knowledge is "a being outside of being
that is nevertheless within being"; and "Consciousness is a being outside of being
that is within being"(ibid.). Both knowledge and consciousness are defined
therefore as relations to Being, using a paradoxical spatial metaphor denoting
both the belonging and the not-belonging of knowledge/consciousness to Being.
Knowledge and consciousness are situated within Being, that is to say, as
Novalis asserts, they are necessarily situated within the determined being of the
I; at the same time, knowledge and consciousness are just as necessarily relations
to Being ("knowledge is a reference (Beziehung) to being", ibid.), they relate the
I-subject to the objects of knowledge and consciousness. In one sense, this is but
a simple unfolding of the operations of knowledge and consciousness according
to the Fichtean transcendental-idealist tenets of I and not-I, subject and object -
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what turns Novalis' formulation inexorably into a paradox is his use of the
concept of Being in relation to knowledge and consciousness, or, in other words,
his non-Fichtean, even anti-Fichtean insistence that epistemology be grounded on
ontology. Examined ontologically, the fragment states, knowledge and
consciousness bear a relation to Being which is both conjunctive and disjunctive,
both inside and outside, at the same time.
The paradox is in need of further explanation, and Novalis provides it,
right after the definition of consciousness:
"But what is that?
That which is outside of being must not be a proper (rechtes) being.
An improper being outside of being is an image (Bild) - thus, this
outside-of- being must be an image of being within being.
Consciousness is therefore an image of being within being. A more
detailed explanation of image. Sign. Theory of the sign. Theory of
(re)presentation (Darstellung) or of the non-being that is within being in
order to allow being to be there in a certain way for itself. (fur sich auf
gewisse Weise daseyn zu lassen) (II, 106,2)
The bones of this paradoxical relation to Being that is consciousness (and
knowledge, insofar as they are expressly equated) are given flesh when the
relation is named Bi/d, image. Image is therefore, and again, thus far at least,
ontological/y, the 'improper' being, an assignation in complete accordance, it
would seem, with traditional (Platonic) ontology. The radical complication,
which at the same time is the 'explanation' of the conundrum, arises when
71
knowledge/consciousness is defined as that 'improper' being, the image, which
nonetheless is situated within being. What is being sketched out here, and which
Novalis will later take up as his 'detailed explanation of image' progresses
through the notebooks, is a theory of knowledge as a theory of images, or as
semiotics. Knowledge and consciousness are tantamount to a Darstellung of
Being for and within itself; that is their ontological status and determination. Yet
this Darstellung, though retaining the sense of its common translation as
'presentation', is already representation, it is already the operation of a re-
presentation of Being for and within itself.48 From an ontological perspective,
what knowledge amounts to is a (re)presentation of being for and within itself,
and Novalis is both cleverly playful and astutely rigorous in connecting the Dar
of Darstellung to the Da of Daseyn - knowledge, the fragment playfully
suggests, is that which allows Being to be, or be-there (Daseyn), by re-presenting
it to itself (Darstellung). Furthermore, there can be no doubt that what Novalis
calls his "Theorie der Darstellung" is the same as a theory of images, signs - a
theory of (re)presentation as the only possible epistemological horizon. The
second fragment of the Fichte-Studien can thus be seen as inaugurating the
establishment of semiotics as epistemology.
The promise of a 'theory of signs' made in the second fragment is
fulfilled shortly afterwards, in fragment 11, which must be seen as the most
sustained elaboration of semiotic theory in the whole of the Fichte-Studien. It is
one of the longest fragments in the notebooks, and thus I cannot quote it whole;
48 Novalis himself will go on to use, in the Fichte-Studien as well as his later notebooks, the term
Darstel/ung alongside Vorstellung, and even the latinate Reprasentation. This is not to suggest
that there is no definable difference in general between the three terms, but rather to intimate that
the ramifications of Novalis' semiotics are such that, with the crucial exception of the use of
Vorstellungto express something akin to an intuition of thoughts, presentation (Darstellung), and
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instead, I will paraphrase its arguments and provide quotations where further
analysis is necessary. Novalis is first concerned with the relationship of the sign
(Zeichen) to the signified (Bezeichnete), and immediately rejects the possibility
of a 'natural language' where this relationship would be a necessary given for
each pair of sign and signified. Both sign and signified constitute "a free effect",
and are the same only for the signifying agent (der Bezeichnende): "otherwise
they are not the same - but this only for the signifying agent - both [the sign and
the signified] are in relation to one another only in the signifying agent" (II, 108,
11). Signs are in effect arbitrary, Novalis suggests, and they can be placed in
necessary relation (signifier-signified) only by the free will of the signifying
agent". The arbitrariness of the sign is, at this moment at least, the consequence
of the free will, the free choice of a determined signifying agent, who freely
posits, in a (thus far) Fichtean manner, the sign as a whole, both signifier and
signified, and their relation. This is, in an important sense, only the first moment
in Novalis' description of the semiotic process; a second moment, which is not
however a secondary or subordinate moment, as I hope to show in what follows,
will put the freedom of the signifying agent in check, and place the production of
the sign and the necessity of its internal relation transcendentally outside a
determined subject-signifying agent. For the moment, though, this freedom in the
constitution of signs on the part of a signifying agent immediately creates the
problem which the rest of the fragment is an attempt to resolve, namely that if the
this more than anything, again, in an ontological sense, is never anything other than
representation. The Darstellung of being is the representation of being for and within itself.
49 The notion that the relations in a sign are freely posited by a signifying agent or a determined
subject has some degree of affinity with Hegel's later formulation of a theory of signs in the
Encyclopaedia - but such superficial similarities are indeed only superficial. In the next chapter I
will undertake a comparative examination of Novalis' and Hegel's semiotic theories which will
demonstrate that beneath the surface there lurk unbridgeable differences in their conception of the
sign.
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relation between a sign and a signified is only a necessary one for a particular
signifying agent, how is it then possible for this signifying relation to be
communicable, and thus for the sign to be understandable, by a second signifying
agent. Novalis wants to hold to the arbitrariness of the sign, to the notion that
sign and signified are effects produced absolutely freely by the signifying agent
(which only serves to point to his insistence on retaining fundamental Fichtean
principles), but at the same time must allow for what he will call a necessary
relation between sign and signified, if these are to be at all communicable:
"Objectively and subjectively necessary signs, which are basically one and the
same, are therefore the only ones through which something that is thought can be
communicated" (II, 109, 11).
His resolution of these apparently contradictory necessities, much like his
explication of the outside of being within being of the second fragment, rests on
a paradoxical yet inexorable formulation - "free necessity" lfreye
Nothwendigkeit). He states: "The necessity of the reference of a sign to a
signified must lie in a signifying agent. But in the latter both are freely posited.
Therefore a relation of free necessity for both must exist in the signifying agent."
(ibid.) How can such a relation which is both free and necessary exist? Novalis'
answer to this particular problem constitutes possibly his most radical
contribution to semiotics in general, and relies on an ingenious reworking of
Kantian transcendental schematism. Now moving away from the Fichtean
assumptions of the freedom of the subject, Novalis will have to appeal to an
"originary schema", which in itself amounts to nothing less than a
reconfiguration of Kant's transcendental schematism:
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"The relation [between sign and signified] must be free with regard to this
particular signifying agent - thus, it can only be necessary with regard to the
signifying agent in general [des Bezeichnenden uberhauptt or other signifying
agents. One could call free necessity self-determination (Selbstbestimmung) -
consequently self-determination would be the character of the signifying agent in
general ( ... ) Originary schema. One in all, all in one." (ibid.)
If the relation between sign and signified is free for every particular
signifying agent, it is nevertheless necessary for signifying agents in general; to
couch Novalis' words in the Kantian thought that undeniably gives them their
cue, the relation may be free for each empirical subject but it is necessary for the
transcendental subject in general - or rather, since Novalis does not speak of the
transcendental subject, one could say that the relation between sign and signified
is free for each particular empirical subject/signifying agent, but necessary
transcendentally, necessary with regard to an a priori, self-determined
transcendental schema: "Each understandable sign must therefore stand in a
schematic relation to the signified." (ibid.) The a-priori schema is in fact what
carries 'free necessity', understood as the transcendental conditions of possibility
for the constitution of a sign as such. Before the 'freely effected' constitution of
the relation between sign and signified by a determinate subject-signifying agent,
there must lie the necessary condition of possibility for that relation - this is
precisely the "transcendental schema", and with this notion Novalis takes a step
back from the Fichtean notion of the absolute freedom of the subject and into the
Kantian realm of transcendental, a priori conditions of possibility operating on a
level entirely prior to any determinate subject, any signifying agent and her
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capacity to constitute signs as free effects. This is why I previously insisted that
the 'moment' of the constitution of the sign as free effect by a determined
signifying agent may come first in Novalis' own presentation of the signification
process, but now comes to be placed in strictly second place, as coming after the
transcendental constitution of the necessary relations in the sign which takes
place with, and in, the originary schema. Thus, and even though Novalis still
manages to hold on to the notion of arbitrary signs, their communicability is
explained by having recourse to a transcendental schema. Just as the Kantian
schema bridged the gap of incommensurability between the senses and the
categories of the understanding whilst retaining their difference of order, the
semiotic schema here allows for the signification process to be both essentially
arbitrary and essentially communicable,free in its arbitrariness, yet emanating by
necessity from the condition of possibility for the signification process in general,
namely from the originary schema. Novalis goes on to determine how
communication of signs through the schema is possible by recourse to the
schema. The first signifying agent is able to communicate what is, for him, a
freely effected relation between sign and signified, because the condition for this
relation, insofar as the sign is to be understood, is necessary for and in the
schema; the second signifying agent is able to recognise the necessary schematic
relation accordingly. "The first signifying agent acts in accordance with the
second in the sign, and the second signifying person acts in accordance with the
first in the signified - a quasi-free contract." (II, 110, 11) In this way, the
semiotic theory of the Fichte-Studien is one where the understanding of the sign
is wholly relational. From each particular vantage-point, be it that of the second
or the first signifying agent, that of the sign or of the signified, the relation
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appears to be a free and arbitrary one, yet this relation is necessary in the schema,
since the schema itself and within itself is nothing other than relational: "The
schema stands in a reciprocal relation (Wechselwirkung) with itself. Each part is
only what it is in relation to the others." (II, 109, 11) The essential relationality of
the transcendental schema, analogous to the fundamental, indeed absolute,
relationality that Novalis proposed as the hypo-thesis of Being, is the moment
where Novalis, as I stated before, takes a curious step back from Fichteanism
into a reconfigured Kantian problematic. The schema allows for the positing of
necessity, not in the particular determined relation between a sign and its
signified as these are, each and every time, constituted by a determined
signifying agent, but rather in the a priori relational condition of possibility of
any signifying relation itself. Thus, every signifier necessarily passes through, as
it were, the relational 'grid' of the a priori schema, before it can correspond to its
signified. The particular relation between specific signifiers/signifieds is not
necessary each and every time, which forbids the significations process from
being taken as one based on the necessary "symbolic" connection of each
signifier to its signified. Relationality is necessary in the schema, and as the
schema alone. Since the schema itself is nothing if not essentially relational,
what Novalis designates as necessity is the Wechselwirkung, the "free necessity"
or "quasi-free contract" which, as the originary schema, is nothing other than the
a priori condition of possibility for any particular, determined (and freely
effected by a determined signifying agent) relation within particular signs.
This immanent essential relationality of the originary schema is what
gives Novalis' semiotic theory its unmistakably modem, even postmodem,
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thrust. 50 Signs are not conceived, as they were in enlightenment epistemology,
as either arbitrary or natural, and Novalis' approach foreshadows Saussure both
in that it is synchronic, disregarding common 'histories' of the origin of language
from Rousseau to Fichte, and in that what is called 'schema' is indeed very close
to what in post-Saussurian linguistics and philosophy will be termed 'structure'.
In fact, the full force of the designation of the originary schema as fully
relational, or, to use a more contemporary but still relevant appellation,
'diacritical', points to it being less an equivalent of 'structure' but, since the
schema is in effect what bears the conditions of possibility for the constitution of
signifying structures, more akin to what the post-structuralist critique of
Saussure, and in particular Jacques Derrida, calls "the structurality of
structure'?". Interestingly, the fragment begins with what can be taken as a
concession to linguistic 'psychologism', namely the idea that signs may be very
much dependent on their users and their 'characters' - yet Novalis is careful to
abstract his concept of the 'signifying agent' from any psychological
determination whatsoever, and the resulting originary schema is very much
completely independent, not only of psychology or character but of the very
notion of subject itself. Indeed, if there is anything truly radical and
groundbreaking about the semiotics of the Fichte-Studien, it must be the primacy
of the schema over and above individual signifying agents, and, what is more,
so Wm.Arctander O'Brien's careful and rigorous examination of Novalis' semiotics (op.cit., pp.
97-106) is crucial in order not to leap to overhasty conclusions about Novalis' (post)modemity,
as O'Brien shows clearly the indebtedness of the fragment to already existing semiotic theories,
including Fichte's. I have appropriated a few elements from his study in what follows.
5) Derrida uses this formulation in the opening paragraph of "Structure, Sign, and Play", in
Derrida, Writing and Difference and it is clearly a notion which informs his critique of
structuralism in the entire text. Again, I need to warn against a hasty identification of
Romanticism with post-structuralism, Novalis with Derrida. I am in no way suggesting that
Novalis 'prefigures' Derrida in any simple way; what needs to be noted, however, is that Novalis'
semiotics are constituted in such a way as to pre-empt the critique of post-structuralism. This is a
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over and above signs and signifieds themselves. In a move comparable to Kant's
famous 'Copernican revolution', Novalis clearly asserts that individual signs and
individual signifieds alike are only ever communicable if one accepts the
primacy of, and the a priori necessary relations within, the schema52• This is
already a leap forward from 18th century theories of the sign, but Wm. Arctander
0' Brien is right to suggest that "the schema's inherent and universal mediation
between sign and signified undercuts any possibility of a stable priority of one to
the other" (op.cit., p.1 04), and thus that it "implies a questioning of the priority
of the signified which, until the late twentieth century will remain as
unquestionable for Saussure as it was for eighteenth-century semioticians." (ibid,
p.l03) This should not mean, and O'Brien is right to point this out in a note, that
Novalis should thus be seen as a precursor of Derridean deconstruction, or at
least not without complications - but it goes some way towards suggesting that at
least part of the radical nature of semiotic theory in the Fichte-Studien lies with
the 'discovery' of a transcendental schema which underwrites, as its a priori
condition of possibility, all possible further signification.
Yet, further to this discovery and to the overall radicality of Novalis'
semiotics in and of themselves, it is their bearing on epistemology which has the
most interesting ramifications for Romantic philosophy in general. For, if
knowledge itself, and consciousness itself is a sign, as has already been asserted,
point which will be developed further in the discussion of Hegelian semiology in relation to
Novalis.
~2 I am here compelled to cite part of a fragment from Novalis' later Allgemeine Brouillon,
written some time in 1798: " Philosophy unfastens everything [ macht alles los] - makes the
universal relative. Like the Copernican system it dissolves the fixed points - and turns that which
is at rest into something hovering [macht aus dem Ruhenden ein Schwebendes]" (III, 622, 378).
The citation seems to me to be paradigmatic of Novalis' project insofar as it states the
transformation of the static into the hovering, the relational. This, then, would be the Romantics'
own Copernican revolution: as concerns ontology, epistemology, the theory of signification all
alike, what is taken to be at the 'centre', so to speak, of the system, is not a fixed point but rather
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then it follows that the process of cognition and of consciousness is or should be
subsumed under the originary schema. Epistemology is thus always already
caught up in a process of signification, and is consequently also caught up within
Darstellung, representation as the work of the originary schema. Once again, the
conclusion that Romanticism ends up with is that all human processes of
cognition, every "approach to Being", can only ever take place from within the
horizon of representation. Novalis' notion of Schein is here most relevant once
again. If, as we have already seen, Schein and Seyn are inextricably linked with
each other, if "truth" and "thought" are also instances of Schein, and if, finally,
the subject's path towards knowledge is but "an approach to Being" - then it
becomes clear that for Novalis, and for early Romanticism in general, Schein as
appearance, illusion, even fiction, is the proper realm of epistemology. Beyond
this, however, the transcendental schema already circumscribes the limits of the
realm of signification, Schein, which is also the realm of epistemology, and it is
those limits which Novalis will later take up as the subject of his Monolog: the
primacy of the transcendental schema, which functions independently of
sign/word, signified/thing and signifying agent alike will become (explicitly, for
implicitly it already is) the self-sufficiency and self-referentiality of all
signification, of language as such.
the inherently dynamic "luminous point of hovering" (II, 266, 555), the a priori relationality of
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II. A Romantic Theory of Language: Novalis' Monolog,
The Monolog of 1798 is justly the most famous theoretical text by
Novalis, and it is also apparently the most 'modem' .53 It encapsulates what must
be taken as the fundamental Romantic conception of language, and this is indeed
a conception with no parallel until Nietzsche, Heidegger, and their more recent
affiliates. Its importance for the issues at stake here is undeniable, and twofold:
first, it is the most succinct presentation of Novalis' linguistic theory, and has to
be read in relation with the semiotics produced a few years earlier in the Fichte-
Studien, highlighting the degree to which Novalis applies the 'originary schema'
to the whole of language; in this way, language, and the schematism which
remains at its core, takes on the central role which the Romantics were the first to
assign to it. Second, and equally important, the Monolog is the first Romantic
text here under consideration whose significance lies not only with what it
purports to say, but just as much with how it does so; in it, Novalis not only
assigns a special role and characteristics to language in general, but in his own
language engages with those characteristics, resulting in a text which, while
denoting the self-referentiality of language, also, and at the same time, performs
this self-referentiality in its own writing. Indeed, many of the key Romantic
the originary schema.
53 As the text of the Monologue already exists in several translations and is quoted whole in
almost every book on Novalis and Romanticism (including Bowie, 0' Brien,
Pfefferkom,Schulte-Sasse, and Seyhan) I have resisted the temptation to provide yet another
translation of its entirety. The translations used in my discussion are my own, but have obviously
been informed by the several translations already in existence.
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texts of the 'mature' period, not least the fragments of the Athenaum, will follow
in the Monolog's example and become explicitly self-referential, in a very
particular manner which will be analysed later.
The very beginning of the text finds Novalis in awe at ''the ridiculous
error of people who believe that they speak for the sake of things" (II, p.672),
and before even considering the ramifications of the statement we must pause to
note and appreciate, for the first but most certainly not the last time, the
appearance, in Novalis' own language, of the dominant Romantic trope - irony.
"[T]he ridiculous error" is an expression already loaded with the 'simple' irony
of someone who laughs derisorily at common misconceptions, and it finds a
peculiar counterpart when Novalis speaks of "speaking and writing" as
themselves "actually quite foolish (niirrische) things": "foolish" here denotes
that which is the domain of the fool, the court-jester, the traditional seat of wit,
and the "ridiculous" (lacherlich - laughable) error Novalis is being ironic about,
is in fact the error of misunderstanding the foolish character of language. In this
way - and this is typical of the Romantic irony most readily associated with
Schlegel, what he in fact calls "irony of irony" - the foolish are those who
misunderstand language, who do not take language itself for the fool that it is. It
is a rhetorically remarkable opening gesture, and one to which the text, after the
'detour' that is its main body of concern, will return towards its end with
renewed ironic ferocity. Rhetoric aside, however, what comes across most
powerfully and succinctly from the very opening of the Monolog is Novalis'
acutely modem conception of language as a closed, self-referential system:
language, Novalis tells us "is concerned only with itself'. Further more, and
crucially for the analysis which follows, of this "peculiarity of language, that it is
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only concerned with itself, nobody is aware."(ibid.) Leaving to the side, if only
briefly, the alarming succession of ironies which continues, and concentrating on
the dictum that "language is concerned only with itself', the first thing to note
would be that it does indeed sound remarkably modem, and has become a
commonplace of linguistics and of philosophy of language in the late 20th
century, at least after Saussure and Wittgenstein. Secondly, though no less
importantly, the pronouncement of a closed system of language has to be read in
conjunction with the earlier semiotic fragments of the Fichte-Studien - the self-
referentiality of language in general can simply be equated with the autonomy
and primacy of the transcendental schema. In the long 'semiotic' fragment of
1795 Novalis established that the transcendental schema is a priori, operating
independently of, and at the same time operating on, the signified and the
signifying agent, or the sign in general; here, three years later, he asserts the
same of language in itself, thus practically equating the schema with 'language'.
Crucially, however, as was pointed out in the previous section, the schema, and
therefore language, was utilised as the pivot around which epistemology, as
defined by Novalis, turns. Signs, language, form the horizon of (re)presentation
which is thus also the horizon of epistemology, or, in plain words: "I", the
subject can only know things (objects) through signs, through language. What
"I" know then, and in perfect accordance with Kant, is the phenomenal sign of an
object, the word and not the thing-in-itself. More than this, what "I" know I
know through the representational activity of the transcendental schema, through
the representational activity of language - but this is clearly no longer
representation as mimesis or as correspondence. Knowledge may only be of
phenomena within the representational horizon, but the self-sufficient and self-
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referential representational activity that is language ceases to correspond in any
necessary way to the realm of proper (or noumenal) objects. The truth that
knowledge may aspire to will never be found outside the self-referential domain
of language, and language thus becomes the inexhaustible and at the same time
inexorable terrain of epistemology. Just as Holderlin in Seyn, Urtheil
circumscribes the very thought of Being as necessarily emanating from within
the horizon of judgment, so Novalis circumscribes the limits of human
knowledge as the limits of the representational horizon of language and
signification.
This could just be taken as a simple linguistic 'twist' on the fundamental
tenets of Kantian epistemology - but such 'twists' are hardly ever simple, and the
philosophical paths now opening are quite new. The very 'foolishness' of
language is also, according to Novalis, its most "wonderful and fruitful secret";
the "idle chatter" of self-referentiality Novalis still thinks people hate and
misunderstand is also language's "infinitely serious aspect" (ibid.). Far from
being limitations and circumscriptions, the bounds of language are in effect its
wonders, its mysteries, and ultimately its infinite seriousness. As a reading of the
rest of the Monolog, as well as a passing acquaintance with the generally exalted
tone of most Romantic theory would support, Novalis is not concerned with
legislating over the limits of human knowledge in the manner of Kant, but with
rejoicing in the endless self-referential play of language. The statement "a real
conversation is mere wordplay" tdas rechte Gesprach is ein blofies Wordspiel)
(ibid) is not meant to sound despairing or disparaging. For Novalis, it is when
people seek "to speak for the sake of things", when they seek "to speak of
something definite" (etwas Bestimmten) that they perpetrate the error of
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misunderstanding language; on the other hand, if one "speaks merely in order to
speak", then "he pronounces the most wonderful, most original truths" (ibid.).
From this it can already be inferred that the very self-referentiality, the word-play
aspect of language which means human subjects are not allowed to reach, to
know objects-in-themselves is also the key aspect of language to be celebrated.
The self-referential game of language should not be berated for denying us
access to the world, but should rather be celebrated for the "wonderful" and
"original" truths that it yields. The best way Novalis can think of to express this
newfound evangelical belief in linguistic self-reflexivity is to compare language
with mathematics, words with numbers. Both "constitute a world for
themselves", "play only with themselves, express nothing but their wonderful
nature"(ibid.), and it is for this reason, because of their autonomy and self-
referentiality, that language and mathematics, words and numbers are so
"expressive" (ausdrucksvoll). One could easily think that, however much
rejoicing in the self-referential nature of language is here taking place, the very
notion that language actually does express something would lead Novalis straight
back into a correspondence, or a mimetic, theory of language - but that would
depend on what language is expressive of. In this case, words (or numbers) are
not said to be expressive of things, or to correspond to things; instead they
"mirror" the "strange interplay of the relations of things" (das seltsame
Verhaltnifispiel der Dinge)(ibid.). As the next couple of lines assert, words and
numbers are indeed "members of nature", and they are so because of, and not
despite of their self-referential "freedom". I want to maintain that this 'mirroring'
of nature, of the world, onto words (or numbers) is at the furthest possible
remove from the simple mimetic correspondence of 'traditional' philosophy, and
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this because of the ontological foundations of Novalis' thinking. More precisely:
the "strange interplay of the relations of things" is not the same as "things"
themselves, and it would be a "ridiculous error" to think that one speaks "for the
sake of things". Instead, one speaks, or rather language speaks, in its endless self-
referential play, of relations, since, as I attempted to show in the previous
chapter, Romantic ontology, and the ontology of Novalis in particular is nothing
if not relational. What the self-referential, autonomous play of language mirrors
is in effect nothing other than the hovering of Being, or the Being-hovering of
the Fichte-Studien. This Being is not (yet) a determinate being, a thing, but rather
(cf. supra, Chapter I) the hovering, the differencing activity which produces
determinations. Thus, what language is said to 'mirror' is not things, neither
things-in-themselves nor even phenomenal things, for, as I showed in the
previous section, the transcendental schema (and this, once again, is language) is
a relational grid existing and operating independently of referents (in other
words, independently of phenomenal 'things') - the transcendental relational
schema, or language, mirrors, or expresses the relational differencing activity of
Being.
From here on the Monolog takes another explicitly self-referential turn, as
it considers what happens to understanding when language is taken as such a
solely self-referential game. Novalis takes up again the theme of knowing and
understanding of the opening ironies of the text. Earlier he had asserted that the
truth about language of which the text speaks, that is the truth that language is
entirely self-referential is one that "nobody is aware of', and, a few lines later,
had prefaced his remarks on the congruence of language with mathematics with
an almost despairing "if only one could make people understand ... " (begreiflich
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machen - render conceptual). Yet, and this would not be lost on any reader, this
is precisely what the text of the Monolog aspires and attempts to do. It would be
a serious, yet laughable error to consider Novalis' position as that of a simple,
derisory arch-ironist, of someone who believes he can "make people understand"
what they admittedly are not "aware of'; the misunderstanding emanating from
the self-referential status of language is a necessary one, and it necessarily
includes Novalis himself, and this should be taken as adding another layer to the
already thickening irony. Language is a difficult beast to tame, and its only
possible tamer would be a "prophet", someone who is described in almost
mystical terms as having "a fine feel for [language's] application, its rhythm
(Takt, a word connoting the time kept in music), its musical spirit", as being able
to "hear in himself the gentle effect of its inner nature and move his tongue or
hand accordingly."(ibid.) This prophet would be someone capable of seeing
beyond the endless self-referential play of language into its rhythm, its "musical
spirit", and who, moreover, would be able to convert his own organs and limbs
according to language's rhythm and musicality, someone who would be entirely
enthused, impregnated by the "spirit" of language, a seer and a speaker-in-
tongues.54 By contrast, whoever lacks those mystical, prophetic qualities of
enthusiasm by language, whoever "lacks the requisite ear and sense" but is yet
capable "well enough to write truths like these" would be misunderstood "as was
Cassandra by the Trojans." (ibid.) What is important to note here is that Novalis
does not think of himself as one of those prophets, but as Cassandra: "When I
S4 Although I have not included it in this discussion, I cannot, at this point, fail to mention one of
Novalis' more 'fictional', less theoretical texts which is concerned with precisely such prophets
and their possibility, the wonderful poetic fantasy The Novices of Sa is (Die Lehrlinge zu Sais). In
this text, Novalis once again puts forward the notion that language is essentially
incomprehensible, beyond understanding, as it "cannot understand itself'(Schr!Jien, I, 79 ). For
an instructive analysis of this text alongside the Monolog, see O'Brien, op.cit., pp 193-215.
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thus believe that I have set out (angegeben habe) the essence and function
(Wesen und Amt) of poetry most precisely, I still know that no man will
understand it." What the text has professed to be doing, fixing, setting out the
essence of poetry, or of language falls prey to the necessary misunderstanding
that all men have of this essence, and Novalis himself is a doomed Cassandra.
Is the prophet therefore an impossibility, a necessary fiction? Are all
writers doomed to play the role of Cassandra? On the first instance it would seem
so, but now the text takes another turn, as Novalis continues to write of himself
in the first person. He declares that fixing the essence of poetry amounts to
saying "something quite inane (albernes), because I wanted to say it", and the
derogatory term 'inane', or 'silly' must alert the reader to its relation with the
earlier derogatory terms used in the beginning of the text: the inanity of speaking
the 'truth' of language, of fixing the 'essence' of poetry is in effect the same
inanity of "idle chatter", the "foolishness" of all speaking and writing, and it is
therefore the same inanity and foolishness which yields, at the same time, the
"infinitely serious" side of language, its "wonderful and fruitful secret". The
incomprehensible ramblings of Cassandra-Novalis stake a claim for the essence
and secret of language, not because they seem to 'fix' its essence, not because of
what they say (that would be, strictly speaking, incomprehensible), but in that
they are said, because in them and through them language speaks its own
inanities. This fundamental insight is crucially given in the rhetorical form of
questions, and the rest of the short text is entirely made up of them: "But what if
I had to speak? And what if this drive of language to speak (dieser Sprachtrieb
zu Sprechen) were the mark (das Kennzeichen - the sign) of language's
inspiration (Eingebung), of language's efficacy (Wirksamkeit) within me?"
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Novalis asks himself, wonders about the possibility ("what if ... ?") that the
marker of enthusiasm is not the gift of a prophet, but the very drive of language
to speak (a wonderfully pleonastic formulation, alarmingly close to the famous
Heideggerian dictum "Die Sprache spricht"). What if a writer is enthused by
language not in any mystical way but in the very fact that s/he has to speak?
What if the very necessity of the Sprachtrieb, the very agent that makes language
"foolish" and "inane" is also the necessary marker of linguistic enthusiasm, the
misunderstood sign of language's "fruitful secret"? What if that which is
necessarily misunderstood, the endless and inane self-referential play of language
is also that which can "make a mystery of language understandable"(ibid.)?
What if, to cut the questions short, incomprehensibility were the very root and
necessary precondition of understanding?
This last surge of the text, laden with the pathos of rhetorical questions,
meticulously laying layer upon layer of discomforting irony to the already
existing heap, is even more astonishing if one considers that it was written in
1798, not 1968. Yet, as I will show in the next section, it has a very direct and
equally striking contemporary counterpart in Schlegel's essay On
Incomprehensibility which also considers the fundamental Romantic issue of the
misunderstanding of language, and does it through an examination of the trope of
irony. Irony in the Monolog may not be mentioned, but it is nearly omnipresent:
from the opening derisory tone, all the way to the almost painful self-questioning
of the end, Novalis finds that "he can only speak of language in language
ironically.v" This is a rhetorical necessity which is the product of Novalis'
conception of language. Language is nothing but endless self-referential play,
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divorced from the world of objects which it only "mirrors" insofar as its
relational games reflect Novalis' own relational ontology. Understanding, at
least insofar as that is conceived as a correspondence of concept with thing, of
word with object, appears to be, strictly speaking, impossible. And yet it is the
very 'misunderstanding' of language, its foolishness, its inanity which is the
bearer of the mark, the sign of language's efficacy; the incomprehensible but
uncontrollable Sprachtrieb ("What if I had to speak?"), even though it results in
the ramblings of a Cassandra, even though it is necessarily misunderstood by
men", and even though it will never yield ''the essence and function of poetry" is
the sign of language working on, effecting the speaker/writer, the marker of
understanding from, and within, incomprehensibility. How else to convey this
double bind of language than with, and as irony? This is why the Monolog must
count as an exemplary Romantic (as well as an exemplary modern) text: its 'said'
is complemented by its 'saying', the two are in effect inseparable, and what the
text speaks of (the necessary incomprehensibility of a closed self-referential
system of language being what in fact is language's essence and the only
condition, the only chance of understanding) the text rhetorically also performs
with its multifarious layers of irony.
There is, however, one more interesting aspect, one more curious twist to
this remarkable text, and it should be no surprise that it is a rhetorical one. I am
referring to the peculiar slide in terminology effected by Novalis in the last
section of the Monolog, the slide from "language" (Sprache) to "poetry"
(Poesie). It happens suddenly, when Novalis writes of his "inane" goal to "set
ss Azade Seyhan, Representation and its Discontents: the Critical Legacy of German
Romanticism, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992, p.88.
S6 Another echo of the first ironist, the first philosopher-riddler, Heraclitus: "Of the logos which
forever holds men prove uncomprehending ... "[B I] (translation mine).
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out the essence and function of poetry", when only a few lines before it had been
a question of the "musical spirit" of language. In the final rhetorical questions of
the text the two terms seem inseparable and interchangeable: the linguistic drive,
the Sprachtrieb is that which, through no wilful execution of the writer,
independently and inexorably, yields poetry, Poesie. Are we to think that
language and poetry are thus made the same? Would Novalis hold that all
language is poetry? Is it merely coincidental that the shift of terms happens after
Novalis has mentioned "rhythm", "musical spirit", and has evoked the tragic -
and therefore poetic - figure of Cassandra? The text offers no direct answer to
these questions. But they serve very well as a sign, a marker of perhaps the most
basic and most important contribution that Romanticism ever made to the history
of philosophy: that is to say, the notion that if Being is conceived as a relational
activity, if non-mimetic (re)presentation is the only possible horizon of
epistemology, or, as Novalis would have it, the only "approach to Being", if,
finally, language and the originary schema lying at its core is only an endless
self-referential game - then, despite phenomena and noumena, despite I and not-
I, the proper terrain, or, if I am allowed a 'witticism', the proper playground of
philosophy is poetry. Thus, in the rest of this chapter, I will examine what the
notion of poetry means philosophically for the Romantics, how their celebrated
ideal of the union of philosophy with poetry comes about and, more particularly
and presently, the tremendous role that the trope of irony plays in all this. And
for this I must finally turn my attention to the writings of Friedrich Schlegel.
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III. Irony and Incomprehensibility in Friedrich Schlegel's Athenlium
fragments.
In the period between 1794 and 1799, when he was, first, in lena and
under the direct influence of Fichte, and then, in Berlin, editing the celebrated but
short-lived journal Athenaum, Schlegel does not offer us anything like a
comprehensive theory of language as such, not even a fragmentary one as
intimated in Novalis' Fichte-Studien and Monolog. What he does offer us,
among fragments and proclamations which sometimes touch on what his
conception of language might be, is a radical theory of understanding situated in
the context of both philosophy and literary criticism. The pivotal text for an
examination of Schlegel's theory of understanding is undoubtedly his essay Ober
die Unverstdndlichkeit, or On Incomprehensibility, with which he chose to end
the scarcely three-year-long publishing experiment that was the Athenaum. It is
this overtly polemical, scathingly sarcastic and thoroughly sui generis text which
exemplifies, more than any other, the central Romantic contention that, in the
strictest epistemological sense, understanding is only ever possible alongside
non-understanding, misunderstanding, or incomprehensibility, or, to be more
precise, that understanding becomes possible only if one allows for the necessity
that incomprehensibility be also, concomitantly, possible. What this contention
highlights is not that understanding is somehow fatally compromised within
92
language, but rather that, within language and with language and (re)presentation
given as the only possible horizon for epistemology and understanding, the
possibility of understanding can only emanate from the possibility of
incomprehensibility, that for understanding to be in any degree necessary one
must first admit the necessity of the possibility of its opposite. In fact, if there is
anything that, even within the context of a wilfully playful and perhaps
ambiguous text such as Schlegel's, is made abundantly clear, that is the fact that
Schlegel consistently holds to the necessary interrelation and exchange, the
reciprocal determination of understanding and incomprehensibility. Furthermore,
it would not appear contentious to suggest that the site for this reciprocal
determination, or rather the horizon out of which it is formed, is language, and
language conceived in a manner similar to the one in which it is conceived in
Novalis' Monolog. Towards the beginning of his essay Schlegel asserts, like
Novalis, that "words often understand themselves better than do those who use
them"s7. It follows that, since human understanding and human pursuits such as
science and art become possible through and in language, with all its potentially
treacherous self-referentiality, such human pursuits as science and art are entirely
complicit in this interplay between understanding and its lack. Schlegel puts it
thus: "one obtains the purest and most splendid incomprehensibility precisely
from science and from art, whose very aim is to be understood and to make
understandable"(ibid.). Already what is intimated is what will become explicit in
the course of the essay, namely that, just as, for Novalis, the "efficacy" of
language is intimately tied up with its "inanity", for Schlegel, the greatest call for
57 The essay is to be found in the Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe, ed. E. Behler &
H.Eichner, Schoningh, 1958- (hereinafter KFSA), Vol. 2,363-372. A translation of the essay is
found in 1.Schulte-Sasse (ed.), Theory as Practice: a Critical Anthology of Early German
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understanding, its greatest necessity and its greatest chance is intimately
implicated with the most fundamental necessity of the possibility of
incomprehensibility. But, as was mentioned earlier, the most important facet of
this essay for the whole of the Romantic enterprise is the theorisation of irony as
precisely the locus of this inter-relation between understanding and its opposite,
as it is with irony that Schlegel identifies the problematic of understanding and
incomprehensibility throughout not only this essay but, arguably, the entire
period of the Athenaum.
Irony, more precisely the seemingly independent mode of "Romantic"
Irony which has become a commonplace in the history of ideas, is widely
regarded as perhaps the key identifiable feature of Romanticism, and, although I
have no desire to challenge this notion, I must already insist that if we want to
understand irony the way the Romantics did, it is thoroughly counterintuitive to
think of it as a specific kind or mode of irony among many others. Even though
there is little doubt that the conception of irony in Schlegel must be differentiated
from its counterpart in Plato (what has come to be called "Socratic irony"), or,
even more so, that in Kierkegaard, and, finally, the mode of irony that has come
to be called 'postmodem', it will become clear that 'Romantic' irony is a
universal (non-)concept or it is nothing. This is not to argue with the easily
established fact that irony can be, and has been conceived in a host of different
ways, but rather to stress that its conception in Schlegel elevates irony to the
status of a universal, necessary phenomenon of language and of the
understanding, a 'transcendental trait', if you like, equally essential and all-
pervasive as language and the subjects of epistemology themselves. And it must
Romantic Writings, University of Minnesota, 1997, here p. 119. I am here using this translation,
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also be stressed that there is no avoidance of the fact that irony, whether it be
conceived of in the classical-rhetorical way as a mere trope, or as a 'character', a
human type of intelligence and behaviour as with Socrates, or even in its
elevation from the Socratic 'character' to a generalisable 'existential'
predicament for the 'ironic subjectivity' (which, not at all coincidentally, also
elevates irony to the status of a "concept") in the hands of Kierkegaard'" - in all
these different modes and types it has historically acquired irony remains
something intricately connected with the understanding. Irony in the rhetorical
sense, from Quintillian to the present, is a trope which is designed to dissimulate,
and therefore to confuse the understanding of those who do not possess it, and
enhance that of those who do, a rhetorical slap on the back for the 'happy few'
who understand that the speaker means the opposite of what s/he says. Socrates
is an ironist, or, to be exact, an "eiron", fundamentally because of the famous
dictum: "I only know that I know nothing", clearly an indication of the
inexorable connection of irony and knowledge, irony and the understanding.
Kierkegaard's irony is more of a human condition, an existential given, but still,
it could be argued, related to understanding, to knowledge and its loss. Finally,
so-called 'postmodem' irony is the irony related to the infamous end of
metaphysical metanarratives, the knowledgeable understanding of the loss of
with occasional slight modifications.
58 Viz. The beginning of the chapter on "The World-Historical Validity of Irony, the Irony of
Socrates", in Kierkegaard's The Concept of Irony, New York: Harper & row, 1965: "If we tum
back to the foregoing general description of irony as infinite absolute negativity, it is adequately
suggested therein that irony is no longer directed against this or that particular phenomenon,
against a particular existing thing, but that the whole of existence has become alien to the ironic
subject and the ironic subject in tum alien to existence, that as actuality has lost its validity for the
ironic subject, he himself has to a certain degree become unactual." Kierkegaard, op.cit., p.259. I
am not here concerned with Kierkegaard's own conception of irony, even if it is conceded that
this was influenced by Schlegel, through the intervention of Hegel (for more on this intervention,
see the next chapter). I am here only sketching the reasons why Kierkegaard's conception should
be read as fundamentally different to Schlegel's.
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complete understanding ". In all cases, irony is endemic to knowledge, and in all
cases, irony is what both confuses, or undermines knowledge and understanding
on the one hand, while simultaneously endorsing a higher, 'ironic' form of
knowledge and understanding on the other.
All of this, there is no question, is nothing other than what Schlegel
means by irony. And yet I would wish to contend that Schlegel's is by far the
most universal and the most radical conception of irony, and this precisely
because it is a conception which universalises and radicalises the essential
relation that irony bears to the understanding. Irony as a trope, the simplest of its
many guises, is already theorised by Schlegel in the same essay as a form of
rhetorical and epistemological doubt", as the figure which symbolises or
schematises the essential interrelation between understanding and
incomprehensibility. In one dense and, needless to say, ironic paragraph of the
essay Schlegel identifies several types of irony, from the "simple" or
"unrefined", through the "fine and delicate", to the "dramatic" and beyond.
Perhaps the most curious aspect of these examples of irony is that some of them
appear to be situating irony in the object, and not the subject, or, even more
surprisingly, in nature itself, as when Schlegel writes of "sincere" irony as being
"most appropriate in old gardens, where wonderful pleasant grottoes lure the
nature lover, brimming with feeling, into their cool laps, only in order to spray
59 The locus classicus for a discussion of postmodemity as the loss of 'grand narratives' is J.-F.
Lyotard's La Condition Postmoderne, Minuit, Paris, 1979. It is interesting to note Lyotard's sub-
title, "rapport sur Ie savoir", or "a report on Knowledge", which situates the problematics of
postmodemity within the sphere of knowledge and the understanding. For a 'postmodem' theory
of irony with indubitable connections with Romanticism (and, for that matter, Kierkegaard), see
Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge university Press, Cambridge,
Mass. 1989. Again I am not here launching into a discussion involving these 'postmodem'
conceptions of irony; I wish merely to highlight this time the continuity of the perception of irony
as related to the understanding.
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him thoroughly from all sides with water and in this way to dispel his tender
mood"(Schulte-Sasse, op.cit., pp. 124-125). This passage is in some ways typical
of the biting ironic tone of the whole essay, and it is in its rhetorical irony that it
divulges the most about what Schlegel really has in mind. It would be tempting
simply to assume that we have understood correctly, first time around, and that
Schlegel is really only ascribing irony to a feature of nature, as if old gardens
were having a quiet joke at the expense of the nature lover who is impregnated
with 'feeling'. But this would be fundamentally wrong for two reasons at least:
first, because it would go against the Kantian transcendental framework which
Schlegel and the Romantics in general inherited nearly wholesale, and which
would entail that, especially since irony is a feature of the understanding, its
import is not on the object as such but on the way the object is made apparent
and cognisable transcendentally to the subject (in the same way that it would be
wrong to speak of the Kantian sublime as pertaining to the object itself); a couple
of pages before hand, Schlegel states that his only working definition of irony is
that "everything is still only a tendency"(ibid., p.122), and among these
tendencies he singles out Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Fichte's
Wissenschafislehre, which, at least, should alert us to the philosophical tradition
that his essay is self-consciously a part of. Second, because the work of
dissimulation that Schlegel seems here to ascribe to nature is, at the same time
and even more clearly, operating on the level of the text itself - in plain words, if
there is anyone poking fun at our understanding here, it is not the garden, but
Schlegel.
60 It should be noted that this conception of irony as epistemological doubt, or as scepticism, is
one formulated earlier by Schlegel, as evidenced by his notebooks of 1796-1797, where irony is
described as "the highest, purest scepticism" (KFSA, XVIII, p.406, no. I023)
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The fundamental mistake people make is that irony could ever be
contained on a single level, that one could simply laugh at being drenched by a
treacherous ironic water-feature and that would be that. Schlegel, to a great
degree a faithful Kantian and a faithful Fichtean, lodges his own conception of
irony on the reflexive level?', the second power (in the same way as he will come
to speak of poetry at the same time as 'poetry of poetry') - he calls that, and it is
the ultimate 'example' given, "the irony of irony". Iquote at length:
"In general, the most basic irony of irony is indeed the fact that one easily
tires of irony if it is offered everywhere and time and time again. But what we
above all want to have understood by the irony of irony arises in more ways than
one. For example, if one speaks about irony without irony, as was just the case; if
one uses irony to speak of irony without realising that at that very moment one
finds oneself in another, much more striking irony; if one is unable to escape
irony, as appears to be the case with this experiment concerning
incomprehensibility; if irony becomes mannerism and thus, as it were, ironises
the author; if one has promised to contribute to a superfluous journal without
previously estimating one's reserves of irony, and now against one's will must
produce irony, like an actor with a stomach-ache; if irony runs wild and simply
won't let itself be governed at all."(ibid., p.l2S)
61 The key text for an understanding of the essential relation between reflection and irony in
Schlegel and Romanticism in general is Walter Benjamin's dissertation, The Concept a/Criticism
in German Romanticism, in Benjamin, Selected Writings, Vol. I, edited by Marcus Bullock and
Michael W. Jennings, Harvard University Press 1996 (a translation of Benjamin, Der Begriff der
Kunstkritik in den deutschen Romantik, in Benjamin, Gessamelte Schriften, eds. Rolf Tiedemann
& Hermann Schweppenhauser, Suhrkamp Verlag 1974). Crucially, as Benjamin painstakingly
analyses, the Romantic/Schlegelian notion of reflection differs from Fichte's, as will be discussed
in a later chapter. For the moment, I only wish to signal Benjamin's essential formulation that
"irony, like criticism, can demonstrate itself only in reflection", Selected Writings Vol I., p.164.
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If it seems that here Schlegel is simply allowing irony to proliferate
unchecked, infinitely, it must also be stressed that this infinite proliferation is not
wilful or contrived. If irony is reflexive it is so always and from the beginning.
This can be seen most readily, at the simplest possible level, if one thinks
through the canonical, rhetorical notion of irony as dissimulation of the
understanding: for a sentence or a proclamation to be labelled ironic (example:
"Hitler was a good man"), it always has to be referred at the same time to both its
meanings, the 'primary', obvious one, which is a dissimulation, ("Hitler was a
good man, straightforwardly", the statement taken at face value) and the
'secondary', ironic one, which would be the 'true' one where the dissimulation
becomes apparent as dissimulation ("no, Hitler was not a good man, I am being
ironic"). In other words, for the irony to be understood, it must be understood on
two levels at once, and thus irony always, inevitably presents the understanding
with the necessity of its doubling, or the necessity of reflection. This is the
'essence' of irony, that it is never simple or straightforward, and thus, strictly
speaking, irony cannot be said to have an essence, other than its necessary
doubling'i'. Where Schlegel is indeed being more radical, and where his notion
of irony decisively departs from 'simple' ironic statements such as the example I
have just given, is in his insistence, evident throughout the essay and in all his
statements on irony, that this doubling cannot itself be simple, cannot itself only
happen once, but must be doubled, indeed must be infinitely proliferated. If, in
the case of irony, the understanding is always necessarily called upon to double
itself in reflection, Schlegel suggests that there is no reason to think that this
62 This is the reason why, in the preceding discussion, I have used the term "(non-) concept" for
irony, that is, irony cannot properly be said to be a concept if it is found to be lacking a singular
(conceptual) essence. In this way, when writing about the 'essence' of irony as precisely a
necessary reflexive doubling, the word 'essence' will appear in quotation marks.
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doubling should stop. Right after the passage just quoted, Schlegel changes
paragraph, and writes:
"What gods will be able to save us from all these ironies? The only
solution might be if an irony could be found that had the characteristic of
gobbling up and swallowing all those large and small ironies so that nothing
more could be seen of them. And I must confess that I notice in my own [ie., in
my own irony, the irony Schlegel himself evidently employs in writing these
lines] a decided inclination toward exactly this. But even this would only be able
to help for a short time. I fear that if I correctly understand what fate seems to
indicate to me, soon a new generation of small ironies would arise: because,
truly, the stars are signalling the fantastic. And even assuming that things
remained peaceful for a long time, they could hardly be trusted to remain so. One
simply cannot fool around with irony. It can cast an unbelievably long
shadow."(ibid., p.125)
What this passage ironically prophesies, and then retracts, is the
eventuality of irony itself being the closure of its own movement of doubling, a
final, apocalyptic irony which would "gobble up" and "swallow" all the
proliferations of irony that have occurred thus far, a reflection to end all
reflection. But Schlegel knows that this would be impossible, closure and non-
reflexive 'rest' are impossible, essentially impossible because of the 'essence' of
irony being itself essentially double. What he "confesses" as his own tendency,
the tendency infinitely to proliferate and enlarge ironies to the point that it might
seem that one could be found to annihilate them all, is only a tendency - and we
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must remember that irony is itself, Schlegel wrote earlier, a marker, a sign for a
tendency. Irony survives its own monstrous self-proliferation, it survives its own
tendency to annul itself, and must finally manifest itself as this survival, the
survival of doubling, and the survival of reflection. There is no use in trying to
find the irony to end all irony, and this precisely because irony does not possess a
single self-identical 'essence'; it is but a tendency, a "shadow". And yet, simply
because irony is that shadow and that tendency, and simply because irony is
nothing other than the tendency to survive attempts to contain it, irony's shadow
can be, that is to say, has the tendency to be "unbelievably long".
Nevertheless, the text does not end here. Schlegel still has to contend with
incomprehensibility, he still has somehow to 'explain' why it is that the
Athenaum was charged with being incomprehensible: "I've already had to admit
indirectly that the Athenaum is incomprehensible, and since my admission was
made in the heat of irony, I can hardly take it back since I would otherwise injure
irony itself."(ibid., p.l26) Schlegel's 'answer' is to turn the accusation of
incomprehensibility on its head, and to assert that incomprehensibility is a
necessity. "But is incomprehensibility actually something so completely
reprehensible, so base?" he asks, indirectly accusing and attacking his own
accusers. A few lines later he continues: "Indeed, you would all be quite
apprehensive if the whole world, as you demand it, were for once to become
entirely understandable."(ibid., p.l26) What is being forcefully resisted here is
the possibility of a closure of the understanding, the possibility of a complete and
unified understanding which would be unassailable by the potentially infinite
doubling of reflexive irony. For the moment this is only an indication, a 'feeling',
perhaps, and the inexorable link between the possibility of understanding and the
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necessity of the possibility of incomprehensibility has not yet been demonstrated.
In the next paragraph, Schlegel finds that "consolation as regards the generally
recognisable unintelligibility of the Athenaum lies in this recognition itself,
because it is precisely this recognition that taught us that the problem will be
temporary."(ibid., p.126) From here on, the text launches into a famous and
rhetorically complex, not to say bombastic, prophetic tone, heralding a "new
age" of understanding, when the Athenaum will finally come to be understood.
For some critics, this is read as a sign of a messianic utopian tendency on
Schlegel's part, or, the opposite face of the same coin, as a sign of a futural
projection towards an end which is bound to be bad. The first case is exemplified
by Peter Szondi, who writes of Schlegel's "openness to the future that expresses
itself in 'presentiment' and 'projects",63; the second by Maurice Blanchot, who
writes that "Romanticism, it is true, ends badly, but this is because it is
essentially what begins and what cannot but finish badly.,,64Both those readings
must be resisted, denied, if the import of Schlegel's essay is to be at all grasped.
In Blanchot' s case, there is a lot to be admired in the position that Romanticism
is indeed "that which begins", but, biographical details aside, there is simply
nothing to suggest, with the force of necessity that Blanchot suggests, that what
begins will finish badly. In Szondi's case, which is here much more apposite
since he is directly referring to the passage under consideration, it is simply
baffling that such an otherwise astute and learned commentator on Romanticism
would read a text so heavily imbued with irony totally and throughout, at face
value. Yes, Schlegel does present what appears to be a messianic vision of a time
63 Peter Szondi, "Friedrich Schlegel and Romantic irony", in Szondi, On Textual understanding
and other essays, trans. By H. Mendelsohn, Manchester University Press, 1986, p.60.
64 Maurice Blanchot, "L' Athenaum", in Blanchot, L 'entretien infini, Gallimard, p.517,
translation mine.
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(for him, ironically, the 19th century, when his critical fortunes were at an all-
time low) when the project of the Athenaum will finally be understood, but it
should only take a simple reading of what has gone on just before (I am referring
specifically to the resistance of closure by the understanding just noted, and more
generally to the unavoidable fact that the whole essay, much less the heavy-
handed rhetoric of this 'messianic' turn, cannot possibly be divorced from the
dissimulation of irony) to understand that the projection into the future
undertaken here is itself ironic. In both cases, what has been misunderstood (and
this is itself a rich irony which would not have been lost on Schlegel) is that
Schlegel's apocalyptic, messianic, or utopian tone is itself but a feature of the
tendency that is irony.
In any case, it is in this projected future dimension that Schlegel finally
comes to articulate the reciprocal determination of understanding and
incomprehensibility. He writes, still in the future tense:
"The great separation between understanding and incomprehension will
become increasingly universal, pronounced, clear. A great amount of hidden
incomprehensibility will yet have to break out. But understanding will also show
its omnipotence - understanding, which ennobles sensibility to character and
talent to genius, and which refines feeling and intuition into art. Understanding
itself will be understood [... ]"(ibid., p 127)
In this ironically prophetic projection Schlegel postulates that the
separation, the rift between understanding and incomprehensibility, the fault with
which the Athenaum project was marred, will be enlarged, reflexively
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proliferated like the endless list of ironies he was addressing earlier in the essay.
The more the rift widens, the more understanding itself comes to the fore - but,
crucially, there are two dimensions of the understanding here which allow us to
grasp what Schlegel actually means by the term. One: the properties and effects
Schlegel ascribes to the understanding are precisely concomitant with the
understanding as conceived by Kant, they betray a more than faithful Kantianism
on his part; this is the understanding as the faculty which connects sensibility to
intuition. Two: understanding here is itself reflexive; what Schlegel says is not
simply that understanding will strengthen along with the incomprehensibility that
"breaks out", but, with greater emphasis, that the understanding of
understanding, understanding in the second power, or reflexive understanding
will finally become possible - "understanding itself will be understood". The
reciprocal determination between understanding and incomprehensibility is
therefore a relation which is itself reflexive, or doubled. It is not just the case that
with more incomprehensibility comes more understanding - that could possibly
be seen as absurd - but it is the case that incomprehensibility, to a progressively
greater degree, allows for the understanding of understanding.
Incomprehensibility is thus seen as that which permits the understanding of
understanding; reflection of, and on, the understanding is made possible if one
allows for the necessary possibility of incomprehensibility'". Thus it becomes
6S This point is also brilliantly made by Werner Hamacher, in Premises: "Irony ... is the structure
by virtue of which language is possible but its complete constitution - as something like a
characteristica universalis or a closed system of tropes - is impossible. Instead of being an
inner-linguistic figure, for which it is often mistaken, irony is, for Schlegel, the limit figure of
affiguration: the interminable opening of the domain of figures, always at their margin, noticeable
in every particular figure as the quivering of its contours, and at the same time their de-
figuration". Hamacher, op.cit., p. 17. Of course, another prominent figure (and Hamacher's
teacher and direct influence) who saw the true dimensions of Schlegelian irony and its relation to
language in general, and figural language in particular, is Paul de Man; see, as the earliest
example of his constant preoccupation with this issue, "The Rhetoric of Temporality" in his
Blindness and Insight, London, Routledge, 1983.
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obvious that, throughout the various rhetorical permutations and ironic doublings
of the essay, Schlegel's conception of the understanding, of the movement of
thought itself, like irony, is always doubled, reflexive. A simple, one-sided
understanding is made impossible by the doubling operations of irony, just as
impossible as a notion of understanding which would be complete, unified,
whole and unassailed by the radical openness of irony; but it is this doubling of
irony, signalling incomprehensibility as reflection on the understanding, which
makes possible the reflection of the understanding, the understanding of
understanding. The understanding of understanding is only possible from
incomprehensibility, and thus the relation between understanding and its opposite
is both a disjunction, a "separation" or a rift, and a conjunction, a necessary
interdependence on the second, reflexive level.
It is clear that the motor behind this paradoxical inter-connectedness, the
reciprocal determination of understanding and incomprehensibility is none other
than irony. As was mentioned earlier, irony is the locus of the relation, both the
rift and the link between understanding and incomprehensibility, and this is
because irony is itself always a double movement and a process of doubling. In
considering further some of Schlegel's numerous proclamations on, and
definitions of, irony, I am guided by this principle, that is to say by the notion
that irony is a process of doubling, a movement of reflection. When Schlegel
writes, in Athenaum 121, that "An idea is a concept perfected to the point of
irony, an absolute synthesis of absolute antitheses, the continual self-creating
interchange of two conflicting thoughts'f", what is of key interest, more than the
66 Schlegel's fragments are to be found in KFSA, Vol. 2. Translations are available in Friedrich
Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Peter Firchow, Univeristy of Minnesota, 1991. Once
again, I follow Firchow's translations with slight modifications when required. References to the
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definition of an idea, is what exactly is meant by "to the point of irony" (his zur
Ironie). It would seem that an idea differs from a concept in that precisely it
cannot be thought of as simple, but must be thought of as double, a "synthesis",
as a connection, an "interchange", and it is this doubling, connecting and
synthesising which is the work of irony. Irony works to produce "an absolute
synthesis of absolute antitheses", irony works to produce "a continual self-
creating interchange of two conflicting thoughts". In this way, and although the
fragment does not directly offer us a determination or a definition of irony, it
tells us much about the operation, the work of irony, and what it tells us follows
inexorably from what Schlegel has written on the doubling of irony, on the
"irony of irony" which is irony's 'essential' determination. Irony is thus, once
again, a reflexive (double), conjunctive/disjunctive relation, it keeps the two
conflicting thoughts which form the idea through their interchange forever
connected and yet forever disjoined, in a condition which Schlegel will also, in
another fragment examined later, describe as "absolute antagonism". This is a
condition of the understanding (since irony, as was established, is always of the
understanding) akin to the relational ontology of Novalis; irony, in other words,
is the epistemological double of Novalis' ontological hovering, a word and a
'concept' that Schlegel mobilises often in the fragments. In Athenaum 305 he
writes, beginning again with a consideration "his zur Ironie", that "humour"
(which in this case must clearly be seen as a sub-set of irony, perhaps the kind of
'humorous' irony Schlegel was employing in relation to his old garden) "likes to
hover about the gently and clearly flowing rhapsodies of philosophy or of
poetry", and, in a formulation which should be enough to allow us to see his
published fragments will be made according to the title of their collection (Lyceum. Athenaum, or
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utterly serious intent despite his writing on humour, that "humour deals with
being and non-being, and its true essence is reflection". Irony (and humour) then
is much more than a simple rhetorical effect; it is the precise mirroring, or
double, of Being-as-hovering, and thus takes on, for Schlegel, the role that in
Novalis is taken by the self-referentiality, the simultaneous inanity and efficacy
of all language, of language as such, as this is seen in his Monolog. I do not wish
hastily to announce a simple identity between irony and language, but rather to
point out that, in the context of Romantic epistemology and language theory, the
conceptualisation of irony by Schlegel, its determination as a reflexive
movement of connection and disjunction at the same time, as an essential
relationality of the understanding, a hovering (between primary and secondary
meanings, or even between understanding and incomprehensibility) finds its
counterpart in Novalis' conception of the endless self-referential, relational play
of language; to suggest, in other words, that even when Novalis and Schlegel do
not use the same terminology, nor even operate within the same rhetorical
terrain, their basic conceptions of language, epistemology, ontology, can be, at
the very least, directly linked.
In fact, it is difficult to resist the temptation of comparing Schlegelian
irony with Novalis' conception of language. It is hard not to see Schlegelian
irony, despite Novalis' own misgivings about his friend's notion'", as just this
radical universal condition of language, and of the understanding, especially
Ideas), and their number.
67 In a direct critical comment on Schlegel's Lyceum fragments on irony, to be found in his
Vermischte Bemerkunegn, Novalis writes: "What Schlegel so sharply characterises as irony is to
my way of thinking nothing other - than the result, the character of true reflection - the true
presence of the spirit. The spirit only appears in a strange, airy form. Schlegel's irony seems to
me to be true humour. Several names are of benefit to an idea." (II, 428, 36) I would like to
suggest that perhaps Novalis' objection is a nominalist one - indeed, "several names are of
benefit to an idea", and what he correctly identifies as "the character of true reflection", and "the
true presence of the spirit" is in gesture just as universal as Schlegel's conception of irony.
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when Schlegel goes to such lengths to make irony inescapable in Ober die
Unverstandlichkeit. Irony is not another name for language, nor another name
for the understanding, hut it stands as the key Schlegelian term for the condition
of both. This should become even more apparent when we consider another
famous Schlegelian fragment on irony, Lyceum 108. Here irony is not only said
to be "the freest of all licenses ... and yet ... absolutely necessary", which
already echoes Novalis' key notion of the "free necessity" governing the
transcendental semiotic schema, but its operation, its work is defined precisely as
Novalis, in the Monolog, talks of the operation of the Sprachtrieb: "It [irony]
contains and arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism between the absolute
(des Unbedingten) and the relative (des Bedingten), between the impossibility
and the necessity of complete communication." Irony is a relation, and thus a
link, a conjunction, and yet a relation of antagonism, thus a disjunction; irony is
the link between the possibility and the necessity of understanding and
communication, and the possibility and necessity of incomprehensibility. Irony
is at once the inane, destructive undoing of the understanding, and the
enthusiasm, in Novalis' terms, which makes it at all possible. What needs to be
noted, further than the congruence between Novalis' and Schlegel's thought, is
the kind of relation, the kind of process or operation that irony announces. As
"indissoluble antagonism between the absolute and the relative", irony cannot he
seen as a movement of dialectical sublation, despite the fact that its perpetual
reflexive doubling and its seemingly infinite progression may suggest that. Irony
can never be a process that somehow manages to complete its series of
doublings, just as a final all-engulfing irony could not be possible in Ober die
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Unverstandlichkeit - the antagonism is indeed indissoluble, the disjunction is
always there.
This seeming permanence of disjunction, which operates at the same time
as its double, a permanence of relation and conjunction, can perhaps best be seen
in the fragment, and in this case it is little more than an unpublished note, which
in my eyes says more about the Schlegelian conception of irony than any other.
The briefest, and perhaps also the most paradoxical definition Schlegel gives of
irony is to be found among his notebooks, and is written at the same time as the
Athenaum fragments. It states: "Irony is a permanent parabasis" (Die Ironie ist
eine perrnanente Parekbase) (KFSA 18, 668, p.85). Before attempting to show
why this fragment is of such cardinal importance for the issues here at stake'",
first it must be literally explained. A parabasis is a classical rhetorical figure,
found chiefly in Attic comedies such as those by Aristophanes, which takes the
form of an 'aside', an interruption in the narrative of a play - perhaps the chief
modern instantiation of parabasis is in Brecht's plays, where it is used to
produced the desired Verfrerndungseffekt. Already, when Schlegel uses the term
to describe irony, a double aspect of irony comes to the fore. First, that the
interruption of parabasis is, on the level of irony, the interruption of the process
of understanding; in dramatic terms, parabasis disrupts the narrative flow of a
play, disconnecting, in a decisive break, what precedes it from what comes after
it, in a way analogous to the disruption of ordinary, 'simple' understanding
performed by the operations of irony. Second, just as parabasis (most clearly and
intentionally in the case of Brechtian drama), by interrupting the flow of
dramatic narrative, actually points to the status of the playas a play, irony as
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parabasis of the understanding, and, to be more precise, as parabasis of
linguistic/rhetorical understanding is exactly what allows for the possibility of
reflexive understanding, in that irony makes the understanding reflexively
double, so that it can reflect on both the primary and secondary senses of the
ironic word or statement, thus resulting in a reflexive understanding of the
process of understanding. Briefly considered, this is at least one of the reasons
why this note of Schlegel's is this cardinal - it states, in a few words, what in the
few pages of Ober die Unverstandlichkeit, and given the essay's rich ironic
texture, Schlegel attempted to assert and, as was seen earlier, severely risked
being misunderstood about. But crucially Schlegel calls irony a permanent
parabasis, something which, in dramatic terms would either be completely
impossible or simply incomprehensible. In terms of irony being a feature, a
phenomenon, or a condition of understanding, (and, again, here it needs to be
stressed that understanding must be seen as schematic, semiotic, linguistic
understanding, in keeping with what both Novalis, and, in his own oblique way,
Schlegel, bring to bear in their epistemology) permanent parabasis suggests that
the disruption of the 'simple' process of understanding is itself permanent, or
rather, that this 'simple' process of understanding, understanding by means of
simple correspondence of word to meaning is, strictly speaking, always already
impossible. Another way of stating this would be to assert that understanding,
within the epistemological limits ascribed to language, is always reflexive
understanding, it is always double, because irony, operating upon the
understanding, is itself double in its 'essence'. Irony as permanent parabasis is
what makes us aware, what makes us understand, that language is the endless
68 I am in no way the first to suggest that. The fragment is a favourite topos in the writings of Paul
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self-reflexive play of Novalis' Monolog - no 'simple' correspondence between
word and meaning, between signifier and signified is ever possible, because
irony as permanent parabasis is the self-same condition of language which
Novalis sees as inanity. And yet, irony as permanent parabasis also yields the
necessary possibility of reflexive understanding, and this is the same condition of
language that Novalis describes as the enthusiasm of the Sprachtrieb. Irony
indeed means, to quote Novalis, that we do not "speak for the sake of things",
since it prevents the simple correspondence of a statement with its 'true',
singular meaning; but irony conceived in such a universal way as an inexorable,
permanent parabasis, also means that what we do speak (ironically) we speak in
self-reflection, and thus are we imbued with the "spirit" of language, we are
enthused by language.
There is one more, indispensable, dimension of Romanticism, and of
Romantic irony in particular, which is exemplified by this fragment of
Schlegel's, and it is this which will bring us once more back to Novalis and the
Monolog. This dimension is the commensurability, or the complicity, of
philosophy and poetry through and because of irony. Schlegel asserts this
elsewhere in the fragments, most famously in Lyceum 42, where he states both
that "philosophy is the real homeland of irony" and that "only poetry can also
reach the heights of philosophy in this way". Defining irony simply as a trope
would place it firmly in the realm of the poetic, and yet there is no avoiding the
fact that for Schlegel irony is indispensable to philosophy, at least, as he writes in
Lyceum 42, "where philosophy appears in oral and written dialogues - and is not
simply confined into rigid systems". The congruence of philosophy and poetry
de Man, especially in Allegories of Reading (London, Yale University Press, 1979), where it is
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for the Romantics is beyond doubt; it can be ascertained in such statements as
Schlegel's "where philosophy stops, there poetry must begin" (Ideas, 48), or
Novalis' "Philosophy is the poem of the understanding"{II, 531, 29), to which I
will have to return. Irony, for Schlegel, is defined both in a philosophical
manner, borrowing key philosophical terms (as "logical beauty" in Lyceum 42),
and, in the fragment on parabasis, unmistakably as pertaining to the rhetoric and
the domain of poetry. The fact of this congruence, this co-extensivity of
philosophy and poetry within and through irony is not enough. What needs to be
investigated is the manner in which this congruence is asserted, and to do this, it
is necessary to ask not just what philosophy means for Schlegel (as for the
Romantics in general) but also what poetry means, what is its "essence and
function", to borrow once again from the Monolog. Irony in its Schlegelian
understanding is, I wish to maintain, the key connection. Philosophically, irony
is a marker for both the impossibility of 'simple' understanding based on direct
correspondence, and for the possibility of a second-power reflexive
understanding; irony can thus be seen to yield the epistemological limitations and
reflexive aspirations of Romantic philosophy. But in poetry, irony is to be taken
in a wholly positive way, and Schlegel's seemingly endless approval for irony in
classic and modem poetic texts alike is indication enough. What is crucial to
grasp here is that it is precisely because irony signals certain limitations and
marks certain impossibilities from within philosophy that it can take such an
infinitely liberating role in poetry. The necessity and the inevitability, indeed the
primacy of reflection and relationality as signalled by irony may indeed be an
essential philosophical legacy of Romanticism, and of Schlegel in particular, but
used to ring a particularly disconcerting note at the very end of the book ..
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it is the very same primacy of relationality and reflection, momentarily grasped
in the analogy of the Schlegelian expressions "irony of irony" and "poetry of
poetry", which is the foundation of Romantic poetology'", Finally, it is this
primacy of reflection and relationality exemplified in, and mobilised by, the
Schlegelian notion of irony, shared by philosophy and poetry alike, that makes
possible the radical Romantic reconfiguration of epistemology as poetology,
69 I use the term 'poetology' in contradistinction with the more usual term 'poetics' in order to
differentiate between what, in Romanticism, is a generalised theory of poetic production (hence
"poetology"), and the more specific use of "poetics" to describe a particular theoretical
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IV. From Theoria to Poiesis 1: Schlegel and Progressive Universal Poetry.
Irony, as we have seen, is one way in which the work of philosophy
appears for Schlegel, and the Romantics in general, to be commensurate with that
of poetry. The critical and sceptical impetus of irony brings much to bear on an
epistemology organised around the central concept of reflection. Yet there is
another way in which this crucial Romantic interlocking of philosophy with
poetry occurs, and this too is dependent on the primacy of reflection, seen, this
time, as operating within the practice of poetry itself. I am referring to what is
perhaps the most famous Schlegelian legacy (alongside the formulation of
Romantic irony) - the theory of 'transcendental poetry', 'Romantic poetry', or
'the poetry of poetry'. In this instance, Schlegel theorises poetry (Poesie) in
language which is distinctly philosophical, and, in essence, transports the chief
philosophical arguments and tenets of Romanticism to poetry - if Schlegelian
irony goes some way towards showing that philosophy is thought of as poetry
("Philosophy is the poem of the understanding" says Novalis), Schlegelian
"progressive universal poetry" shows how the Romantics equally, at the same
time, thought of poetry as philosophy. Furthermore, only a couple of years later,
Holderlin will present a thoroughly philosophical account of the genesis and
background to particular poetic practices, as in the commonly used designations such as
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production of poetry, in which what he calls "the poetic spirit" is truly nothing
less than the then emergent "spirit" of the German Idealist systematic
philosophers, Schelling and Hegel. This is not to suggest that what can be
properly called a 'Romantic poetology', or literary theory, collapses into idealist
philosophy; as I intend to show in the final chapter, the Romantics have a very
specific conception of what poetry (or literature) is. Nevertheless, the Romantic
theory of poetic production, as exemplified by Schlegel (and Holderlin), is, I will
maintain, at the same time, a philosophical, more precisely an epistemological,
story. Thus, with Romanticism, poetry retains, on the one hand, its specificity
and particularity as poetry, while, on the other hand, becoming a generalised
theory of production as poiesis and, as such, a theory of the production of
concepts and knowledge, an epistemology.
At the centre of this radical reconfiguration of both poetry and
epistemology lies what has already been identified as Romantic ontology, or
metaphysics. As I demonstrated in chapter 1, Romantic metaphysics rests on a
conception of Being as hovering, as a differencing activity, as well as on the
postulation of an epistemological horizon, the horizon of "Judgment", "Schein",
and (re)presentation, from within which Being is to be "approached". This
metaphysics itself rests on a transfiguration of Fichte's transcendental idealism,
on a reading of the Wissenschoftslehre which emphasises the founding Act-of-
Being (the Tathandlung) as reflection and production, and it is those two key
terms, reflection and production, which also form the basis for Schlegel's
poetology. This, of course, has not gone unnoticed: Frederick Beiser, for one,
"Holderlin's poetics".
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writes of Schlegel's concept of Romantic 'poesy'?Oas "essentially the aesthetic
version of the philosopher's eternal striving for truth", clearly having the
Wissenschaftslehre in mind". Nevertheless, I must take issue with Beiser's use
of the term 'aesthetic'. What I will be maintaining in this section is that
Schlegel's "version" is a poetic one, which is to say more than simply aesthetic;
the transformation of the Fichtean philosophical (epistemological/ethical) story
does not happen on the level of aesthetic reception, but on that of poetic
production.
To see this transformation and its ramifications more clearly we need to
examine closely Schlegel's famous fragments on "progressive universal poetry"
iAthenaum 116) and "transcendental poetry" (Athenaum 238). In both, Schlegel
expounds a theory of poetic production based on his own understanding of the
transcendental, crucially mediated by the concept of reflection, and amounting to
nothing less than, to paraphrase Beiser, a poetic transformation of the
transcendental-idealist infinite epistemological 'journey', or approach, towards
Being. To begin with, in Atheneum 238, he states: "There is a kind of poetry
[Poesie] whose one-and-all is the relation between the ideal and the real, and
which therefore, by analogy to the manner of speaking of philosophy, should be
called transcendental poetry." The use of the term 'transcendental' to describe
70 A note on terminology. I have chosen to translate Schlegel's term 'Poesie' not as 'poesy'
(which is how Beiser, as well as many others, such as Bowie and the contributors in the Schulte-
Sasse volume, translate it), but as 'poetry' (with Behler and Seyhan). The reasons for this will
become apparent in the discussion which follows, but can be summarised thus: although it is
crucial to differentiate 'Poesie' from 'Dichtung', or poetry as imaginative literature, this, I feel, is
better done by insisting, as I do, on the provenance of 'Poesie' from the Greek 'poiesis', and all
its incumbent, and crucial, connotations of creation and production in a generalised sense. At the
same time, however, it is absolutely clear that 'Poesie' in the Schlegelian sense still refers to
poetry as such, thus to 'Dichtung' (and Schlegel also frequently uses cognates of Dichtung
alongside Poesie), and from this it can be linked to Holderlin's more 'conventional' use of
'Dichtung' throughout his theoretical writings. 'Poesie' is notjust 'Dichtung', but is a/ways a/so
'Dichtung', and this is absolutely crucial. Poetry thus retains its specificity as poetry whilst being
allowed, at the same time, to be extended into a generalised theory ofproduction-poiesis.
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poetry is immediately striking, but Schlegel is careful in explaining exactly what
he means. 'Transcendental', for him, at least in this instance, is what maintains
the tension between the real and the ideal, and this should be glossed in its
evidently Fichtean provenance - the transcendental is that which is maintained,
that which 'hovers', as Schlegel will say a few lines later, between the pure
ideality of Fichte's absolute I, and the pure reality of a 'realist' conception of
nature, such as that Schlegel finds in Spinoza72. Although his use of the term
elsewhere, and also in the context of this fragment, also suggests that he takes its
meaning directly from Kant, defining 'the transcendental' as that which
maintains the relation between the real and the ideal is surely both in keeping
with his precursors, and an altogether novel reading of the term. It allows him
even to formulate a cursory theory of genre, when he continues: "It
[transcendental poetry] begins as satire in the absolute difference between ideal
and real, hovers in the middle as elegy, and ends as idyll with the absolute
identity of the two". But 'transcendental' also, for Schlegel, retains its original
Kantian designation, transported from the realm of philosophy (and, in particular,
epistemology) to that of poetry:
"Just as one would not place much value on a transcendental philosophy which
was not critical, which did not present [darstellte] the producer along with the
product, which did not contain at the same time within the system of
transcendental thoughts a characterisation of transcendental thinking: so too this
kind of poetry should unite the transcendental materials and preliminaries of a
71 Beiser, Frederick, German Idealism: the Struggle against Subjectivism, Cambridge: Harvard,
2002, p. 448. The same argument is in operation in Behler, op.cit., pp.137-139.
72 Schlegel read Spinoza avidly and there is ample evidence of his admiration for him, not least in
the published fragments of the Athenaum (see fragments 270,274,301,450).
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poetic theory of the poetic capacity [einer poetischen Theorie des
Dichtungsverm6gen], something often found in modem poets, with the artistic
reflection and beautiful self-mirroring found in Pindar, the lyric fragments of the
Greeks and, among the modems, in Goethe, and should, in all its presentations
[Darstellungen], present also itself [sich selbst mit darstellen], and always be
simultaneously poetry and the poetry of poetry."
Here transcendental becomes transcendental and critical, and by that
Schlegel means reflexive. 'Transcendental poetry' is that which presents its
producer along with its product, in keeping with what the term means in Kant
and Fichte. Moreover, and this is critical, Schlegel really does mean
transcendental poetry, he sees it in evidence in ancient and modem poets alike,
and writes of a 'poetic theory of the poetic/versifying capacity
[Dichtungsverm6gen]'; what in philosophy designates the mode of cognition
which is not merely interested in the cognition of objects, but rather more in the
manner of cognition of those objects, in poetry becomes self-reflexive, self-
theorised versification, "simultaneously poetry, and poetry of poetry". This is a
wholesale transposition of a fully grasped philosophical vocabulary onto a
wholly different terrain for which it can be shown (and Schlegel does it by
providing examples) to be suited - poetry thought and conceived of as
philosophy. Yet the crucial difference is that what in the realm of philosophy is a
purely epistemological concern, both with Kant and with Fichte, becomes, when
it is transposed to poetry by Schlegel, a reflexive, second-level (re)presentation
of (re)presentation, a poetic representation of poetic representation itself. In
Schlegel's own terms, the "poetry of poetry" is, as it were, at MO removes from
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'simple' Dichtung; once as Poesie, and a second time as Poesie der Poesie.
What is crucial in this is that the operation of reflection with which poetry
becomes 'poetry of poetry' is itself reflected in a 'beautiful self-mirroring' - it is
the germ of what is formulated, in Athenaum 116, as the infinite reflection of
Romantic poetry.
Athenaum 116 is justifiably the most famous of all of Schlegel's
fragments. It is here where Romantic poetry is defined as "progressive universal
poetry", and is given a decidedly programmatic description, including its "aims"
(among them, significantly, "to put poetry in touch with philosophy and
rhetoric") and its elevation into the status of what all poetry should be. It is
obvious that Schlegel is not here describing an already existing type of poetic
creation, and he avoids giving any examples, as he did in the fragment just
discussed; "the Romantic kind of poetry [here Dichtart]", he writes in its closing
sentence, "is the only one that is more than a kind, and is, as it were, poetry
[Dichtkunst] itself: for in a certain sense all poetry is or should be Romantic".
However, it is also obvious that the characterisation of "transcendental poetry" as
seen in Athenaum 238 pertains here with even greater force. Romantic poetry can
"best hover at the midpoint between the presented object and the act of
presenting it [ZWischen dem Dargestellten und den Darstellenden], free from all
real or ideal self-interest, on the wings of poetic reflection, raising this reflection
again and again to a higher power, multiplying it in an endless succession of
mirrors". Here are the main characteristics of the self-reflexive transcendental
poetry taken up again, only this time even more powerfully, precisely, and
radically. Romantic poetry hovers between that which is (re)presented and that
which (re) presents - or the act of (re)presentation - that is to say, it manages to
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(re)present both, like a good transcendental argument. It is, this time not a
combination of the real and the ideal, but entirely free from either, at least insofar
as these take the form of 'self-interest'. Interestingly, this leaves Schlegel
without the possibility of recourse to a theory of genre, but that is entirely
concomitant with a 'kind' of poetry which is all kinds at once, the uber-genre of
Romantic poetry73, but it allows him to situate this poetry "at the midpoint"
between every pair of opposites that Schlegel is exercised by. This hovering at
the midpoint has been seen as Schlegel's version of Schelling's more famous
Indifferenzpunkt'", but should more readily be seen in association with Novalis'
central ontological conception of the Fichte-Studien, as will become apparent in
what follows. What is more, here Schlegel makes absolutely explicit his notion
of the infinite proliferation of reflection, the endless play of mirrors allowed by
the initial transcendental reflection of Romantic poetry. In a gesture which is
entirely commensurate with that of Schlegelian irony, once the first reflection
occurs, and here it occurs simply by the instantiation of transcendental poetry
"on the wings of poetic reflection", there is no reason why this reflection, this
doubling, and this play of mirrors, should ever be stopped. Once the original
doubling takes place, the doubling of self-reflexive poetry or, if you like, the
transcendental doubling, Romantic poetry makes it its task to proliferate
reflection infinitely. It is here where the influence of, and also the decisive break
with, Fichte's transcendental idealism is most apparent. Schlegel retains the
Fichtean conception of the 'originary duality' of the Tathandlung in his
73 These remarks on genre are here only preliminary, unavoidable because they pertain to the
philosophical significance of the fragment. For a more detailed discussion of the great
importance that a theory of genre has for Romanticism, and for the thoroughly philosophical
implications of that importance, see chapter 4.
74 See Beiser, op.cit., pp.448-449. For a more detailed discussion of the similarities and
differences between Schlegel and Schelling, see Chapter 3.
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poetological transformation of the language of transcendental philosophy, but he
does not see why the doubling, reflection, in the case of poetry at least (but this is
also, as we have seen, the case with irony), should be checked by Fichte's
Anstoj375. The result is infinite reflection, an "endless succession of mirrors" as
the medium of Romantic poetry.
Moreover, the result is that Romantic poetry itself is unending, infinite, in
fact it is the only possible designation of the infinite: "It [Romantic poetry] alone
is infinite, just as it alone is free". And, a few lines previously: "Other kinds of
poetry [Dichtarten] are finished and are now capable of being fully analysed.
The Romantic kind of poetry [Dichtart] is still in the state of becoming; that, in
fact, is its real essence: that it should forever be becoming, and never be
perfected." Thus, Romantic poetry is progressive, universal, infinite, forever in a
state of becoming; it is also transcendental and reflexive, infinitely reflexive. All
these designations are sign enough that what is at stake here is far more than
simple versification, for which these already bloated claims would sound
positively outlandish. But Romantic poetry, although contrasted (ironically?)
with other Dichtarten, is decidedly not a simple type of poetry, not even simply
'the poetry of poetry', for which Schlegel can at least find examples, species of a
genus. Romantic poetry is for Schlegel, and in solely philosophical terms,
nothing less than the transcendental, real-ideal (re)presentation of the infinite,
what most commentators on Romanticism call the Romantic Absolute". And
this is just as momentous a conception as was Novalis' ontology of Being as
75 On this, see the amusingly clever, but nonetheless decisively anti-Fichtean comment in one of
Schlegel's notebooks: "An seinem Anstoj3 bin ich immer angestossen" (KFSA, XVIII, p.31,
no.134) - the pun is, of course, untranslatable.
76 For instance, Beiser, who labels Holderlin, Novalis and Schlegel alike "absolute idealists",
op.cit. See also, Bowie, op.cit., pp.75-80. For a discussion of the Romantic notion of infinity in
contradistinction with that seen in Hegel, see chapter 3.
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hovering, or his semiotic theory. Schlegel's Romantic poetry should, in fact, be
seen in conjunction with both those notions. It is clearly connected to the inanity
and enthusiasm of language as described by Novalis in the Monolog, of which
Schlegel was aware before publishing the fragment in the Athenaum, since the
fragment speaks of poetry in the same exalted tones as found in the Monolog,
and, more importantly, since Athenaum 116 can be seen to proceed from where
the Monolog left off. Novalis' Sprachtrieb, the inane ramblings of the 'prophet'
enthused by language, is what yields, significantly, Poesie - it is only a small
step from the Monolog's contentions on the self-reflexivity of all language, to
their being brought to the infinite power in his friend's ''progressive
Universalpoesie". And Schlegel uses his friend's term "schweben", both in this,
and the fragment previously examined. If one also takes into account Novalis'
notion that "all production approaches being, and Being is hovering", it is not
difficult to see how Schlegel's Romantic poetry [now Poesie] is just that theory
of production infinitely approaching Being as hovering. This is perhaps how
Schlegel's ideas on the real and ideal nature of transcendental-Romantic poetry
can be best understood, via Novalis, and with Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre always
waiting in the wings; Romantic poetry mirrors or expresses, like Novalis'
transcendental semiotic schema, the infinite hovering of Being, a hovering
between, in Schlegel's terms, the real and the ideal, Fichte and Spinoza, subject
and object. As such it is far more than a simple poetological theory; it becomes a
Schlegelian equivalent of an idealist (but also, crucially, realist) epistemology,
insofar as epistemology is for the Romantics "an approach to Being". Poesie then
is brought all that closer to its Greek origins, as poiesis, creation and production,
whilst at the same time retaining enough of its specificity as a theory of poetic
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production to warrant the assertion I am making in this chapter, that for the
Romantics epistemology becomes poetology, and theoria becomes poiesis. Yet,
there is one more step to take in this direction, a step which will take us into
possibly the most intricate Romantic theoretical text, will show the complete
congruence of epistemology and poetology, their belonging together under one
roof, and which will also demonstrate the affinity of Romantic methodology with
that of its bigger sibling in the Idealism of Schelling and Hegel, in the
construction of the progressive dialectical. method. All this is Holderlin' s domain.
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V. From Theoria to Poiesis 2: Hblderlm's On the Operations of the Poetic
Spirit.
Holderlin's Homburg period (1798-1800) must be recognised as one of
his most fertile, especially in terms of his theoretical output. Particularly towards
its end, in 1800, Holderlin wrote a handful of poetological, or theoretical, texts
which would surely warrant him a secure place in the pantheon of early German
Romantic literary theorists, alongside the Schlegels and Novalis. Having left Jena
a couple of years previously, he was no longer in direct contact with the
philosophical developments of the university, but his writings from Homburg
show, together with a potent literary-theoretical drive, an astute philosophical
awareness and provenance. In fact, as I will be arguing in what follows, even
though texts like On the Operations of the Poetic Spirit and On the Difference of
Poetic Modes should prima facie be read as poetology, indeed as possibly the
most involved works on the subject of the whole period, they also continue, in
more or less direct ways, the negotiation with, and critique of, Fichte which
began with Seyn, Urtheil five years earlier. Moreover, they can be seen to be
possibly the most detailed, if not always the most concrete, elaboration of the
nascent dialectical method, and can be seen to point forward to the mature
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dialectical systems of Schelling and Hegel. Once again, as with Schlegel and
Novalis, the reader of these texts finds herself faced with a thought that bears on
poetry, more specifically the poetic process of creation, just as much as it does on
idealist epistemology, insofar as this latter is conceived of as the then emergent
drive towards the self-reflexive philosophical system which seeks to tell a story
whose "aim is to comprehend within the system itself the history which enabled
the philosopher to come to the point of creating the system" 77. Again, a Romantic
seeks to write of philosophy within poetry and of poetry within philosophy,
turning epistemology into poetology, theoria to poiesis.
Out of those texts, which cannot, in truth, be considered anything more
than fragments or notes, as they are frequently interrupted, unfinished, clearly
meant for personal consumption rather than publication, On the Operations of the
Poetic Spirit (Ober die Verfahrungsweise des poetischen Geistes) is by far the
most complex and also the most crucial for what is here at stake". It seeks to tell
the story of the creation of a poem, which at the same time is the story of the
development of the "poetic spirit" in a way which, if not in content then certainly
inform, is strikingly similar to the story of the development of consciousness in
Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism and also Hegel's Phenomenology.
If comparisons with Schelling or Hegel may seem, at this stage, somewhat
heuristic, I would like to stress that I do not wish here to argue for any possible
congruence between Holderlin's and Schelling or Hegel's thoughts, nor for a
direct, and unavowed, debt owed by either or both to their erstwhile Stift friend,
77 Bowie, op.cit., p.82. As Bowie concurs, the most famous and most complete elaboration of
such a story comes with Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, written some 7 years after Holderlin's
efforts.
78 The title is not Holderlin's but, as with Seyn, Urtheil, editorially imposed by the editors of the
Groj3e Stuttgarter Ausgabe. The text exists in English translation in Pfau, op.cit., pp. 62-82. I
have followed this translation, modifying it slightly when necessary.
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although there is ample scope to do so elsewhere; rather, I want to highlight the
unmistakable philosophical drive, both in vocabulary and in methodology, in a
text which nevertheless seeks to elaborate poetic creation, and to point, once
again, to the peculiar Romantic way of treating poetology as epistemology. In
the arguments which follow I have had to curtail the text to selective quotes in
order to be able to bring to the fore more general points about the text's
construction, its philosophical impetus and method. This is due to the fact that
this is a singularly impenetrable text, even by Holderlin' s standards - its first
sentence alone, which I intend to discuss in some detail, contains at least four
alternating pairs of oppositions developed integrally throughout it, runs to over
two pages (three in the German edition), and is not even complete. It could be
argued that Holderlin tries to perform, within 20 pages or so, what takes the
whole of the Phenomenology - admittedly, not a particularly 'easy' read either-
for Hegel to do. Even though there can be no question here of a full textual
analysis, my intention is to set Holderlin's thought process off in relation to the
cardinal issue here at stake, namely the Romantic conception of poetology as
epistemology.
The text begins with a series of interrelated sentences beginning with
"once", or "when" [wenn], and marking the moment in a process when the poet
"is in control of the spirit", thus basically forming the pre-requisites for such a
control". What the 'spirit' is, is not explicitly determined, but what is of
importance here, as with the rest of the essay, is to understand that, at least on a
first level, the issue of Holderlin's discourse is the creation of a poem by a
particular, empirical subject-poet, through the mediation of 'the spirit'. Thus,
79 Translation in Pfau, op.cit., p.62.
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and even though it is the determination of the different moments in the spirit's
development which will chiefly hold Holderlin's attention, the reader of his text
should never forget that the end-result of the development here described is the
production of a poem - in other words, the essay is, at the same time, both a
'practical' guide to the production, the genesis of a poem, and also a story about
the spirit's development. How then is this spirit initially characterised? The
spirit is in fact never characterised as such, never given a proper definition, and
what we can understand about it we understand as process; the spirit seems to be
nothing other than its own process of becoming, and it is no accident that all the
initial, or grounding determinations of this process are to do with movement.
Initially then, this process is characterised as "the free movement [freien
Bewegung], [... ] the harmonious alternation and progressive striving
[harmonischen Wechsels und Fortstrebens] wherein the spirit tends to reproduce
itself within itself and others" (ibid.). Already, correlations between what occurs
in this text, and Schlegel's progressive Universalpoesie are abundantly clear80:
Holderlin's spirit shares with Schlegel's concept a basic determination as
'alteration', and 'progressive striving', and this cannot but be at least partially
due to both writers' familiarity with, and appropriation of, Fichte's epistemology.
Next, Holderlin asserts that the spirit begins in a state of "necessary conflict"
[nothwendiger Widerstreit], that is to say, in an immanently dynamic state. It is
this original conflict, this immanent dynamism and momentum which carries the
movement of the spirit along its path, and which may be compared, not just with
the dynamism and immanent development of consciousness in Hegel's
80 This is not to suggest that Holderlin must have had Schlegel's fragment in mind when writing
his own essay. However it is well reported (inter alia, in Bowie, and Beiser) that Holderlin
expressed a wish for the creation of a journal which would be the counterpart to the Schlegels'
Athenaum, and it would seem that he was at least aware of the fragments published there.
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Phenomenology, but also with the dynamic ontology mobilised by Novalis'
concept of hovering. What is more, the conflict the spirit originally finds itself
into is that between two originary "postulates" [Forderung], "the most originary
postulate of the spirit which aims at the communality and unified simultaneity of
all parts [Gemeinschaft und einiges Zugleichseyn aller Theile], and the other
postulate which commands the spirit to move beyond itself and reproduce itself,
within itself and others, through a beautiful progression and alternation" [in
einem schonen Fortschritt und Wechsel sich in sich selbst und in anderen zu
reproduciren] (ibid.). This contradictory pull on the spirit, at once centripetal
and centrifugal, is directly reminiscent of the distinction Holderlin made five
years earlier, in Seyn, Urtheil, between the unifying simultaneity between subject
and object expressed in Seyn (the originary condition), and the separation and
alternation of subject and object occurring within Urtheil (the second originary
condition). It is also an element clearly demarcating Holderlin's text from the
process of Hegel, who does not begin with two but with one such postulate.
There is, however, a crucial difference between the two Holderlinian texts:
where, in the earlier text, Holderlin postulates the logical and temporal
dependence of the moment of separation upon the moment of absolutely
originary unity, in this text, the conflict, the struggle, is in fact what is being
postulated as the originary motor of the spirit's process of development. Indeed,
for the rest of the essay, Holderlin will maintain the tension inherent in the
originary conflict within the spirit, modifying it into an impressive series of
dialectical oppositions, themselves in constant development and progression. It
would seem that Holderlin's thought, at least in what constitutes the development
of the poetic spirit, is now able to move further from the fundamental assertion of
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the arche-separation between the realm of unity and simultaneity, and that of
disjunction and temporal progression, and it will become clear in the rest of the
text that Holderlin intends a 'reconciliation', a resolution of the contradictory
pulls on the spirit. It seems, even from the very beginning, that it is the spirit's
dynamic, processual character which will allow it somehow to reconcile its initial
conflict".
So begins the series of dialectically opposed pairs, the very opposition
between which is precisely what allows the spirit to carry on its development. In
a sense, all pairs of opposition are permutations of the originary distinction,
postulated in the spirit's necessary conflict with itself, between alternation
[Wechsel] and simultaneity [Zugleichseyn], or between separation and unity.
Thus the conflict is reconfigured in terms of "the struggle between spiritual
content [geistigem Gehalt] (between the interrelation, the affinity of all parts)
[der Verwandschaft aller Theile] and spiritual form [geistiger Form] (the
alternation of all parts) [dem Wechsel aller Theile]" (ibid.). This opposition is
resolved when it is itself opposed to another opposition, that between "objective
content" [objectives Gehalt], and "objective form" [objective Form], and this
new pair is but a different version of the initial fundamental distinction between
simultaneity and alternation. The "objective content" is "the form of the subject
matter" [Form des Stoffes] (ibid., p.63) insofar as that is to "remain identical in
all parts"; the "objective form", on the other hand, is what arises from "the
81 This can also be seen as a way in which Holderlin is able to move beyond the thought of an
intellectual intuition as a means of grasping the originary unity behind difference earlier
expressed by Seyn. While there is almost no talk of Seyn in this text, it is obvious that
Holderlin's attempt to find a way in which contradictions and separations are somehow
reconciled and made sense of is akin to his own 'approach to Being'. What is significant in this
attempt however, as I will be trying to demonstrate, is that it does not seek this reconciliation in
an all-encompassing (and highly problematic) gesture, such as intellectual intuition, which would
aim to grasp the totality of unity in one fell swoop, but seeks it rather in the process, the
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material change" [materielle Wechsel] of the subject matter. We thus have not
two butfour pairs of opposites:
Spiritual Form - Spiritual Content
Objective Form - Objective Content
but also,
Spiritual Form - Objective Content
(since the objective content remains identical in all parts it is contrasted to the
spiritual form whose essence is the alternation of all parts - Holderlin contrasts
them explicitly, ibid., p.63), and
Objective Form - Spiritual Content
(since "precisely this material change constitute[s] the objective form, the
appearance [Gestalt] in contrast to the spiritual content", ibid.).
This complication in Holderlin's method of opposing becomes
comprehensible when he states that the conflicts between the pairs of opposites
are themselves irreconcilable, and also that this irreconcilability is what actually
renders the oppositions meaningful. Remember that the sentence began with a
series of admonitions towards the poet, who is called to 'realise' the existence of
these oppositions; again, Holderlin writes, "once he has realised how... the
conflict between material alternation and material, identical striving [ ie:
effectively between any two of the four pairs just extracted from the text], insofar
as they are irreconcilable renders tangible one as well as the other" (ibid., p.64).
Thus, what is of cardinal importance here, beyond the specific determinations of
the opposing pairs which appear to be fairly interchangeable, is Holderlin's
development, the movement (which can be called differential, or dialectical) of the contradictory,
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method of opposing oppositions both from within, and from without, with other
oppositions, and, further to this, his notion that the 'resolution' of these
oppositions rests in the recognition of their reciprocal irreconcilability. The
spirit finds itself caught within a movement of constant self-opposition which has
no singular resolution, other than the perpetual movement between oppositions
afforded by the alternating pairs, and which is what ultimately makes the
oppositions 'tangible' [fuhlbar]. It is this, more than anything else, which
differentiates Holderlin's dialectical procedure from Hegel's: where Hegel seeks
'reconciliation' or 'resolution' by way of the sublation of opposites, and their
eventual integration into the unity and wholeness of the concept, Holderlin
expressly postulates that such 'reconciliation' is precisely the recognition of
irreconcilability - a paradox, perhaps, but a productive one82.
'Once', then, the poet has realised what the constantly self-opposing
contradictory pulls of the spirit bring to bear on his operations, he is only
concerned with "the receptivity of the subject matter [die Receptivitat des Stoffs]
to the ideal content and the ideal form" (ibid.). Yet another opposition obtains:
that between the ideal, and the material, or the operations of the spirit, and the
matter [Stoff] of the poem. And it is in this opposition, once again held in check,
that the poem's significance or meaning [Bedeutung] lies: "Between the
expression, the presentation [Darstellung] and the free idealistic treatment, there
lies the foundation and significance of the poem" (ibid., p.66). Here, a lengthy
quote will prove necessary:
conflicting spirit itself.
82 These remarks on Hegel's method may appear overhasty, and a much more sustained
presentation of the methodological and essential differences between Hegel and Romanticism is
undertaken in the following chapter. They appear here in such truncated form, lest it be thought
that Holderlin's procedure is closer to Hegel's than to Novalis' or Schlegel's who, as I have
shown, place an equally great stress on 'irreconcilability', or 'perpetual antagonism'.
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"It [the significance of the poem] is the spiritual-sensuous, the formal-material of
the poem; and if the idealistic treatment is more unifying [... ] whereas the
expression, the presentation in its characters [... ] are more separating, then the
significance rests between the two; it gives itself meaning, it signifies itself [sie
zeichnet sich aus] through being everywhere opposed to itself: through [the fact]
that [... ] it separates all that is united, fixates everything free, universalises
everything particular, because it considers what is treated not merely an
individual whole, nor as an entity complemented as a whole by what is
harmoniously opposed [harmonischentgegengesezten] to it, but a whole
altogether [... ]; that it unites by way of opposing, through the meeting of the
extremes insofar as these are not comparable with respect to content but with
respect to direction and degree of opposition, such that it also compares what is
most contradictory, and is quite hyperbolic [... J so that naive, heroic, and ideal
tendencies contradict each other in the object of their tendency yet are
comparable in the form of their opposition and striving, and are united according
to the law of activity [nach dem Geseze der Thatigkeiti, thus united in the most
universal, in life." (ibid., p.66).
Without aiming at a full and comprehensive explanation of this passage,
something for which incomparably lengthy and detailed discussions of its
somewhat elusive tenns cannot be avoided, I want to highlight certain aspects
which point to the direction Holderlin's thought is now taking. First, and
although I will have the chance to analyse Holderlin's idiosyncratic theory of
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genre later", I need to signal that the final designations "naive", "heroic" and
"ideal" correspond to exactly such a theory, as propounded in this essay's
companion piece, On the Difference of Poetic Modes, written a few months
previously. What is important in this instance is to realise that, even after such
tantalisingly complex thought-movements as the essay has presented us with thus
far, Holderlin's aim still remains the theoretical 'explanation' of the process of
poetic creation - in other words, we are still dealing with a theory of poetic
production. Yet the thrust of the argument presented here is unmistakably
philosophical, and ascribes to something as 'humble' as the significance, the
meaning [Bedeutung] of a poem the ability to perform ''the meeting of extremes"
but also the ability to "separate what is united", the ability to "universalise
everything particular", resulting in the final unification of all opposing
tendencies in "the law of activity", or "life". From this passage, a few important
philosophical aspects of Holderlin's thought become apparent. First, the
resemblance of the absolutely universalising tendency within the poem's
significance as Holderlin states it, with Schlegel's progressive universal poetry:
in both cases we are dealing with the type of creation that is capable of
manifesting the greatest universality through the greatest difference, with an
absolutely universal theory of production. Second, the passage's culmination in
what is unmistakably a Fichtean determination of "the law of activity", the
Tathandlung which for the Romantics, as we saw in the previous chapter, is the
founding of Being as the activity of differencing, but also, what is more, the
law's permutation into "life". What I take Holderlin to mean by "life"
corresponds to a radical reworking of the position he expressed regarding Being
83 Cf., chapter 4.
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in Seyn, Urtheil - namely, that "life" seems here to encompass the unifying
thrust, not of a singular, indivisible Being, but of the differencing activity capable
of uniting what is most fundamentally opposed, and this only by virtue of the
opposition. Just as earlier in the essay Holderlin was adamant that the opposing
pairs of Spiritual/Objective Form/Content were tenable, graspable,
comprehensible as such only through the necessary irreconcilability between
them, that, in effect, the unity of opposites is only tenable if the opposition
between them is kept in check, so here he implies that opposite determinations
are "united in the most universal" only when that universal, the Romantic
Absolute, or as Holderlin calls it, "life", is one which is itself constantly opposed
to itself, so that it can "unite by way of opposing". Third, the designation of the
process as "hyperbolic", which seems to hold the key to Holderlin's own
particular manner of thinking. Holderlin had already expounded the notion of
hyperbolic logic in his novel, Hyperion. Here, he clearly defines this logic as
precisely that whereby extremes of opposition may be unified whilst retaining
their initial opposition, the logic which is "characterised by being everywhere
opposed to itself', indeed, as he made explicit in Hyperion, his own version of
the Hercalitean "en diaferein eauto". In this he must surely be seen to follow,
albeit unknowingly, in the footsteps of Novalis' ontology.
Yet what I wish to uphold as probably the most significant philosophical
import of the text occurs a few pages later, after Holderlin has progressed
through a discussion of "life" as, indeed, "poetic life", and after he has once
again asserted that "that act of the spirit which, as regards the significance [of the
poem], entailed only a continuous conflict, will be as much a uniting one as it
was an opposing one" (ibid., p.69). It occurs when Holderlin shifts his attention
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from the general operations of the poetic spirit, to the more particular ones of the
poetic I. The argument is that the poetic spirit, if it is to be 'embodied' in a
particular "poetic individuality", by which we may well understand the empirical
subject-poet, must overcome the same restrictions which Holderlin foresaw in
Seyn, Urtheil, namely that any notion of "individuality" or "subject" is
necessarily limited as a product of the arche-separation of judgment. As we saw,
this is a direct criticism of Fichte's fundamental assumption of the I as originary
identity. In this text too, Holderlin raises a powerful critique of Fichte's
epistemology, but in a manner which differs from that of Seyn, Urtheil.
Significantly, this also entails a curious twist to the terminology, and area of
application, of Holderlin's concepts: even though we are still undoubtedly
dealing with a process of poetic creation, the emphasis now, tellingly, is on the
mode of the poetic I's cognition, or knowledge of objects - what has been
poetology throughout is now explicitly couched in the language of epistemology.
He begins by delineating a moment in the I's development, in its process, which
he labels "the subjective nature" of the I (ibid., p.72). In this instance, the I "can
only form knowledge as an opposing or relating one", and it "cannot recognise
itself as the poetic I" (ibid.). In a note, Holderlin explains that this 'subjective
nature' of the I is the moment when "the I act[s] as that which differentiates or
unifies" (ibid, p.73), and this can evidently be seen as his own rendition of the
Fichtean epistemological tenets wherein the I posits itself as a unity opposed to
the unity of non-I; the I differentiates itself from the object in the process of
cognition of the non-I, and unifies itself with itself in the process of its own
cognition, or self-consciousness, depending, Holderlin writes, "on whether, in its
subjective nature, it finds something to be differentiated or unified; it therefore
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posits itself as something differentiating and unifying in dependence and [is]
absolutely dependent in its acts, so that it knows itself, its act, neither as
something opposing nor as something unifying." (ibid.). Thus, the 'subjective
nature' of the I is always already one where the I finds itself separated from its
object, whether that be an object (non-I) or itself - in other words, we are within
the realm of Urtheil. But Holderlin can now go further, and, after the critique of
Fichte, can postulate an overcoming. This overcoming takes once again the form
of a constantly sustained double opposition; the I is to be opposed not just to the
non-I but also to itself as possible object of cognition. And the crucial transition
comes when Holderlin postulates that this double opposition results in a tri-
partite structure which follows the transcendental framework to the letter: "that
which is cognised [das Erkannte] must always constitute that threefold nature of
the poetic I together with the cognising [dem Erkennenden] and the cognition of
both [der Erkennmifi beider]" (ibid, p.72). What is required for the I to leap
from its 'subjective' nature into the fully-fledged assumption of 'poetic
individuality' is that it encompass not only itself as subject, but also the
transcendental demand for the process of cognition, as well as the cognised
object. For the I to become the 'poetic I' finally, it must constitute itself in a
three-fold manner as subject, object, and the relation between the two - in this
case, significantly, a relation of cognition, knowledge. It is this extra dimension
which makes the I poetic: "its threefold nature: as opposing the harmoniously
opposed [ie, the object, the non-I], as formally uniting the harmoniously
opposed, as comprehending in one the harmonious opposed, the opposition, and
unification" (ibid). Holderlin's final formulation of the same idea comes in the
form of a command: "Posit yourself by free choice into a harmonious opposition
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with an outer sphere just as by nature you are in harmonious opposition with
yourself, yet unrecognisably so, as long as you remain within yourself' (ibid,
p.74).
Here then, in a nutshell, is Holderlin's critique and overcommg of
Fichte's epistemology, in its transformation into a process of poetic production.
The I of cognition, the Fichtean I, is incomplete if it does not recognise that, just
as it is opposed to the 'harmoniously opposed', the 'outer sphere' of the world of
objects, it is also, by its very nature and by the nature of the opposition, opposed
to itself. If it comes to a comprehension in one of the opposed, the opposition,
and the unification of both, if it makes sense, in other words, of its opposition
with the outer sphere by opposing itself to itself, it shall be able to comprehend,
to make sense again, (herein lies the significance of Holderlin's word Bedeutung)
of its unification with the 'harmoniously opposed' - it shall become, no longer
the cognising I but the poetic I, and by this Holderlin means no less than the I
that is free to produce its own opposition, self-opposition, and unification with
the opposed. Here is how, five years later than Seyn, Urtheil, Holderlin may
surely be said to have arrived at a radical new critique of transcendental
epistemology, where it is no longer a question of the anteriority of an indivisible
Being over the 'arche-separation' of judgment, but a question of the progressive
development of a fundamental originary conflict and opposition into a unity
which can only be such if it is conceived, not just as a unity of opposites, but the
unity of opposites and the process opposing them. What Holderlin postulates by
the end of On the Operations of the Poetic Spirit is nothing less than, to follow
Frederick Beiser's estimation, an 'absolute idealism'. But, and this cannot be
overstressed, he can only arrive at such a position when he looks, no longer to a
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'strict' epistemology, but to an epistemology lifted to a higher level when
understood as the operations of the poetic spirit.
Itmay well appear that Holderlin's fragmentary, hermetic, tantalising text
is something of a culmination of the Romantic project. Indeed, it can be shown
(as I tried to do here) that within it the most radical Romantic conceptions take
shape, none more so than the transformation of epistemology into poetology,
theoria to poiesis. And yet, some of the most groundbreaking philosophical
notions and methods exemplified in this text will find a comparably great
expression (if anything, a more systematic one), in the systems of Schelling and
Hegel. Indeed, the methodological procedure witnessed in the essay can be said
to be closer to the dialectics of Schelling and Hegel than the infinitised reflection
of Schlegelian irony, were it not for Holderlin's seemingly paradoxical insistence
on the irreconcilability of the elemental oppositions. The difference between the
Romantic project, on the one hand, and those great scions of Idealism, on the
other, must therefore be examined.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ROMANTICISM
AND IDEALISM
I. Schelling.
Without doubt, Schelling, more than Hegel or any other philosopher
contemporary to the Romantics, appears to be closest to the philosophical project
of Romanticism overall. Indeed, commentators such as Frederick Beiser and
Andrew Bowie often view Schelling's position either as a moment in the
continuum from Kant, via Fichte and the Romantics, and on to Hegel, or, even
more pertinently, ascribe to Schelling a "tension between an idealist and a
Romantic conception?". In what follows I will follow such estimations up to a
84 Bowie, Andrew, From Romanticism to Critical Theory, London, Routledge, 1997, p.199. note
14. Beiser's position (in his German Idealism, op.cit.) is admittedly more nuanced, as he is
avowedly trying to exorcise the ghost of Hegel's history of philosophy, and of German Idealism
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point, and will try and indicate the ways and moments in which Schelling's
thought is indeed very close to that of Schlegel, Holderlin, or Novalis.
Nevertheless, my contention is that Schelling's philosophy should not be viewed
as the natural progenitor or bedfellow of Romanticism, despite common
departures and frequent similarities. The differences may be subtle but they are
crucial for the reading of Romanticism presently underway.
My consideration of Schelling is based primarily on the first phase of his
career, and in particular the first two important books under his name, the Ideas
for a Philosophy of Nature (1797), and the System of Transcendental Idealism
(1800)85.In the first instance, this limitation is imposed by purely chronological
concerns, since Schelling's career spans most of the first half of the 19th century,
long after Novalis, Holderlin, and Schlegel were either dead, mad, or serving the
Hapsburg empire. A second, perhaps more important reason for concentrating
on the early phase of Schelling's philosophy is that this was the time when he
was personally acquainted with all three Romantics under consideration,
especially in the years of publication of the Athenaum, when he was closely
associated with the Schlegels. Nevertheless, and although the later philosophy of
freedom and philosophy of religion will not concern us at all, some mention of
Schelling's most notorious philosophical development, that of the 'philosophy of
identity' (first expounded in his Darstellung meines Systems of 1801)will also be
in particular, yet his positioning of Schelling after the Romantics as in some sense the carrier of
what he terms 'absolute idealism' betrays the continuum I indicated.
8S Hereinafter, these two works will be abbreviated as IPN and STI respectively. I have used the
existing English translations of both, namely Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature,
translated by Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath, with an Introduction by Robert Stem, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press 1988; and Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, translated
by Peter Heath, with an Introduction by Michael Vater, Charlottesville, University Press of
Virginia, 1978. Of course, it should be noted, these are not Schelling's very first publications, far
from it - they are, however, widely acknowledged to be the first publications where Schelling
'comes into his own' (as he acknowledges himself in his correspondence), where he is not merely
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made, particularly since it is this phase in which Schelling can be said to come
into his own and develop, as the title he gave to his book clearly indicates, his
own philosophical system, having foregone even the attempt to forge a system
which can be classified as 'transcendental' after Fichte. Having said that, it must
be admitted that Schelling's career is frustratingly inconsistent, even in the short
space of time here discussed, and this makes pronouncements on 'Schelling' very
difficult to make in general. Of course, this is a charge that can equally be laid
against Schlegel, for instance. Yet I believe there to be a crucial difference,
which goes some way towards highlighting the more profound philosophical
differences between the two - namely that, where Schlegel is often accused of
being a 'dilettante' who never managed to offer a fully systematic exposition of
his philosophy, thus leaving us with a legacy of stymied, disheartening
fragments, Schelling's inconsistency almost always takes the appearance of
potentially irreconcilable systematic treatises. Frederick Beiser praises Schelling
for making "fully explicit and systematic" what was "only implicit and
embryonic" in Schlegel, Novalis, and H6lderlins6• I cannot deny this; yet my
claim is that Romantic fragmentariness serves a defined and theorised purpose'",
as, indeed, does systematicity in Schelling. Therefore, to assume, as Beiser does,
that it is somehow naturally better to adhere to Schelling's systematicity over
and against the pronounced problematisation of the notion of a philosophical
system with the Romantics is indicative of the general tendency (which,
doing expository/critical work on the systems of other philosophers but attempts to construct and
develop his very own systems.
86 Beiser, op.cit., p. 467. The reference here is to Naturphilosophie which indeed is made
programmatically systematic in Schelling, whereas it is only afforded glimpses in Novalis,
Schlegel, and Holderlin, Yet the same could be said about transcendental philosophy, the
philosophy of Art, or anything else - it is my impression that Schelling is a more systematic
philosopher in general, and it is this systematicity, this "drive towards a system" as Schlegel
would put it, that is at stake here.
8? hFor more on t e fragment, see the next chapter.
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ironically, Beiser himself derides) to treat the Romantics as poor cousins in
philosophy. Would it not be tempting, from a 'Romantic', anti-systematic and
anti-foundationalist perspective, to see Schelling's failure to construct a coherent
and historically consistent system as the bankruptcy of philosophical
systematicity itself? This provocation will remain, for the time being, tempting
and tentative, but it is perhaps worth acknowledging as a possible 'ideological'
axis for the discussion of Schelling's philosophy that follows.
This discussion is organised around the two books that I mentioned, and
around two central areas of inquiry: ontology and the philosophy of nature on the
one hand, and transcendental epistemology and the philosophy of art on the
other. These are two areas that Schelling himself views as complementary, not
least in the foreword to the STI where it is a case of "the parallelism of nature
with intelligence" CST/, p.2). Ultimately it is the precise nuances of this
complementarity and parallelism that form the crux of the issue between
Schelling and the Romantics.
1. The Ontology of Nature.
Schelling begins philosophy by postulating an originary identity between the
subjective and the objective, or the ideal and the real. In the terms he puts it in
the programmatic and methodologically illuminating Supplement to the
Introduction to the IPN: "The first step to philosophy and the condition without
which it cannot even be entered, is the insight that the absolute ideal is also the
absolute rear' (lPN, p. 44, emphasis mine). In an important sense, such a
postulation is but the epigone of Holderlin's critique of Fichtean philosophy in
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Seyn, Urtheil, and it has often been seen as such in the critical literature.
Nevertheless, Holderlin's Being, as I have already discussed, is not a clear,
unproblematic identity between the subjective/ideal and the objective/real, in fact
it is not an identity at all. Schelling, on the other hand, perhaps in keeping with
his (at the time of the IPN) still undiminished admiration for Fichte, always
postulates the Absolute as an essential and originary identity. Again, in the
Supplement, he states:
"That equal and pure absoluteness, that equal identity in the subjective and
objective, was what we have defined in this characterisation as the identity, the
equal essence of subjective and objective. Subjective and objective are,
according to this explanation, not one, as opposites are, for with this we should
just admit them as such; rather, it is a subjectivity and objectivity only insofar as
that pure absoluteness, which in itself must be independent of both and can be
neither the one nor the other, introduces itself, for itself and through itself, into
both as the equal absoluteness" (ibid., pp.46-47).
Subjective and objective, according to Schelling's careful formulation, cannot be
thought of as united opposites, at least not prior to their being thought as
opposites tout court, for precisely the same reasons that Holderlin thinks Fichte's
concept of identity cannot be thought of as primary - namely that the unification
of opposites can only be possible after these are opposed, and thus divided, both
in the logical and the temporal sense. Yet where Holderlin's Being is admittedly
that which cannot, in any way whatsoever, be thought of as divisible or internally
opposed, Schelling's "equal absoluteness" is precisely an internally divisible
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whole, which, "for itself and through itself', splits itself into two equally
absolute absolutes, the subjective and the objective. Thus, and even though
Schelling is careful to avoid designating the subjective and the objective as
opposites, he does characterise them as equal, which, to my mind, invites exactly
the same sort of criticisms - how is it possible for an Absolute to be the equal of
another? How is it possible that the one, undivided Absolute be split, even if it is
"for itself and through itself', into two? Schelling seems to be suggesting that the
Absolute itself makes itself manifest in an absolute subjectivity and an absolute
objectivity, which are thought of as such "only insofar as" they form equal parts
of the self-same Absolute. I do not wish to deny the methodological advantages
of such a position; it is precisely this which will enable Schelling to maintain the
equivalence of Naturphilosophie as the manifestation of the absolute-objective,
and transcendental philosophy as the manifestation of the absolute-subjective,
which will allow him ultimately to postulate an identity, or at the very least a
correspondence, at the end of his system. But the position is a deeply paradoxical
one, inviting the same sort of criticisms Holderlin directed against Fichte, and
can, at best, be seen only heuristically as enabling Schelling to go on with the
business of creating not one, but two philosophical systems of the Absolute. If it
be objected that Schelling wants to hold to the position of the Absolute qua
Absolute, indivisible and self-identical, which can be seen in his insistence that
"the absolute [... ] is necessarily pure identity" (ibid., p.46), the only possible
retort is that it is precisely this which makes his position suspect, from the
Romantic perspective - Novalis, as we have already seen, designates identity as a
"subaltern", secondary concept, which, it should follow, cannot possibly be an
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adequate designation of the Absolute, and this particularly when it is the case that
the identity is also, automatically, split in two.
Already therefore, and despite an initial similarity between Schelling's
and Holderlin's positions, a gulf of difference has emerged. This gulf between
the Romantic and the Schellingian projects widens once we examine the precise
characterisation Schelling gives to the absolute-ideal and the absolute-real. Once
Schelling has established the split Absolute as the starting point of philosophy,
he then asserts that philosophy must begin with the absolute-ideal, which, once
again, is in keeping with Fichte's (and Kant's) assumption of the horizon of the
transcendental subject as the only possible horizon for any philosophical
investigation. Yet, if perhaps it can be argued that Schelling is following Fichte,
the same cannot possibly be said with regard to Kant, since Schelling evidently
postulates the transcendental subject's horizon as absolute in itself, and goes as
far as defining the "absolute-ideal" "as absolute knowing, the absolute act of
cognition"(ibid., p.46). In this Schelling betrays his fervent admiration for
Fichte's attempt to 'break free' from the legislations and limitations of a Kantian
reason which would always, in the last instance, be curtailed by the finitude of
the transcendental subject. To want to begin with the absolute-ideal is the
equivalent, from the Romantic perspective, of assuming the horizon of
Holderlin's Urtheil,wherein the subject is necessarily located; but to advance the
position that the absolute-ideal is absolute knowing, "the absolute act of
cognition", is to stay too close to the criticised Fichtean Tathandlung as an act of
subjectivity on the one hand, and also, which is not insignificant, to veer close to
the Hegelian position of the possibility of absolute knowledge, on the other.
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What is more, this characterisation of the absolute-ideal as absolute
knowing is fundamental for Schelling's thought, to the degree that it is not a
consequence but a cause of the postulated identity between absolute-ideal and
absolute-real. He states: ''the first idea of philosophy already rests on the tacit
presupposition of a possible indifference between absolute knowing and the
absolute itself, and consequently on the fact that the absolute-ideal is the
absolute-real" (ibid., p.44, emphasis mine). This 'tacit presupposition', the
bedrock of Idealism, is for Schelling merely hypothetical, but it is the necessary
hypothesis for the existence of philosophy itself: "If philosophy exists, then that
is its necessary presupposition" (ibid.). In this Schelling shows himself as a
follower of Fichte and a defector from Kant's postulation of the limits of human
knowledge. From a purely 'first-philosophical' perspective then, this is the crux
of the disagreement between Schelling and the Romantics, who, at least in this
instance, and as I suggested earlier in chapter one, are far more faithful Kantians
than either Fichte or Schelling. For the Romantics, as for Kant, cognition is not
absolute; cognition, insofar as it proceeds from the human subject, is always
already a part of the horizon of Urtheil, or Schein, always already emanating
from the originary division, and thus necessarily divorced from the Absolute as
such. Schlegel makes this argument with unquestionable force, in his notebooks
of 1796: "Cognition already designates a conditioned knowledge. The non-
cognisability of the Absolute is therefore an identical triviality" (KFSA, Vol.
XVIII, p. 511).
Schelling's position on the issue of absolute knowledge is one which sets
him a priori apart from the Romantics; it is a position following from Fichte's
'discovery' of the intellectual intuition of the I (as Tathandlung) which, as we
146
have already seen, is treated with some suspicion by the Romantics who remain
faithful to Kant's more restricting notion of the limits of human knowledge. Yet
to see Schelling as simply going beyond Kant in a way the Romantics would
have disavowed is to oversimplify the issue. Crucially, it is from Fichte's
influential (to all concerned) attempt to 'overcome' the limits of Kantianism that
Schelling's most seemingly 'Romantic' notion stems, and this is the notion of the
Absolute as productivity. Again in the Supplement to the Introduction to the
lPN, Schelling states: " The absolute is an eternal act of cognition, which is itself
matter and form, a producing in which, in eternal fashion, it converts itself in its
totality as Idea, as sheer identity, into the real, into the form, and conversely, in
equally eternal fashion, resolves itself as form, and to that extent as object, into
the essence or subject" (lPN, p.47, emphasis mine). Two years later, in his
Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, Schelling comes
even closer to the vocabulary mobilised by Novalis, but borrowed, of course,
from Fichte: " ... that hovering (schweben) of nature between productivity and
product must therefore appear as a universal duplicity of the principles, by which
nature is sustained in continual activity and is prevented from exhausting itself in
its product" (quoted in Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, p.
41). The introduction of the notion of productivity is undoubtedly an idea which
the Romantics, particularly Novalis, also, as we saw, developed from Fichte and
made their own.
Yet again however, the differences underlying the initial similarity are
significant. In this instance, Schelling attributes productivity both to the Absolute
as "an eternal act of cognition" and to nature itself. In the latter case, as
commentators have readily observed, it is a question of Schelling's redrawing the
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Spinozan distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata, and indeed,
where the philosophy of nature is concerned at least, the shadow of Spinoza is
never far away. Insofar as the productivity of nature as natura naturans, as an
active agent of auto-production, is held to be an ontological issue, it can be
argued that Schelling's and Novalis' positions are equivalent, a fact betrayed by
their equivalent transposition of the Fichtean rhetoric of productivity onto the
realm of the ontology of nature. Yet, crucially, Schelling sets out the
productivity of natura naturans on an ontological 'plane' which is "equal" or
equivalent but not absolutely the same as that of the productivity of 'absolute
knowing'; this is necessary in his own formulation, as it stems inexorably from
the originary presupposition of the 'equality' between absolute-real (nature) and
absolute-ideal (the mind, or knowledge). The point is this: Schelling must hold
on to what he calls "the parallelism of nature with intelligence", since this
parallelism, this equivalence is rooted in the curious notion of the Absolute we
have just examined, namely that the Absolute is both the absolute-ideal and the
absolute-real, and also the absolute identity of the two. On the other hand, the
ontology of production mobilised by Novalis in his reappropriation and
'ontologisation' of Fichte's transcendental philosophy rests on the notion of
Being as a productive relation, as the activity of differencing, situating
productivity at the level of Being as an 'absolute' which cannot be thought of as
split. Where Schelling takes on the basic arguments of Fichte's Grundlage and
transports them equally onto the plane of the absolute-real (nature) and the
absolute-ideal (intelligence), thus strangely doubling any potential criticisms
such as those levelled at Fichte by Holderlin and Novalis alike, Romantic
ontology, perhaps precisely because it only has an 'embryonic' conception of the
148
philosophy of nature, locates absolute productivity on the singular level of Being
as differencinglhovering, thus avoiding the pitfalls of the 'equally split'
Absolute.
In this sense, what is perhaps Schelling's most original idea would be
alien and unacceptable to the Romantics. This is, once again, the "parallelism of
nature with intelligence", which finds its most famous expression at the end of
the (original) Introduction to the IPN: "Nature should be Mind made visible,
Mind the invisible Nature. Here then, in the absolute identity of Mind in us and
Nature outside us, the problem of the possibility of a Nature external to us must
be resolved" (lPN, p.42). For the Romantics, such an identity is a priori
impossible as identity, as it is impossible to think of an absolute which is
absolutely split into two equal absolutes - this is perhaps why Schlegel, as early
as the Athenaum fragments, casually condemns Schelling'S Naturphilosophie by
writing that "his [Schelling's] gift for universality is probably still not
sufficiently developed to be able to discover in the philosophy of physics what it
seeks" (AF 305). Schelling's 'parallel absolutes' position would be inexcusable
for the Romantics, especially when it leads him to suggest that "the same powers
of intuition which reside in the self can also be exhibited up to a certain point in
nature" (STI, p.3). From a disinterested viewpoint it is perhaps easy to see the
reasons why for Schelling such pronouncements are necessary and strategic - it
is a case of having to render nature absolutely knowable, of 'epistemologising'
nature, if this cumbersome formulation can be allowed, just as he has to
'ontologise' the transcendental subject, in Fichte's manner, by assuming the
Tathandlung as intellectual intuition. If nature is mind made visible, then it
follows that nature can be, or even ought to be, absolutely knowable, and if mind
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is the invisible nature, then the mind has the same absolute ontological status as
nature. The system, unsurprisingly, comes full circle: the presupposition of the
equality between absolute-real and absolute-ideal becomes realised in the
postulation of powers of intellectual intuition in nature (even if this is the
'ontological' natura naturans of productivity, as opposed to the determined
product of natura naturata) and in that of the absolute knowability of the mind
that knows itself.
It can be argued that Schelling evolves his thinking on the identity of
absolute-real and absolute-ideal in quite different ways when he reaches the
often-called 'dark' period of the philosophy of indifference. In some respects
this is true; in the Darstellung meines Systems the Absolute has become pure
identity, complete, unified self-sameness, perhaps along the lines of what
Holderlin expressed as the originary unity of Being. But where Holderlin
cautiously relegates any form of knowledge of that Absolute to the sphere of
judgment as separation (Ur-theil) and thus renders it, in absolute terms,
impossible, Schelling elaborates, more geometrico and with an unmistakable
allusion to the composition ofSpinoza's Ethics, the various levels of organisation
of that Absolute as it appears in the particular ontic determinations of nature. In
this way, he leaves himself open, even in this vision of 'the night where all cows
are black,88,to the fundamental criticism voiced by Holderlin and Novalis, as to
how it is possible for the Absolute which is One and indivisible, to form
particular determinations. Schelling's answer is to distinguish between the form
and the essence of absolute identity: as can be seen from the formal expression of
absolute identity, A=A, even when the essence of identity is the unity of A with
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A, this takes the propositional form of a distinction, and thus a separation,
between A and A - this, Schelling suggests, is the form of the Absolute
(Darstellung meines Systems, §15)89. Knowledge of the Absolute, therefore,
must of necessity be knowledge of its form (ibid., § 18). The problem arises with
the fact that Schelling wants to hold on to the idea that knowledge of the
Absolute in its form is itself Absolute, or, to put it in a way reminiscent of the
earlier formulations of the 1790s, that Absolute knowing, the absolute-ideal is
equivalent, or just as absolute as the absolute-real. It could be objected that
Schelling's differentiation between the essence and the form of the Absolute is
tantamount to Holderlin's distinction between Seyn and Urtheil, or even to
Novalis' dissection of the proposition of identity as a Scheinsatz - but the
difference, not for the first time, is in the detail: even if we admit that Schelling's
distinction between absolute form and absolute essence is a step forward from
the identity between absolute-ideal and absolute-real, the fact remains that
Schelling's Absolute is necessarily split, or double'". And the crucial distinction
between such a notion, and the ontology proffered by the Romantics is that the
latter see separation, Ur-theilung, as the only possible epistemological horizon
and deny any possibility of access to the unity of the Absolute, or to the Absolute
as unity. This can clearly be seen by a comparison between Holderlin's position
88 This is, of course, Hegel's' famous image of the Schellingian Absolute in the Preface to the
Phenomenology of Spirit.
89 My reading of Schelling's 1801 system here follows that of Frederick Beiser, op.cit., pp.565-
576.
90 This duplicity of the Absolute can evidently be seen to stem, again, from Fichte's insight about
the ursprungliche Duplicitaet of the subject-object as Absolute I. It can also be pointed out that
the phenomenological critiques of Idealism, in the hands of Husserl and the early Heidegger, also
have recourse to an idea of 'double origin' or Gletchursprunglichkeit (for this, see the discussion
of double origin in Rodolphe Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of
Reflection, Cambridge, Harvard, 1986, pp.181-183). The crucial point of difference between this
and the Romantic position is, as I tried to demonstrate in chapter 1, that the notion of double
origin for the Romantics, as also, perhaps, for the later Heidegger, is not one which can be
resolved or 'sublated' in the search for a single origin.
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m Seyn, Urtheil and such a Schellingian statement (from the STI, but
unquestionably still tenable for the philosophy of indifference) as "[a]II
knowledge is founded upon the coincidence of an objective with a subjective"
(STI, p.5). For Holderlin, all knowledge is indeed founded upon such a
coincidence between a subjective and an objective, but only in so far as that is
mediated by the unavoidable horizon of their separation - access to the unity
which is Seyn as unity is strictly impossible. Holderlin himself, in 1799, may
justifiably be said to have Schelling in mind when writing with derision about
"the sages, however, who differentiate only with the spirit, only universally
hasten quickly back into pure Being and fall into an all the greater indifference
because they believe to have differentiated, and because they take the non-
opposition to which they have returned for an eternal one" (in Pfau, op.cit., p.49).
Ultimately, the Schellingian Abso1ute(s)is/are not the Romantic one, despite the
common origin of their thought in the Wissenschaftselhre, their seemingly equal
determination to exit the realm of transcendental subjectivity, and their only
apparently similar expressions. It must be seen, more than anything, that the
Romantic ontology of productive differencing avoids the pitfalls of Schelling's
problematic equation between absolute-ideal and absolute-real, as well as the
similarly problematic distinction between the essence and the form of the
Absolute, and this for two related reasons: first, the Absolute as differencing
maintains its characteristic as a singular Absolute not to be thought as divided
into two, whilst, as I will show in the section on Hegel, allowing for a thought of
the Absolute which is not, perhaps curiously, totalisable as a unity; second, and
just as importantly, the Romantics do not, as Schelling does, want to postulate
the Absolute as absolutely knowable.
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2. Knowledge and Art.
More than any of Schelling's other books, or any stage of his philosophical
development, it is the System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), which has
generated the most comparisons with the Romantic project". The reason is quite
obvious, in that Schelling is seen as the philosophical companion to the
Romantics insofar as he elevates art to the level of "the universal organon of
philosophy" (STI, p.12), and this in a book which professes to be a fully realised
epistemological system, describing the quasi-historical path of consciousness
from mere sensation to the Absolute revealed in the artwork. Having spent the
previous chapter extolling the Romantic notion of turning epistemology into a
theory of poetic production, it could seem as though I could have nothing to
counter to such a Schellingian vision. Nonetheless, I wish to maintain that
Schelling'S elevation of art into the manifestation of the Absolute is ultimately a
far cry from Romantic poetology. Once again, there is an apparent similarity
between the Schellingian and the Romantic positions which points to
fundamental differences of detail and nuance which in themselves betray a
fundamental difference in the projects themselves. In the final analysis, I will
maintain that Schelling holds the artwork to be a privileged means of access to
91 More than anyone else, it is Andrew Bowie who exemplifies this position. From Aesthetics and
Subjectivity, through Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, and onto From Romanticism
to Critical Theory Bowie constantly equiparates the Schellingian and the Romantic positions in
ways which are historically illuminating but also disingenuous in that they tend to flatten
important distinctions and differences between Schelling and the Romantics. With regard to
Bowie's project as a whole, and to the (incontestable, and fully admitted) degree that it is rooted
in an understanding of Romanticism, I will have more to say in the concluding remarks to the
thesis. Here I am only concerned to redress the all too frequent and unfortunate levelling of
differences between Schelling and the Romantics in his work.
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the Absolute, again, insofar as the Absolute is taken to be knowable, whereas for
the Romantics poetry is a means of understanding what Schlegel explicitly states
as the non-cognisability of the Absolute.
Just like the lPN, the STI begins with the postulation of the 'coincidence of
an objective with a subjective' as the ground of all knowledge. Thus, the
criticisms of this position previously voiced will still hold for this present book,
and yet the different ways through which this position is consequently shaped
and elaborated will concern us at greater length. And again, just as in the lPN,
there is an essential (and on the surface very Romantic) focus on productivity;
Schelling, taking his cue from the Fichtean notion of the Tathandlung, sees a
parallel between the "consciously productive" activity which engenders the will
(what Fichte would have called the 'ideal sphere' of the practical I) and an
"activity which is productive without consciousness in bringing about the world"
(STI, p.12), which he sees as forming two parts of the same activity. This being
transcendental philosophy, Schelling then goes on to state that "this
simultaneously conscious and unconscious activity will be exhibited in the
subjective, in consciousness itself' (ibid.). And this is where art comes in: "[t]he
ideal world of art and the real world of objects are therefore products of one and
the same activity; the concurrence of the two (the conscious and the unconscious)
without consciousness yields the real, and with consciousness the aesthetic
world" (ibid.). Art is therefore, for Schelling, the concurrence of the two
opposed aspects (conscious/unconscious) of the self's activity elevated into the
sphere of consciousness. But Schelling is not saying that the self's production, in
the Fichtean manner, of the object-world around it is itself only ever
unconscious; it is so only in comparison to the acts of the will, moral or aesthetic.
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Philosophy is also opposed to art with regard to the direction of the productive
act: "For whereas in art the production is directed outwards, so as to reflect the
unknown by means of products, philosophical production is directed immediately
inwards, so as to reflect it in intellectual intuition" (ibid., p.14). Thus, both
philosophy and art are grounded transcendentally on the subject, and appear but
as opposed directionally in their production. Already, the Fichtean bias towards
the subject of self-consciousness becomes apparent: "by positing an absolute that
is both cause and effect - both subject and object - of itself, and since this is
initially possible only through self-consciousness, by again positing a self-
consciousness as primary" (ibid., p.17). In this way Schelling has unmistakably
grounded art in the operations of the subject, in a way which would have been
alien to the Romantics in that, as I have tried to show, their notion of a
transcendental subject is not such an avowedly Fichtean one, nor one which
would hold on to the primacy of self-consciousness. Again, Schelling's problem
is his presupposition of the identity of the objective with the subjective, and, in
this case, his positioning of that identity in self-consciousness, following the
Fichtean positions which the Romantics were cautious to discard. Where
Holderlin and Novalis either explicitly reject or, at the very least, problematise
the notion of intellectual intuition, as that is designated by Fichte, Schelling finds
he has to rely on the founding act of self-consciousness, instantly recognisable as
the Tathandlung: "This unmediated identity of subject and object can exist only
where the presented is at the same time that which presents, where the intuited is
also the intuitant. - But this identity of presenter and presented occurs only in
self-consciousness"(ibid., p.24). For Holderlin, and also for Novalis, such an
unmediated identity between subject and object could never possibly be found
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located in self-consciousness, since self-consciousness IS itself a part of
reflection, mediation par excellence.
The degree to which Schelling remains faithful to Fichte, and, what is more,
to aspects of the Fichtean dogma which were previously criticised by the
Romantics, can be glimpsed by his insistence on a Fichtean absolute self, over
and against a more generalised notion of Being expounded by Novalis and
Holderlin alike: "The eternal, timeless act of self-consciousness which we call
self, is that which gives all things existence, and so itself needs no other act to
support it" (ibid. p, 32). The problem with this is that if Schelling is taken at his
Fichtean word, where is the scope for a philosophy of nature that would be
concerned, not just with the ontic level of natural entities (yet which, even at this
level, could not possibly be said to be strict productions of a transcendental self),
but also with the ontological status of a productive natura naturans? Even with
the proviso that the STI is a work on transcendental philosophy, and thus must
begin with the transcendental subject and not a dogmatic acceptance of 'Being'
outside the subject, Schelling can only allow the complementarity, which he
frequently advocates himself even in these pages, between transcendental
philosophy and the philosophy of nature, if he takes nature to be an intelligence.
The problems with such a position have already been addressed, but what has to
be mentioned at this stage is that it is obvious that for Schelling, at least at this
stage of his philosophical development, the residual Fichteanism marking itself
everywhere in the STI means that the subject of self-consciousness is indeed the
terminus ad quem for any philosophical investigation, and that would have to
include the apex of the system, "the universal organon of philosophy", art. Now,
this is a position which could never have been supported by any of the
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Romantics. To begin with, both Novalis and Holderlin (and, to a lesser degree,
Schlegel as well) would have immense trouble agreeing with the position of self-
consciousness as the ground of philosophy, as it is evident from their critique of
Fichte. Perhaps more importantly though, the Romantics cannot hold art itself to
be unproblematically grounded upon the self, much less the operations of self-
consciousness'S. The apparent similarity between Schelling's and the
Romantics' positions therefore is only apparent: yes, the Schelling of the STI
privileges art as the Romantics do - but the manner in which this privilege is
bestowed could not be more different, both in essence and strategically.
Henceforth it should be evident what those concerns of Schelling's which I
have just termed strategic are: art is ''the universal organon of philosophy"
insofar as it is actually in the service of the transcendental subject. Moreover,
since it is the task of the STIto tell the story of the development of the subject's
consciousness (which is always already grounded upon the coincidence of
objective and subjective in self-consciousness), art, as the culmination of the
journey, is but the reverse image of its beginning, namely intellectual intuition.
Schelling is explicit about this in a rightly famous passage: "This universally
acknowledged and altogether incontestable objectivity of intellectual intuition is
art itself. For the aesthetic intuition is simply the intellectual intuition become
objective" (ibid., p.229). This betrays the strategic bias of the whole of the
enterprise of the ST], which can now be seen, not so much as a document
espousing the glorification, much less the emancipation of art from the confines
92 Unfortunately, a fuller discussion of the status of the work of art, and in particular the literary
work, has to be assigned to the following chapter. Nonetheless, I believe it is possible to
substantiate my claim here by pointing to my previous discussion of texts such as Novalis'
Monolog, Schlegel's fragments on Romantic poetry and Holderlin's essay on the operations of
the poetic spirit, where it is obvious that the creation of a work of art (a poem), though of course
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of a philosophy of the spirit (or a transcendental philosophy), as it has all too
often mistakenly been read, but as one which posits art as the house-keeper, the
first butler of transcendental subjectivity. From the very first page of the book,
Schelling saw its purpose as illuminating "all knowledge", and this, later on in
the introduction, is the "simultaneously conscious and unconscious activity" of
the spirit, as this can be seen "in consciousness" (ibid, p.12). Art is simply what
strategically, in the system as a whole, makes this chimera possible. His
'deduction of the art-product as such' begins with postulating the "identity of the
conscious and the unconscious in the self, and consciousness of this
identity"(ibid., p.2I9). This is the role of the art-work: "In the activity at present
under discussion [ie, the activity of art], the self must begin (subjectively) with
consciousness, and end without consciousness, or objectively; the self is
conscious in respect of production, unconscious in respect of the product" (ibid.).
The originary distinctions between conscious and unconscious activity are
united, and made conscious for the self, in the production of the artwork. This is
why Schelling must have recourse to "the obscure concept of genius" as ''that
incomprehensible agency which supplies objectivity to the conscious, without the
co-operation of freedom"(ibid., p.222). Thus art ends up being the flip-side of
intellectual intuition; where the latter was the terminus a quo of the system, the
originary, unmediated coincidence of subjective and objective, the artwork is
now the terminus ad quem, revealing "what philosophy cannot depict in external
form, namely the unconscious element in acting and producing, and its original
identity with the conscious" (ibid., p.23I).
never entirely divorced from the subject, cannot possibly be said to be straightforwardly
emanating from the subject alone.
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This is a salient point. There is an important sense in which Schelling adheres
to the Romantic project in ascribing the role he does to the artwork; the
conclusion to the STI is not all that far removed from the famous proclamation of
Schlegel's: "Where philosophy stops, there poetry [Poesie] must begin" (Ideas,
48). Moreover, Schelling espouses ideas that Schlegel in particular, but the
Romantic project in general also, would surely make their own: he introduces the
idea of poetry (again, crucially, Poesie) as the "unconscious element in all art"
(ST!, p.223) in a manner which highlights the importance of poetry as
production; he also, in line with the Athenaum, finds that "the basic character of
the work of art is that of unconscious infinity" (ibid, p. 225), and he complements
that with the fundamentally Schlegelian idea that artworks are in themselves
incomplete and "capable of being expounded ad infinitum'fibid.j'". It can thus
be argued that Schelling's estimation of the work of art comes very close to that
of the Romantics. The difference is the following: even when Schelling veers
away from the stronghold of transcendental subjectivity, that is, even when he
seems to admit that, despite the necessary original presence of intellectual
intuition in the system, "the work of art merely reflects to me what is otherwise
not reflected in anything, namely that absolutely identical which has already
divided itself even in the self' (ibid., p.230, emphasis mine), for him the work of
art performs the function of 'revealing' the Absolute as such, in its unity and
identity, and to me, the subject", Contrast this to Schlegel's proclamations on
behalf of 'progressive universal poetry', where the subject is almost totally
absent as a consideration, and where, if we are to take Romantic poetry as
93 This is Schlegel's notion of the literary work being incomplete and open to infinite criticism
and interpretation, which I will look at in greater detail in the following chapter.
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somehow progressively striving for the attainment of the Absolute, it is never a
question of that Absolute being revealed within it. The reasons for this should be
obvious from the preceding discussions: the Romantic Absolute, even were it to
be conceived as a unity (although never as an identity), is not of the kind that can
be revealed as such, and Schlegel's infinite striving for it, or Novalis' 'inane'
ramblings on linguistic enthusiasm in the Monolog serve as what Novalis calls
approaches to Being. The Romantic Absolute is not accessible in itself, even by
way of the revelation of the artwork or of poetry, and all poetry is, in relation to
it, an expression of the infinite striving towards it, an expression which is
privileged, as was seen in the last chapter, precisely because the subject-based
epistemology of transcendental idealism, with which Schelling is ultimately
completely tied up, is transformed into poetology. Schelling's elevation of the
artwork to the "universal organon of philosophy" is therefore best not seen as a
notion complementary to Romanticism. In fact, to the degree that Schelling
relegates the work of art to the position of service to the transcendental
consciousness he is closer to Hegel than to Romanticism.
94 This is Bowie's main contention regarding Schelling, and although I do not doubt it in this
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II. Hegel.
A confrontation with Hegel is inescapable - this much can be said from
the beginning. On one level, the justification for such a statement is provided, as
with Schelling, by historical and textual considerations: Hegel was, without a
doubt, the major voice in the history of German Idealism of which Romanticism
is unquestionably, though not perhaps straightforwardly, a part, and therefore a
comparative overview of points of convergence and divergence between
Romantic and Hegelian thought appears eminently warranted. Further more, with
Hegel's major writings appearing almost a decade later than the crux of
Romantic writings under consideration, Hegel had the time to consider the
Romantics as thinkers and writers himself, and consequently made various and
challenging pronouncements on them, which thus need to be taken into
consideration. On quite another level, however, the confrontation is necessary
not only because of any particular considerations (historical or textual-
exegetical), but because of Hegel himself, because of who, or what he has
become, unwittingly or not, in the history of modem philosophy, and because of
what the name 'Hegel' stands for even in contemporary philosophical debate".
respect, I remain unconvinced that this is really the Romantic position, as will be clear in what
follows.
95 Although I have no intention on dwelling further on the 'Hegel renaissance' in contemporary
philosophy, it is worth indicating that it is his name, and not that of Kant, or Schelling, or
Nietzsche, that seems recently to have activated a major philosophical debate in what is
traditionally seen as the analytical 'camp' of philosophy, which, also traditionally, can be taken to
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From Nietzsche to Deleuze, through Heidegger, Gadamer, Sartre, Adorno, and
Derrida, to name but a few, European philosophy of the past century or so has
been, it would be fair to say, obsessed with precisely such a confrontation with
Hegel, who has come to represent the apex of speculative thought, the
culmination of metaphysics, and, in a complicated but unequivocal sense, the
very end of philosophy itself. I will not be concerned with assessing such a
heavy claim for itself, or in relation to Hegel's philosophy as a whole; I repeat
the claim so as to contextualise my own, hopefully more modest, presentation of
the confrontation with Hegel. For if the greater part of philosophy since Hegel
has seen fit to place itself in relation to his thinking, then the claims that can be
made for such a confrontation taking place at roughly the same time, or even
before, this thinking, may well be illuminating for the history of philosophy as
such. In other words: if, as I wish to maintain, the issues arising out of a
confrontation between the Romantics and Hegel are of cardinal importance for
an understanding of the development of philosophy (and also, at the same time,
of literature and its relation to philosophy), then perhaps the later confrontation
with Hegel with which the philosophy of the past century has almost exhausted
itself can be backtracked, or at least reconfigured, by paying the attention needed
to the 'original' confrontation between Hegelianism and Romanticism. This
'perhaps' is, however, crucial, inasmuch as it serves as a guard against the all-
too-hasty (and entirely wrong) collapse of the whole of the history of philosophy
since Hegel into the confrontation here underway. I am in no way suggesting
that it would be possible to claim that later responses to Hegel can be eliminated
by a reconsideration of his relationship to the Romantics. What such a
be the most inherently antagonistic to Hegel's philosophy. I am referring, of course, to the 50-
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reconsideration can, however, yield, is a new understanding of the ways in which
responses to 'Hegel', to what Hegelianism has stood for since Hegel, are already
at work even before 'Hegel' himself.
What needs to be taken into account, even with the given of modem
philosophy's seemingly compulsive need to 'take on' Hegel, is that, as it has
often been noted of late, the 'Hegel' that thus becomes the object of
philosophical confrontation can frequently be distorted, turned into the monster
to be slain by each coming philosophical Saint George. Accordingly, and to
redress the balance, modem Hegelians have come to Hegel's defence by
precisely pointing out the misconceptions and indefensible presuppositions at
work in the anti-Hegelian camp. Chief amongst those misconceptions seems to
be the idea that the absolute, self-sustained, and self-grounding philosophical
system which is clearly the most 'monstrous' Hegelian legacy is somehow itself
presupposed. In Stephen Houlgate's words: "Thus, even though he states in the
preface to the Phenomenology that 'the true is the whole', Hegel cannot start out
from any preconceived idea of the whole,,96. I accept such a position on the
whole, not only as the necessary and perhaps long-overdue redress to some of the
excesses of anti-Hegelian rhetoric, but also as a true challenge to any reading of
Hegel which wants to avoid distortion and monstrosity. But I am not here
concerned with a reading of Hegel as such, but rather, as has been stated from
the beginning, with a confrontation, a head-to-head between Hegel and the
Romantics, and it is for this reason alone that I cannot therefore accept the
conclusion that Houlgate draws from the previously quoted statement. Thus:
called 'Pittsburgh Hegelians', Robert Brandom and John McDowell.
96 Taken from Houlgate's General Introduction to The Hegel Reader, Oxford, Blackwell, 1998,
p. 18. Another such redress to anti-Hegelian claims can be seen in William Maker's Philosophy
without Foundations, New York, SUNY, 1994.
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"The task facing the reader of Hegel's texts and lectures is thus to try to
understand why in each specific case a concept (or form of consciousness)
develops as it does .. , It is only by comprehending these specific transitions, and
their interconnections with one another, that a grasp of Hegel's whole system can
be built up. Hegel's system does certainly form an integrated whole, but that
whole is nothing beyond the interrelatedness of its manifold parts. Consequently
there is no shortcut to the whole 'itself. There is nothing but the long and
difficult, at times tortuous, at times exhilarating, path through the details?",
There is a lot to be said for the challenges presented by such a demand for an
immanent reading of Hegel, not least the fact that it can be said to issue from the
exigencies of Hegel's system itself, but by definition a confrontation cannot be
immanent - it has to take place between the Hegelian and the Romantic thinking.
Further than that, and although there is indeed "no shortcut to the whole 'itself",
there is a definite sense, and Houlgate cannot deny this, in which, simply stated,
there is a 'whole', or that we find, with Hegel, the articulation of philosophy as
an entire, absolute system. In William Maker's words: "According to Hegel the
system is absolute in that it is all-encompassing and fully justified; it expresses
universal, necessary, unconditional, eternal, infinite, and absolute truth,,98. And
not only does Hegel attest to a presentation of 'the whole', of 'eternal, infinite,
and absolute truth' in his philosophical system, but this system, in its absolute
immanence, "is self-grounding, absolute to the extent to which, in it, determinacy
comes to be constituted out of indeterminacy in a manner such that no external
determination enters into this process" (ibid., p.133). As Maker suggests, and as
Hegel himself repeatedly states, the 'whole' system is constituted, in its
97 Ibid., p.18-19.
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wholeness and absoluteness, precisely by virtue of its immanence to itself. If,
however, we are allowed to entertain the possibility of a position outside the
absolute system, even if only for the strategic reasons of conducting a
confrontation, then there also arises the possibility that the absolute system as a
whole be itself confronted, conflicted, countered. Such a possibility is perhaps
the only possibility of confronting such an immanently 'perfect', absolute
system. It should be clear by now that such is the possibility afforded by and in
the confrontation with Romanticism.
This confrontation will have to take place within ''the long and difficult
path through the details" of Hegel's philosophy, although not in order to prove or
disprove why any Hegelian concept "develops as it does", but rather in order to
show that, in the specific contexts within the system where the confrontation
with the Romantics figures, the possibility of a position outside the system is
always alive. Ultimately, the very core of the confrontation will have rested on
the very notion of an absolute system as such - Hegel avowedly proposes such a
system, and his defenders cannot but concur. Romanticism, on the other hand,
will have to be seen as articulating doubts with regard to such an absolute
system, or, which amounts to the same, as expressing the possibility that an
absolute system need not be absolute in the sense of self-contained. It is in this
articulation that the fundamental importance of the confrontation between Hegel
and the Romantics arises - it is only in relation to Hegelianism, to the idea of an
absolute philosophical system, and to the particular determinations that such a
system engenders (more specifically, the determinations of infinity and absolute
knowledge) that the true radical nature of what it is that Romanticism proposes
98 Maker, op. cit., p. 127.
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for philosophy may be understood. And it is only with this relation to Hegel in
mind that the claims advanced on behalf of Romanticism can be substantiated as
being an important part of the history of philosophy, and especially of a
philosophy that likes to play Saint George to Hegel's dragon. For, if there is a
'way out' of the absolute system, if the possibility of a position outside the
system is allowed its chance, this is clearly better served as precisely the
articulation of such a possibility and such a chance than with polemics which
will always fall foul of the defence of immanence. This is why 'the long and
difficult path through the details' is the only way this possibility may be
articulated, in what Derrida has so aptly called the "point of almost absolute
proximity to Hegel,,99. What the Romantics have to offer in such a confrontation
is a reconfiguration, a revision even before Hegel, of the meaning and
determination of the word 'absolute', both in 'absolute system', and in 'absolute
proximity' .
With the above preliminary considerations in mind, the confrontation will
take place only at those intersections within the Hegelian system where
Romanticism's articulation of another possibility becomes apparent. To begin
with, Hegel's own pronouncements on the Romantics, in the Philosophy of Right
and in the Aesthetics, must be taken into account. Following on from that, the
first articulation of a difference from Hegel's system is traced in the pages on
signs in the third part of the Encyclopaedia. Finally, and perhaps most
essentially, the pages of the Logic concerning infinitude will be seen as the most
dramatic expression of the difference between Hegelianism and Romanticism,
99 Derrida, Positions, trans. A.Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1979, p. 44.
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and will also allow the clearest articulation of what I have been calling the
possibility of a position outside the absolute system100.
1. Hegel contra Schlegel: the misreading of irony as subjectivity.
That Hegel was deeply inimical to Schlegel, at least by the time of his
mature works, is incontestable. It would not seem inappropriate to suggest that
the numerous scathing remarks on Schlegel dispersed throughout, chiefly the
Aesthetics, but also in key moments of the Philosophy of Right and the
Phenomenology, are, even when Hegel does not name Schlegel directly, aimed
principally at Schlegel's person, his personality - but this is not to say that Hegel
dismissed Schlegel's thinking because of his dislike of him as a person. Rather, it
is quite the opposite: Hegel dismissed Schlegel's thinking as a thinking of
personality, or subjectivity. The key focus for such a claim is Hegel's virulent
dismissal of what he rightly saw as the dominant Schlegelian concept, that of
irony. This rejection is entirely based on a misreading, on the part of Hegel, of
Romantic irony as identifiable with a type of moral subjectivity (in the
Philosophy of Right), a particular form of consciousness (in the Phenomenology),
and a type of artistic character (in the Aesthetics), which all are variations on the
100 I am here using the existing English editions of Hegel's writings, as follows: Hegel's
Philosophy of Right, trans. J.M. Knox, Oxford, OUP, 1952 (hereinafter abbreviated as PR);
Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. J.M. Knox, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975 (A);
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V.MilIer, with foreword by J.N. Findlay, Oxford,
OUP, 1977 (PS); Hegel's Philosophy of Mind; Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the
Philosophical Sciences, trans. W. Wallace, with foreword by J.N. Findlay, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1971 (E); and Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller, New York, Humanity Books
1999 CL).
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same theme, the thematisation of irony as a type of subjectivity'?'. This finds its
clearest expression in the section on irony in the Philosophy of Right, where "the
supreme form in which this subjectivism is completely comprised and expressed
is the phenomenon which has been called by a name borrowed from Plato -
'Irony" (PR, p. 101). In this instance, Hegel is careful to disassociate what he
perceives as the 'right' conception of Plato's irony from the 'subjectivism' that
borrows its name and follows in its wake. Thus: "The name alone, however, is
taken from Plato; he used it to describe a way of speaking which Socrates
employed in conversation when defending the Idea of truth and justice against
the conceit of the Sophists and the uneducated. What he treated ironically,
however, was only their type of mind, not the Idea itself. Irony is only a manner
of talking against people. Except as directed against persons, the essential
movement of thought is dialectic" (ibid.). According to Hegel, Socratic irony,
the fountainhead of the modem version, is "a way of talking against people", and
thus already endowed with a relation to personality and subjectivity, although the
crucial moment comes when Hegel is keen to separate "the essential movement
of thought", as much his own as Plato's, from whatever irony is. This is
interesting, at least as far as a confrontation with Schlegel goes, in that, as I have
already argued, for Schlegel irony clearly is something like "the essential
movement of thought", or at least the necessary and universal condition of the
understanding; thus Hegel's dismissal appears declamatory, programmatic.
101 This misreading has already been identified as such by a host of commentators on the subject,
and my calling it so should therefore not appear controversial. Ernst Behler identified it, from as
early on as his article "Friedrich Schlegel und Hegel" in Hegel-Studien, 2, 1963, and up to his
books of the 90s, German Romantic Literary Theory, op.cit., and Irony and the Discourse of
Modernity, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1990. Even more recently, the same
judgment on the misreading can be found in Judith Norman's "Squaring the Romantic Circle:
Hegel's Critique of Schlegel's Theory of Art", in William Maker, ed., Hegel and Aesthetics, New
York, SUNY, 2000, as well as in Karl Ameriks's "Hegel's Aesthetics: New Perspectives on its
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From then on Hegel concentrates on what irony has become, that is "the
culminating form of subjectivity which conceives itself as the final court of
appeal", "subjectivity knowing itself as the arbiter and judge of truth, right and
duty"(ibid., p.102). We are firmly in the realm of moral considerations, and
more precisely subjective moral attitudes, with irony consisting "in this, that it
knows the objective ethical principles, but fails in self-forgetfulness and self-
renunciation to immerse itself in their seriousness and to base action upon them"
(ibid.). It is only in a note that the real terms of this condemnation, and the
culprits, are named. Irony is seen unequivocally as the "obliteration of good and
evil" from a purely subjective position, the position of a "lofty attitude" which
surveys good and evil and is capriciously capable of deciding on a moral action,
arbitrarily and without recourse to the self-interiorising of objective principles, in
full knowledge that it is its own "lord and master". Irony is the ethical attitude of
self-aware, and therefore also deflated, evil - "the consciousness that this
principle of conviction is not worth much and that, lofty criterion though it be, it
is only caprice that governs it" (ibid., p.258). And the culprits? "This attitude is
really a product of Fichte's philosophy, which proclaims that the Ego is
absolute", but, crucially, "of Fichte himself it cannot properly be said that he
made subjective caprice a guiding principle in ethics, but, later on, this principle
of the mere particular, in the sense of 'particular self-hood', was deified by
Friedrich von Schlegel" (ibid). The germs of Hegel's rejection of Schlegel are
already here, in precisely the terms of a misreading: the misreading consists in
taking Schlegel to be promoting, even further than Fichte himself, the principles
of absolute subjectivity so that it now becomes absolute particular 'self-hood', or
Response to Kant and Romanticism" in the Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, 45-46,
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personality'[". Hegel takes issue with what he sees as the relegating of an
objective ethical attitude to a subjective, and more than that, individualistic,
particularised position. But Schlegel's idea of a 'person', or an 'individual' is
never quite identical with that of a subject, let alone the 'absolute Ego' of
Fichtean philosophy. The 'individual' is more akin to the fragment, it is a notion
expressing a perhaps eccentric articulation of the relation between particular and
universal, whole and part, as can be seen from Athenaum 242: "Aren't all
systems individuals, just as all individuals are systems, at least in embryo and in
tendency?" And Ideas 24: "The symmetry and organisation of history teach us
that mankind, for as long as it existed and developed, has really always been and
has become an individual, a person." I will have recourse to Schlegel's notion of
individuality and personality in the discussion on the fragment in the next
chapter, but for now, suffice it to say that it is clearly not, despite Hegel, a notion
of particularised subjectivity with its origins in the Fichtean absolute ego.
The misreading, or the mistake, therefore, is to think. that Schlegel is
somehow turning Fichte's absolute subjectivity into the particular subjectivity
and the particular will of an empirical person. As was seen in the previous
chapter, Schlegelian irony is not an operation of the subject, but a condition of
language as such - but nowhere does Hegel seem to have made this realisation.
In the Aesthetics, Hegel's critique of irony as a form of subjectivity results in him
attacking explicitly the person, the figure of the ironist, and this as what he calls
"the individuality of genius" (A., p.67). What immediately becomes apparent is
2002.
102 Karl Ameriks has also recognised this symptomatic Hegelian misreading of the Romantics:
"They [The Romantics] were not radical subjectivists or Fichteans demanding that philosophy
demonstrate the mind's absolute domination over nature. Instead, they directly criticised this
demand and understood romantic art, and irony in particular, as valuable precisely because it
points us beyond the powers of mere subjectivity." In Ameriks, op.cit., p.85.
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the transposition of basically the same objections from the 'evil subjectivity' of
the Philosophy of Right to subjectivity as genius in the aesthetic realmlOJ• In the
introduction, Hegel defines "the general meaning of the divine irony of genius as
this concentration of the ego into itself' (ibid., p.66) - there could hardly be a
more decisive gesture to relate inescapably the notion of irony with that of the
ego, and that of genius. Again, Hegel reads Schlegel as continuing and refining
the model of Fichtean absolute subjectivity, but, as Judith Norman rightly notes,
"although Schlegel did have a fundamentally Fichtean position, ... he never
associated the artistic genius with the absolute subject"I04. Moreover, Hegel
reads the 'character' of the Romantic-ironic genius as eminently destructive and
self-destructive: "the ironical, as the individuality of genius, lies in the self-
destruction of the noble, great, and excellent"; and "there is nothing in what is
lofty and best, since, in its appearance in individuals, characters, and actions, it
contradicts and destroys itself and so is ironical about itself' (ibid., p.67). There
are a number of points to be made here. First, it should be noted that what Hegel
has clearly in mind, as his reference to Novalis later in the Aesthetics shows, is,
partly, a self-destruction as part of the individual life of the artist, the cliche of
the doomed romantic genius which Novalis' life-story has done so much
(unfortunately) to propagate. This now banal characterisation points further to
103 It should probably be noted, mutatis mutandis, that it is here in the Aesthetics that Hegel most
explicitly derides Schlegel, alongside his brother August Wilhelm, in the most inimical manner,
talking about "their completely non-philosophical, but essentially critical natures", their
"miserable philosophic ingredients", and proclaiming that "neither of them can claim a reputation
for speculative thought" (A., p.63). It is here then, with Hegel, that Schlegel's' reputation as
what Frederick Beiser calls" a philosophical dilettante" arises.
104 Judith Norman, op.cit., p. 133. Although I am quoting Norman approvingly here, I have
reservations as to whether it is really appropriate to state that Schlegel had a 'fundamentally'
Fichtean position. As I tried to show in chapter one, much of the philosophical foundations of
Romanticism, and of Schlegel's thought in particular, do stem from a reading of the
Wissenschaftslehre, but this was, in Schlegel's case too, a reading, and one which certainly
transformed several aspects of Fichtean doctrine to such a degree that it would be careless to call
any Romantic positions 'fundamentally' Fichtean.
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the fact that Hegel is decidedly trapped into thinking of the Romantics, and
perhaps also of Romanticism in general, as a collection of individual (and in this
instance also empirical) persons in a way which is drastically incompatible with
the figuration of impersonality in texts such as Novalis' Monolog (where the poet
is 'enthused', inhabited by language) or Schlegel's 'Incomprehensibility' essay
(where irony is never located on the level of the individual subject but on that of
language as such). Secondly, what Hegel denigrates as "the self-destruction of
the noble, great, and excellent" on the part of the artistic genius is also not
concomitant with what Schlegel (or, for that matter, Novalis) has to say on the
subject. Even though, in the cornerstone of Schlegelian theory, Athenaum 116,
we can read a sentence ("[Romantic poetry] recognises as its first commandment
that the will of the poet can tolerate no law above itself') which seems to
conform perfectly with Hegel's indictment, there are several instances elsewhere
in the fragments where the artistic genius is defined as the free and self-
restricting will: "the dignity of self-restriction ... is, after all, for the artist as well
as the man, the first and the last, the most necessary and the highest duty. Most
necessary because wherever one does not restrict oneself, one is restricted by the
world; and that makes one a slave. The highest because one can only restrict
oneself at those points and places where one possesses infinite power, self-
creation, and self-destruction." (Lyceum 37). This fragment is (relatively) early,
and still betrays a hefty dose of Fichteanism, but it is also impossible to mistake
the accent Schlegel places on self-restriction as a duty of the artist, precisely at
those points where his power is the greatest - it can be read as Schlegel's own
version of Fichte's Anstofi, transposed onto the level, no longer of the absolute
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subject, but of the individual empirical artist, and could easily serve as a 'check'
on Hegel's objections.
Nevertheless, here in the Aesthetics, more than in the Philosophy of Right,
what Hegel has to say about Schlegelian irony, and despite the subjective
misreading which always accompanies his comments, betrays true analytical
greatness, and, most importantly, points towards what I wish to uphold as truly
essential differences of position between his and the Romantics' thought. If
irony for Hegel remains a matter of individual subjectivity, it nevertheless, he has
to concede, finds ways of manifesting itself in the actual artwork, or the poem.
In his view, this happens in the construction of character in a work, but through
this seemingly specific literary-critical discussion Hegel touches on essentially
philosophical distinctions between his own, and the Romantics' approaches. In
the section on 'action', which forms a part of 'the determinacy of the ideal' in
art, Hegel reaches the point where he needs to discuss "the modern principle of
irony": "This false theory has seduced poets into bringing into characters a
variety which does not come together into a unity, so that every character
destroys himself as character. [On this theory] if an individual comes forward
first in a determinate way, this determinacy is at once to pass over into its
opposite, and his character is therefore to display nothing but the nullity of its
determinacy and itself' (A.,p.243). Irony is the cause of the dissolution of
determinacy in an artistic (poetic-dramatic) character, in such a way that, by
Hegel's own admission, the character cannot be further sublated into a
recognisable determinate 'unity'; as such, the operation of irony, in the specific
instance of the creation of literary characters, acts as a moment in the dialectical
movement which 'falsely' dissolves determinacy and disallows the Ideal from
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being actual (ibid., p.244). Here we have, perhaps, a glimpse of a real, and
essential, problem that Hegel would have with irony even if it were not seen
merely as a subjective trait - irony, to put it in a pre-emptive manner, cuts the
dialectical movement, ''the essential movement of thought" short, it freezes the
sublation of determinacy at precisely the moment where determinacy is
destroyed. But this is not all. Irony, Hegel clearly sees, is a form of negativity,
and as such comes at least quite close to the kind of productive negativity that is
at work in the dialectic. The problem is, as Hegel sees it, that irony is not the
kind of negativity that has an inherent, in-built check, a dialectical Anstop, if the
expression be allowed, of the kind that can lead to its Aujhebung according to the
dialectical method. Back in his discussion of Novalis, Hegel identifies precisely
why this is:
"True, irony implies the absolute negativity in which the subject is related
to himself in the annihilation of everything specific and one-sided; but since this
annihilation, as was indicated earlier in our consideration of this doctrine, affects
not only, as in comedy, what is inherently null which manifests itself in its
hollowness, but equally everything inherently excellent and solid, it follows that
irony as this art of annihilating everything everywhere, ... , acquires, at the same
time, in comparison with the true Ideal, the aspect of inner inartistic lack of
restraint. "(ibid., p.160)
Irony, by Hegel's own admission, is uncontainable. It parasitises,
contaminates, "affects" everything that stands in its path; it is a manifestation "of
inner inartistic lack of restraint" insofar as it is still seen as emanating from the
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subjectivity of the Romantic-ironic artist-genius, but this lack of restraint, looked
at, so to speak, objectively, or in the work itself, amounts to nothing less than
"the annihilation of everything everywhere". In this Hegel is incontestably right,
or at least, right from the position advanced about irony in Schlegel's Ober die
Unverstandlichkeit, where, as I have already shown, irony is seen as an infinite,
uncontainable movement. In the Introduction, during a discussion of Solger
which can easily be transposed onto Schlegel, Hegel objects to what he terms
"the ironic dissolution of the determinate and the inherently substantial alike"
(ibid., p.69), thus pointing the finger at what, at heart, is truly, essentially,
objectionable about irony: not that it is the offspring of a bloated and evil
subjectivity which annihilates all objects before it in a Fichtean paroxysm, but
rather that, in its effect on the work, it is thoroughly destructive, a negativity
which goes wild and cannot be contained within the dialectic, destroying both
indeterminacy and determinacy, the particular as well as the universal. Of
course, within the movements of the dialectic in the Aesthetics, irony represents
nothing more than a 'false' moment, which is itself bypassed on the way to
actualising the Idea - but, inasmuch as Hegel's characterisation of irony at this
point cannot be said to be remotely wrong and does not appear as a misreading, it
points to what I maintain are the true, essential issues in the confrontation
between Hegelianism and Romanticism, and which I will approach in the
discussion on infinity in the Logic later. First, I must take a detour through the
first instance where, even though Hegel does not mention the work of the
Romantics, his own position can be seen to be radically at odds with
Romanticism, and for substantial reasons - the theory of signs.
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2. Signification and Subjectivity: Hegel contra Novalis.
It is highly unlikely, if not altogether impossible, that Hegel had any
knowledge of Novalis' 'semiotic fragment' in the Fichte-Studien, or any
knowledge of Romantic semiotic theory in general. His remarks on the sign
therefore, appearing at a specific place immanently assigned to them within the
whole of the system, must be considered primarily for their own sake - and yet,
what I am proposing to undertake in this section is a comparative investigation of
Hegel's and Novalis' semiotic theories, aiming to examine striking similarities,
but also fundamental differences between them, and so throwing light on the
essential distinctions between Hegelian and Romantic thinking. There is a sense
in which highlighting the theory of signs in Hegel appears counterintuitive, at
least bearing in mind the immanent development of Hegel's system and the
particular place assigned to this theory within it; but even here, before the
analysis has properly begun, a fundamental discrepancy becomes manifest. For
Novalis, who will be the key figure in this investigation, the theory of signs also
has a particular place assigned to it in the Fichte-Studien (which may in this
instance, temporarily and heuristically, be viewed as at least approximating a
'system'), but this place is remarkably more prominent. In fact, if we take
Novalis' notes at face value, the 'semiotic fragment' assigns the ''theory of the
sign" a place before the system itself, even before "the possibility of a system" or
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"philosophy as a whole"IOS. Even before any particular distinctions are to be
made then, it must be noted that, even though both Novalis and Hegel, in their
own way, place the theory of signs within a general theory "of consciousness"
(Novalis), or of "subjective spirit" (Hegel), thus relating semiotics to
subjectivity, in Novalis' thinking the elaboration of a theory of signs strictly
precedes the articulation of the very possibility of a system - this will not turn
out to be a trivial difference, although, for the moment, it must remain suspended
as the comparative examination begins.
Hegel places 'the sign' in the section on the imagination, part of the
section on representation, itself part of the section on psychology in the first
division of the philosophy of spirit, namely subjective spirit. The first two,
'minor' headings (imagination and representation) seem to suggest that Hegel is
thinking of the production of signs as forming part of a general theory of
representation, while the latter two, 'major' headings (psychology and subjective
spirit) are indication enough that what is here being considered is closely related
to a form of subjectivity, even though, it must be noted, this is not the
subjectivity of consciousness pertaining properly to the Phenomenology - rather
it is the subjectivity, or, better, the subjective nature or aspect, of spirit itself. In
the 'remark' to paragraph 458 of the third part of the Encyclopaedia, Hegel puts
the sign in its proper place, as follows:
"In logic and psychology, signs and language are usually foisted in
somewhere as an appendix, without any trouble being taken to display their
necessity and systematic place in the economy of intelligence. The right place
lOS See II, 108, 11: "l. Theory of the sign or / what can be true through the medium of language? /
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for the sign is that just given: where intelligence - which as intuiting generates
the form of time and space, but appears as recipient of sensible matter, out of
which it forms ideas -now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from
itself, treating the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property,
deleting the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it, and
conferring on it another connotation as its soul and import." (E., p.213).
The proper place of the sign, therefore, is within "the economy of
intelligence", by which Hegel denotes a certain type of subjectivity which is not
the 'empirical', so to speak, subjectivity of consciousness but the subjectivity of
the subjective spirit. More specifically, the place of the sign in this economy is
at the precise moment where the idea to be produced in the sign becomes an idea
of the intelligence itself, "its own property", where the sign "has received as its
soul and meaning an independent mental representation"(ibid.). From this it can
be inferred without ambiguity that Hegel adheres to the position, which is also
that of Novalis, that the sign is essentially arbitrary, an "original" production on
the part of intelligence or subjectivity, expressly unrelated to what could have
been, so to speak, objectively "the connotation which properly and naturally
belongs to it". At the same time as being arbitrary, and in essence because it is
arbitrary, the sign, according to Hegel, is also, however, in a decisive sense,
transparent. It is created arbitrarily by the intelligence which thus bestows a
connotation upon it which has nothing to do with its objective 'natural'
properties, but rather with the intelligence itself as exercising "ampler authority
in the use of intuitions" (ibid.). The sign is the creation of the intelligence, and
2. On philosophy as a whole - the possibility ofa system, etc. f 3. System itself." The 'f' marks a
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as such it emanates from it, is controlled by it, and is witness to that
intelligence's power and freedom to use and transform the givens of intuition.
It is in relation to what, in the system, precedes the sign, namely the
symbol, that this becomes most apparent. For Hegel the symbol is anterior, or
lesser, than the sign, in that in the symbol the intelligence selects "only that
sensuous material whose independent signification corresponds to the specific
content of the universal to be symbolised" (ibid., p.212). In the symbol, the
intuition "counts positively, or as representing itself' (ibid.), the operation is not
arbitrary but heavily reliant on a residue of objectivity, whereby what comes to
be symbolised "properly and naturally" belongs to its symbol. Interestingly, for
Hegel this apparent coincidence between symbol and symbolised (what in
modem semiotics one would call the 'signifier' and 'signified'), does not render
the symbol as transparent as the sign. From this it is obvious that the
transparency of the sign is inherently dependent on its arbitrariness, on the free
choice, the "ampler authority" of the intelligence producing it: "The sign is
different from the symbol: for in the symbol the original characters (in essence
and conception) of the visible object are more or less identical with the import
which it bears as symbol; whereas in the sign, strictly so-called, the natural
attributes of the intuition, and the connotation of which it is a sign, have nothing
to do with each other" (ibid., p.213)106.In the symbol, Hegel maintains, the
intelligence is still too caught up in the objective content of what it represents,
change of line, diacritically further emphasising the positioning.
106 At this point of the intersection between symbol and sign, or, to be precise, in the Zusatz
added later between paragraphs 457 and 458, Hegel also takes into account the notion of
allegory, differentiating it from the symbol in that, where the latter operates by assigning an
object to a symbol imbued with that object's natural qualities, and this in a unified way (so that
'the eagle' is a symbol for 'Jupiter' because they both 'properly and naturally' attest to the single,
unifying property of being 'strong' which is what binds the symbol and the symbolised together),
allegory "expresses the subjective element more by an ensemble of separate details" (ibid.,
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allowing the natural properties of the object to inform the symbol for it, whereas
in the sign it has reached a degree of self-interiorisation of the objective in which
its own freedom, the arbitrary choice of sign divorced from the natural properties
of the object it signifies, becomes manifest - in the transparency and the
arbitrariness of the sign which thus are inherently linked.
Arbitrary, transparent, an indication of free choice and instrumental
power on the part of the intelligence, the sign is not simply 'one better' than the
symbol; inasmuch as it negates the 'natural' and 'proper' connection between an
object and its intuition or representation, inasmuch as it re-interiorises the
'given' of intuition, the sign is a model for the operations of the Hegelian
Aufhebung. Hegel writes, beginning the next paragraph (459): "The intuition -
in its natural phase a something given and given in space - acquires, when
employed as a sign, the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and
sublimated (aufgehoben)" (ibid., p.213, emphasis mine). The sign is the
Aufhebung of spatial intuition, its re-interiorisation and recasting in the form of
time: "Such is the negativity of intelligence; and thus the truer phase of the
intuition used as sign is existence in time" (ibid.). Thus the sign serves as the
Aufhebung of spatial intuition into interiorised time, which, for Hegel, means that
the intelligence is now capable of producing, in the sign, the element of its own
"natural institution" - to wit, "the vocal note" (Ton), the voice. The voice is
what, in the sign, makes the intelligence institute, bring or set forth "its
(anthropological) own naturalness"{ibid., p.214). The voice is therefore the
sound of ''the psyche as a subject for itself and affecting itself by itself"!", it is
p.212). I mention this here as the first manifestation of Hegel's treatment of allegory, which is,
a~ain, divergent from its Romantic treatment.
10 Jacques Derrida, "The Pit and the Pyramid", in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass,
Brighton, The Harvester Press, 1982, p. 89. Derrida's reading of Hegelian semiology is very
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the clear indication that the sign is itself a sign of the special "negativity of
intelligence", of the process of Aufhebung. Undoubtedly, as Jacques Derrida has
shown, Hegel privileges "the vocal note" in his discussion of signification; it is
with the voice that the intelligence is capable of producing its "own naturalness"
and able to bring it out into the arbitrary (vocal) sign. But, again as Derrida has
shown, what becomes interesting is Hegel's treatment of writing, given this
privilege bestowed on the vocal sign. Hegel distinguishes between hieroglyphic
and alphabetical writing in much the same way that he distinguishes between
symbol and sign. He writes, in the remark to paragraph 459 concerned with
written language: "It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which
written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs. In particular,
hieroglyphics uses spatial figures to designate ideas; alphabetical writing, on the
other hand, uses them to designate vocal notes, which are already signs"(ibid.,
p.217). Hieroglyphics are spatial representations of ideas, bereft of the
Aufhebung which turns such spatial intuitions into signs proper, into the vocal
sign, whereas alphabetical writing is the sign of the vocal sign, thus bearing the
same transparent relation to the vocal sign that the sign bears to the intuition.
This transparent relation is posited by Hegel as "the fundamental desideratum of
language - the name"(ibid., p.217). Thus, "alphabetical writing retains at the
same time the advantage of vocal language, that the ideas have names strictly so-
called: the name is the simple sign for the exact idea, not decomposed into its
features and compounded out of them" (ibid., emphasis mine). The name, then,
is the true essential character of the sign in its transparency, and thus, as Derrida
important precisely because of the highlighting of the voice and its privileged position in
Hegelian thinking. In what follows I shall often have recourse to arguments that Derrida was first
to deploy in relation to Hegel, but which, as I hope to show, are closely related to the 'alternative'
position, hidden away in the fragments of Nova lis' Fichte-Studien.
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points out, ''the linguistics implied by all these propositions is a linguistics of the
word and singularly of the name" (Derrida, op.cit., p.96). The name is the name
Hegel gives to the ultimate 'desideratum' of language and signification which is,
not arbitrariness itself, but because of arbitrariness, because arbitrariness implies
the freedom and power of intelligence, of the subject of signification, immediacy
and transparency. "To want a name means that for the immediate idea (... ) we
require a simple immediate sign which for its own sake does not suggest
anything, and has for its sole function to signify and represent sensibly the simple
idea as such" (E., p. 217, emphasis mine).
Ultimately, what becomes apparent in the discussion of signs and
symbols, vocal and written language, hieroglyphics and alphabetical writing, is
that for Hegel the process of signification is presented as concomitant with that
of naming, the sign is the name; this is because Hegel posits the name, in its
transparency and immediacy, as the "fundamental desideratum of language". The
sign itself is transparent, and thus when alphabetical writing is described as
consisting of "signs of signs", what is achieved is a second level of transparency,
so that both in vocal signification and in alphabetical writing "the visible
language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence expresses itself
immediately and unconditionally by speaking"(ibid., p.218, emphasis mine). To
draw from this the conclusions that Derrida draws, to wit: that Hegel's semiotics
is an instance of the philosophical privileging of the voice as opposed to writing,
seems inevitable. But for the purposes of elucidating the differences between
Hegelianism and Romanticism, it is Paul de Man's indictment of Hegel's
semiotics, that "the predication involved in a sign is always citational" that is
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more directly relevant108• What this means, as de Man explains, is that the sign,
in its essential identification with the name, is always thought of by Hegel,
without doubt, as essentially deriving from the subject which produces and cites
it - the transparency and arbitrariness of the sign is, as I have been arguing, an
indication of the freedom and power of the subject. Whether this necessarily
implies (as I think it does) that Derrida is right in thinking that Hegel's
semiology is an instance of the philosophical privileging of presence through the
valorisation of the voice is not here the issue. Incontestably, however one thinks
of presence in relation to the subject, Hegel's theory of the sign is one in which
the sign properly emanates from the subject, from the intelligence, and where,
more importantly, the transparency of the sign not only means, or is an effect of,
the freedom and "ample authority" of intelligence, of the subject, but is achieved
with a sign which always cites the subject's authority alongside its production.
What, then, are those differences between Hegel's and Novalis' semiotic
theories? As it should be clear already those differences are related to Hegel's
and Novalis' varying positions on the relation between signs or language and the
subject. Even a cursory look at the Monolog allows one to see that for Novalis,
who speaks about being 'enthused' and inhabited by language, a relation of
instrumentality, in the Hegelian manner, between subject and signs is
unacceptable. But this is hardly sufficient. More interestingly, the conclusions
that can be drawn by looking back at Novalis' 'semiotic fragment' from the
Fichte-Studien after having examined Hegelian semiology, are richer and point
to further essential differences between their thoughts. What has to be stated
108 Paul de Man, "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics", in de Man, Aesthetic Ideology,
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 96. I should note that, despite the title of de
Man's essay, the quotation just given comes in a discussion of the difference between symbol and
sign in the Encyclopaedia.
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from the outset is that Novalis shares, more or less, his starting point with Hegel,
inasmuch as Novalis also considers the 'theory of the sign' to be a part, in a
certain sense, of an examination of the subject, in his case the I inflected
significantly by Fichte, but, as I have argued before, certainly not identical to
Fichte's absolute subjectivity. Before re-examining the 'semiotic fragment'
however, a rather astonishing connection (though not identification) between
Hegel's and Novalis' concerns must be noted. Shortly before the 'semiotic'
fragment, Novalis writes:
"The I has hieroglyphic power."
"Das Ich hat eine hieroglyphische Kraft" (II, 107,6).
The fragment stands alone, and no further explanation is given as to what exactly
this hieroglyphic power of the I may be. In conjunction with what Novalis has to
say in the semiotic fragment, and against Hegel's own proclamations on
hieroglyphic writing, I would like to suggest that the I's hieroglyphic power
consists in nothing other than the 'transcendental schema' which lies at the
foundation of every process of signification and which, as I will try to show, has
more in common with the traits Hegel denounced in hieroglyphic writing than
with the transparency of the Hegelian sign. To begin with, it needs to be stressed
that, even though Novalis claims hieroglyphic power for the I, this should not be
confused either with the Fichtean absolute subject or with empirical subjectivity.
As I showed earlier in Chapter 2, the transcendental schema is, in the final
analysis, both prior to and independent of any subject - thus, if it is in the
schema that this 'hieroglyphic power' is to be found, it is not, strictly speaking,
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the power of a subject, but rather the 'power' or the operation of the originary
schema to which every'!' as determined subject relates as part of the
signification process I 09.
Why 'hieroglyphic' though? In the semiotic fragment itself Novalis does
not utilise the same expression, nor is there a sense in which the operations of the
schema are explicitly connected to hieroglyphics. I would like to suggest that the
picture may be made clearer if lines of connection are drawn, reading, as it were,
between the lines of Novalis' fragments. One first such line takes us back to
what Hegel designated as the essential property of hieroglyphics, which is their
provenance, as written marks, in "spatial intuition", as opposed to the
interiorised temporal intuition of vocal, and thus also of alphabetical, signs. As
opposed to this Hegelian conception, Novalis states: "But thought, like
everything else that is external, can only be communicated to a second signifying
person through space" (II, 108, 11). For Novalis therefore, the communication
of signs, the process of signification itself is not, as it is with Hegel, a process of
re-interiorisation of spatial intuition into time, but remains within spatial
exteriority. The sign, it can already be seen, is not "aufgehoben", it only has the
quality of spatial exteriority 'through and through' and thus, it would not be too
bold an assertion, all signs are, in this singular sense of being imbued with
spatiality, hieroglyphic - which is not, as I will show, quite the same as saying
that all signs are identical to hieroglyphs. What Hegel denounces is what
109 It stills needs to be acknowledged that Novalis does say that the hieroglyphic power is in the
possession of the I, whereas in the analysis that follows I ascribe that power, to the extents that
will be demonstrated, to the a priori, a-subjective originary schema. The justification for doing
this should transpire with what follows - as for the I, I would merely like to appeal to the protean
dynamic of the Fichte-Studien as a whole, where determinations (and especially of the 'I') are
never stable; to the fact that the fragment (no, 6) is of the earliest, where Fichte casts the longer
shadow; and to the fact that, from the perspective of an analysis of the Fichtean I which is what
the fragments are, 'J' may well be much less a subject than the unconditioned a priori structure
that 'the schema' here represents.
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Novalis actively embraces - but this is not simply capricious or wilful. The
essential reasons for designating signs as pertaining to spatial exteriority, as
bearing essential hieroglyphic qualities, are to do with the originary
transcendental schema itself. For, as was examined earlier in Chapter 2, Novalis'
postulation of the schema amounts to a rejection of the Hegelian notion of the
transparency of the sign. Although for both Novalis and Hegel signs are
arbitrary, and they are arbitrary because they are seen as effected freely by the
power of a subject or an intelligence, the arbitrariness of the sign does not entail
its transparency for Novalis. Instead, the paradoxical formulation of "free
necessity" governs the relation of each particular determined sign (freely effected
by a signifying agent) to the a priori necessary condition of possibility for any
such determined signification, which lies in the originary schema and its essential
relationality. What this means for the notion of transparency is that the necessary
given of the transcendental schema as relationality always mediates every
particular determination of the sign - sign and signified are not, as they are
presented by Hegel, posited in a relation of immediacy, but rather as always
already mediated in, and by, the transcendental schema. Consequently, although
it would be mistaken to suggest that for Novalis the sign is opaque, it would be
even more mistaken to see it as transparent - the sign appears as arbitrary effect,
but is always the product of a mediation through the essential relationality of the
schema.
The mediation of the schema has another radical consequence, parallel to
the rejection of the sign's transparency, and which also aligns it to Hegel's notion
of the hieroglyphic. This is the fact that, through this mediation, the mark of the
transcendental schema is always imprinted on each particular, determined
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relation between signifier and signified, on each determined sign. In the semiotic
fragment we read:
"Question: How can the first signifier [das erste Bezeichnender'"
recognise this schema and act accordingly?
The first signifier will have painted its own image, unperceived, in the mirror of
reflection, without forgetting the feature that the image [Bild] is painted in this
position, that it paints itself' (II, 110, 11).
What this means is that the schema, which is what forms "the mirror of
reflection" according to Novalis, always, necessarily allows the imprint, the mark
of its operation to appear, to "be painted" in each signifier, and thus its sign. As a
result, the sign for Novalis, far from being a "simple immediate" (E., p.217) as it
is for Hegel, is the product of a mediation through the transcendental schema, a
singular mediation which takes the form of the 'transcendental mark', the form
of having imprinted itself on every sign. Through the mediation of the schema,
the sign does not lose its arbitrariness but it does unequivocally lose all
aspirations to transparency and immediacy that Hegel bestowed upon it. Thus, to
repeat, every sign is hieroglyphic, or, to be more precise, the condition of
possibility for each sign (which condition lies within the originary schema as
essential relationality) is a certain kind of hieroglyphic (spatial, marked) imprint
[BUd] that accompanies the process of signification. It is not without
110 A crucial point of clarification is here unavoidable. Novalis distinguishes between das
Bezeichnende and der Bezeichnende, ie. between the signifier (in the sign) and the signifying
agent, the subject. In this citation, he is concerned with the former, that is to say with the signifier
as part of the sign.
187
significance that the semiotic fragment does not make clear whether the
signification processes at stake are oral or written, or that Novalis decidedly does
not place the vocal sign in the privileged position ascribed to it by Hegel.
Although it would be wrong flatly to assert that Novalis thinks of all signs as
hieroglyphs, mediation through the schema ensures that all signs bear a spatial,
"painted" mark, a mark akin to Hegel's own designation of the hieroglyph.
Signs are not, simply, hieroglyphs, one and all, but they all bear the mark, the
imprint of the "hieroglyphic power" which is none other than the operation, the
mediation of the transcendental schema.
This comparative examination of the theory of signification in Hegel and
Novalis has an importance which lies far beyond the localised concerns of a
comparison. If, as I suggested at the beginning, Hegel's philosophy represents a
canonical body, a system to be confronted by all following philosophical
endeavours, and if, as analyses such as those of Derrida and de Man seem to
prove, the theory of signification within the Hegelian system is symptomatic of
its concerns, exposition, and import, then it follows that the confrontation with
the Hegelian system, and in particular with the theory of the sign, afforded by a
look back to Novalis' theory of the sign has already moved the goalposts and
changed the stakes of philosophy's general confrontation with Hegel. And it is at
this point, with Derrida and de Man, that is with deconstruction, in mind, that a
perhaps bold assertion needs to be made. If, as I readily admit, it cannot simply
be asserted that the theory of the transcendental schema somehow prefigures the
concerns of deconstruction, a perhaps more modest, but for this no less pertinent,
claim can be made - namely that, with the theory of the sign as expounded by
Novalis, with the primacy of relationality in the transcendental schema, the mark
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of the hieroglyphic imprinted on the constitution of all signs, the 'other
possibility' earlier intimated is already with us, even before Hegel arrived.
Novalis allows for a reconfiguration of the signification process which presents
already a 'way out' of that which, in Hegel, is seen as the hallmark of 'western
metaphysics', 'logocentrism', or any other such designation. And if Manfred
Frank is able, after a brief consideration of Novalis' semiotic fragment, to come
to the Derridean conclusion that "the transcendental refraction of meaning has
the effect of generalising every text, regardless of its genre and content - that is
to say, every sign which carries with it an indication of the act of its making
bears an index of its textuality?'!' then, at the very least, there is something in
Romanticism, and in this case in Novalis' theory of the sign, that has been
forgotten - what has been forgotten, in the rush to confront Hegel head-on, is the
sense in which the confrontation, or at least the possibility of a non-Hegelian
alternative, is already (and perhaps always already) before us.
To return to the matter at hand, however, let me add the following
concluding remarks, before examining another aspect of Hegelian philosophy in
its relation to Romanticism. What the different approaches to semiotic theory in
Novalis and Hegel show is, firstly, that the theory of the sign, despite the specific
positioning it has received within their respective thoughts, points far beyond that
specificity and into general distinctions between the Romantic and the Hegelian
thought. Secondly, and just as importantly, since a theory of signs and language
is intimately connected to epistemology, it should not be hard to see, as I
suggested previously, that the decisive element in the difference between Hegel
and the Romantics may well turn out to be that step back, from the Fichteanism
III Frank, "The Infinite Text", in Glyph 7, 1980, p. 73. In the concluding chapter I will have the
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that Hegel still accuses the Romantics of ascribing to, to a more rigorously
Kantian perspective - and what this entails is of fundamental importance for
what is here at stake. Where Hegel, in attempting to overcome Kantian
restrictions and his legislation over the powers of reason, can uncontroversially
be seen as attempting to form a system as a whole, a system where the
coincidence of the Absolute with absolute knowing cannot fail but be a pivotal
consideration, the Romantics' disavowal of the notion of the complete system
marks a Kantian bias undetected, at least by Hegel. The difference between
considering the sign either as a transparent and immediate relation (Hegel) or as
always mediated by an originary relational schema, and, just as significantly, as
always bearing the mark of that mediation, becomes none other than the
difference between two versions of the Absolute in philosophy - and this is what
will ultimately concern me in the following section.
3. 'Spurious Infinity' and the Absolute: Romanticism contra Hegel.
As already mentioned, in his discussion and condemnation of Novalis in
the Aesthetics, Hegel touches on what he sees as a fundamental flaw in
Romanticism, and which he designates as a certain kind of "longing" for infinity,
"a longing which will not let itself go in actual action and production, because it
chance to discuss Frank's version of Romanticism and its relation to deconstructive readings such
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is frightened by being polluted by contact with finitude" (A., p.l60). Even
though, in this particular case, and also in his discussion of the 'beautiful soul' in
the Phenomenology which commentators also associate with a (nameless)
condemnation of Novalis 112, the charge is against a notion of infinity in relation
to a particular empirical subject or, in the case of the Phenomenology, as a
moment in the development of consciousness, the difference in the way Hegel
and the Romantics understand and employ the concept of infinity bears traits
entirely symptomatic of a fundamental philosophical difference. In fact, as I aim
to show, it is this difference in the abstract concept of infinity which lies at the
heart of the confrontation between Hegel and Romanticism. And, what is more, I
wish to maintain that an exploration of this difference may also pave the way for
a more fully articulated elaboration of the fate of Romanticism, not just in the
hands of Hegel, but also in those of Hegel's critics and detractors who employ
Hegel's own arguments against the Romantic position in an attempt to demarcate
Romanticism from, in this instance, deconstruction. Thus, in the exemplary
articulation and defence of deconstruction performed by Rodolphe Gasche,
Romanticism is summarily dismissed using entirely, and admittedly, Hegelian
arguments. In what follows I shall try to counter those arguments and to show,
not that Romanticism may be equated with the work of Jacques Derrida and his
followers, but that, at least, the elaboration of the concept of infinity in
Romanticism, and in contradistinction with that found in Hegel, may well turn
out to be much more similar, structurally, strategically, and systematically, to
that of (Gasche's) Derrida.
as de Man's and Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy's in more detail.
112 See Behler, Irony and the Discourse of Modernity, p.86.
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First, it is vital to take a close look at how Hegel conceives of infinity in
the pages devoted to it in the first part of the Logic. For him there are two
'types' of infinity, the 'true' and the 'spurious', or 'bad' (in German, schlecht)
infinite. The point of my reading is precisely to examine the degree to which
'spurious' infinity can indeed be associated with the concept of infinity operating
in Romanticism. To begin with, I am assuming that the spurious infinite is,
indeed, the Romantic one. How does Hegel define it? There are two answers, or
rather, two moments of a single answer to this question. Firstly, spurious infinity
is defined as the infinite insofar as it is opposed to the finite; further than that, in
a formulation which will hold my attention with regard to Romanticism, this
spurious infinite is designated as the infinite of the understanding. Thus: "The
infinite as thus posited over against the finite, in a relation wherein they are as
qualitatively distinct others, is to be called the spurious infinite, the infinite of the
understanding, for which it has the value of the highest, the absolute Truth" (L,
p.l39). With Gasche, I must concede that "Hegel's arguments against spurious
infinity remain perfectly valid. They remain relevant because the relegation of
spurious infinity to the empirical discredits it as a tool of philosophical analysis.
Spurious infinity disregards the fundamental difference - difference itself-
between what is given and the given as thought"I13. The argument against this
'type' of conception of the infinite is that it is only an empirical conception,
ultimately, as Hegel himself points out, a 'finite' conception of infinity. If the
infinite is simply conceived as that which, permanently and indefinitely opposes
the finite, that which is defined by its simple negation of the finite, then, as Hegel
points out, this infinite is but the flip-side of the finite, its negation, and thus
113 Gasche, "Structural Infinity", in Inventions of Difference: on Jacques Derrida, Cambridge,
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becomes itself 'finitised': "the main point is to distinguish the genuine Notion of
infinity from spurious infinity, the infinite of reason from the infinite of
understanding; yet the latter is the finitised infinite, and it will be found that in
the very act of keeping the infinite pure and aloof from the finite, the infinite is
only made finite" (L., p.137). This expression of the distinction clearly exhibits
similarities to the 'longing for infinity' Hegel ascribed to the doomed Novalis in
the Aesthetics; it is an infinity which must, at all costs, be kept away, 'aloof,
from the contamination of finitude; the way the understanding understands it,
infinity can only ever be that which is not finite. But, as Hegel painstakingly
explains, such a notion of infinity which finds its only determination in the
negation of finitude dialectically becomes itself finite: "the infinite, in that case,
is one of the two; but as only one of the two is itself finite, it is not the whole but
only one side; it has its limit in what stands over against it; it is thus the finite
infinite"(ibid., p.144).
The second 'moment' in the definition of spurious infinity comes about
because, in its determination as the 'simple', 'finitised' infinite always opposed
to the finite, this infinite is always in a relation of opposition with the finite, a
relation which Hegel determines, in this instance, as the perpetual alternation (to
infinity) of finite and infinite. In Hegel's words: "We have before us the
alternating determination of the finite and the infinite; the finite is finite only in
its relation to the ought or to the infinite!", and the latter is only infinite in its
Harvard UP, 1994, p.130.
114 This relation to 'the ought' (das Sol/en) is how Hegel advances the dialectical speculation
from finitude to infinity. I am here only concerned with the specific determinations of infinity
that run through these pages, and cannot aim to provide an adequate (immanent) description of
the transitions at hand. This should not mean that my reading or understanding of the Logic is
somehow lacking in the immanent rigour which is indispensable for its proper development, as
well as for its defence - my aim is to highlight how Hegel defines and articulates the difference
between the spurious and the true infinite.
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relation to the finite. They are inseparable and at the same time mutually related
as sheer others; each has in its own self the other of itself'(ibid., p.141). This
determination of finitude and infinity as always opposed to each other, "mutually
related as sheer others" logically results in its perpetuation, as the constant
alternation between a finite and a 'finitised' (simple) infinite: "it is this
alternating determination negating both its own self and its negation, which
appears as the progress to infinity, a progress which in so many forms and
applications is accepted as something ultimate beyond which thought does not
go"(ibid, p.142). As should be evident, it is this progress to infinity, this
spurious infinite in its determination, no longer as simple but as progressive
infinite, which bears the obvious mark of what the Romantics would call infinity,
drawn in particular from Schlegel's definition of Romantic poetry as infinite and
progressive in Athenaum J J 6. According to Hegel, and although this represents
a second moment or stage in the determination of infinity, we are still within the
bounds of an infinite which is only and always defined as the negation of the
finite, although whether this is indeed what the definition of infinity is for
Schlegel or Romanticism remains to be seen. For the moment, let us note that
for Hegel this is (still) the spurious infinite inasmuch as, within this alternating
determination, finite and infinite are both thought of as "credited with a self-
subsistent determinate being"(ibid.); in this way, just as with the 'simple'
infinite, the infinite is finitised, rendered itself finite in the perpetuity of the
alternating determination, for, as sheer negation of the finite, it still carries
finitude within it. "The finite reappears in the infinite itself es its other, because it
is only in its connection with its other, the finite, that the infinite is. The progress
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to infinity is, consequently, only the perpetual repetition of one and the same
content, one and the same tedious alternation of this finite and infinite" (ibid.).
Thus, and to recap, the spurious infinite is, according to Hegel, spurious
because: 1) it is simple negation of the finite, and thus always carries the finite
with it as its other; and 2) in its determination as negation of the finite, it appears
as 'the progress to infinity', which in itself is only a "perpetual repetition" of the
alternating determination of the infinite by the finite and vice versa - thus it is
still simply the negation of finitude, and not the true infinite. At this stage it is
useful to point out that not only is this spurious 'progressive' infinite aligned
with its Romantic conception, (although not explicitly by Hegel himself) but
also, crucially, that there seem to be important similarities between the perpetual
negation of finitude which characterises spurious infinity, on the one hand, and
the determination and condemnation of irony as an uncontainable negative force
in the Aesthetics. In his notebooks Schlegel writes that "irony is the 'epideixis'
[the exhibition, the demonstration, the Darste//ung if you wish] of infinity"
(KFSA, XVIII, no. 76), and I tried to show irony's intimate relation with infinity
in the previous chapter. The problem Hegel finds with the spurious infinite can
be thus shown to be akin to that he found with irony - they both represent or
express, they both stem from and result in, a negation which is uncontainable by
the movement of dialectical logic, and they both result not in the articulation of a
concrete whole but remain fundamentally incomplete. In the case of irony this
can be seen from Hegel's remarks about the paucity of dramatic characters
created in the spirit of irony, characters which do not form concrete, whole,
recognisable and determinable entities; in this case, the spurious infinite, the
infinite of the understanding, is that which is perpetuated in its "tedious
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alternation" of finite and infinite and does not comprehend them both in a unity.
Hegel is quite explicit that this is in fact the way towards true infinity: "The
reason why the understanding is so antagonistic to the unity of the finite and
infinite is simply that it presupposes the limitation of the finite, as well as the in-
itself, as perpetuated; in doing so it overlooks the negation of both which is
actually present in the infinite progress, as also the fact that they occur therein
only as moments of a whole, and that they come on the scene only by means of
their opposite, but essentially also by means of the sublation of their
opposite"(ibid., p.l47). It is not enough to define infinity as sheer opposition to
finitude, nor even to define it as the perpetual, infinite alternation between such
two sheer others as the progress to infinity. Infinity, if it is to be true, can only
ever be infinity as totality, it can only ever be determined as the sublation of the
sheer opposition of finitude and infinity, as the unity of unity and opposition as
moments of infinitude. Spurious infinity, by contrast, is, in Hegel's words,
"incomplete reflection" which "has completely before it both determinations of
the genuine infinite: the opposition of the finite and infinite, and their unity, but it
does not bring these two thoughts together; the one inevitably evokes the other,
but this reflection lets them only alternate"(ibid., p.150-151). The second
moment of spurious infinity, the 'progress to infinity' allows for both the
opposition and the unity of finite and infinite, but it does not allow for the unity
of unity and opposition, which results in the true infinite as the whole, infinity as
totality. "What is required in order to see into the nature of the infinite is nothing
difficult: it is to be aware that the infinite progress, the developed infinite of the
understanding, is so constituted as to be the alternation of the two
determinations, of the unity and the separation of both moments and also to be
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aware that this unity and this separation are themselves inseparable" (ibid.,
p.15l). This inseparability of unity and separation constitutes the completeness
of the total infinite. Thus Rodolphe Gasche is right in saying that "the true
infinite is characterised by absolute wholeness, in other words, by a wholeness
that is also self-inclusive to the extent that it is not in opposition to that of which
it is the totality" (op.cit., p.l33).
In this complete, total infinity, all negation, all differentiation, which has
nonetheless been the unmistakable motor of the movement of Hegel's thought,
dissolves - or rather, to be true to the Hegelian spirit, it is preserved in the very
totality that no longer bears its mark. Thus the true Hegelian infinite is also
absolute, it is indeed the Absolute. If anyone could think that this discussion of
infinity is but a localised concern - which, given its specific place within the
movement of the Logic as a whole, may seem to be tempting - Hegel himself
offers an important corrective: "in this detailed example, there is revealed the
specific nature of speculative thought, which consists solely in grasping the
opposed moments in their unity"(L., p.152). I take this to be an admission on
Hegel's part of the character and motivation of the speculative procedure, of the
dialectic as movement of thought and of the operation of the Aufhebung as its
chief method of advance. Even though I concur, as previously stated, with recent
immanent defences of Hegelianism and do not wish to repeat the damaging move
of assuming Hegel's goal before he has reached it, the conclusion appears to me
inexorable, namely that, in this specific instance which, however, and by Hegel's
own admission, is exemplary of the Hegelian procedure as a whole, what
ultimately appears to hold sway over everything is precisely a thought of totality,
and of infinity as totality. The true is indeed, even now, the whole. The Hegelian
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absolute therefore, even before its determination as Notion by the end of the
Logic or as absolute knowing by the end of the Phenomenology can
unequivocally be characterised as complete, unified, whole. And, as Gasche
correctly notes, the completeness of Hegelian infinity represents, or expresses,
nothing less than "philosophy's requirement of wholeness, totality, and unity. It
expresses it in a privileged way because, unlike the spurious infinite, it IS
complete. By including itself and its Other within itself, by being thus in
opposition to all opposition, it is a fully determined whole which, because it
includes itself, no longer has an outside. It is, therefore, identical with reason as
pure thought'{Gasche, op.cit., p.134). It would be undesirable, and perhaps even
impossible, to argue against such a conception immanently, in other words to say
that Hegel's Absolute, or his version of the true infinite is 'wrong' from within
the perspective of the Logic itself, if only because there is, immanently speaking,
no possible position outside the true infinite. And yet, I want to uphold just such
a 'position', as the position of the spurious infinite, inasmuch as that represents
the Romantic Absolute. This can only be possible if, somehow, it is possible to
arrest the dialectical movement, if it is possible to uphold something other than
the dialectic as "the essential movement of thought", if it is possible to think of a
radically incomplete Absolute (which may very well not turn out to be strictly
philosophical) - in other words, if one is allowed to entertain the possibility that,
for reasons which cannot fall within the purview of the dialectic, the spurious
infinite is, if not "something ultimate beyond which thought cannot go" (that
Hegel proved to be incorrect, and conclusively), then something which,
presupposed as it is by the true infinite, marks the true infinite in such a way as to
disallow unity and completeness, the spurious infinite as both condition of
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possibility and condition of impossibility of the true infinite. This is what is at
stake with Romanticism's version of the incomplete Absolute, and, it should be
clear, it is not something which can be arrived at from an immanent Hegelian
perspective. A step back needs to be taken, allowing the spurious infinite the
chance not to be conceived as sublatable into the true one.
First, the question needs to be answered: to what degree can spurious
infinity as Hegel conceives of it be taken to be concomitant to the Romantic
notion of infinity? Gasche follows Hegel to the letter in assuming that it is wholly
concomitant, an identical notion, but pays little attention to the detail of the
Romantic conception. I shall attempt to broach the question obliquely, starting
with the crucial characterisation of the spurious infinite as "the infinite of
understanding". In Ober die Unverstandlichkeit Schlegel seems to uphold the
position that, indeed, one cannot go beyond the limits of the understanding. This
can easily be taken to be a position with fundamentally Kantian traits, the same
kind of traits of limitation that Hegel seeks to transcend. Irony, revealed in
Schlegel's essay as the essential operation, "the essential movement of thought"
of the understanding, points to an infinity which, at first, seems indeed to be
Hegel's spurious infinity. Irony is the "epideixis", the Darstellung of infinityfor
the understanding, as my analysis in the previous chapter showed. The operation
of irony, all-pervasive in the understanding, is indeed an operation of disjunction,
of what Hegel calls separation. In the case of the spurious infinite, this is the
separation of finite and infinite in their alternating determinations, a separation
which Hegel, curiously and crucially, perhaps even ironically, calls
"incomprehensible. Neither such a finite nor such an infinite has truth; and what
is untrue is incomprehensible"(L., p.1S3). Curious, crucial, and perhaps ironic (in
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the Schlegelian, wholly unintentional sense) is the fact that 'incomprehensible' is
the very characteristic which, for Schlegel, actually gives rise to the reflexive
possibility of the understanding of understanding - incomprehensibility, the very
'untruth' of incomprehensibility is the condition of possibility for the
understanding of understanding, or, it amounts to the same, for there ever being a
'truth'. If Hegel suggests that the spurious infinite IS such an
incomprehensibility, Schlegel would counter that such an incomprehensibility is
both what makes understanding (reflexively) possible, and that is to say, what
permits the move from the spurious infinite of the understanding to the true
infinite of reason as complete speculative reflection, and, at the same time, the
condition of impossibility of reflexive understanding, or, better, that which would
make it impossible for the reflexive understanding to achieve the goal of
completion - that which would make it impossible to attain 'true' infinity as
totality. Irony, which gives rise to incomprehensibility, is what makes for both
the possibility of reflexive understanding, and for the impossibility of its
completion. The spurious infinite therefore, though only if looked at from the
'outside' of Schlegel's text and not from within the immanent dialectical moves
of the Logic, is both that which permits the true infinite as totality to be
entertained as a possibility, and, at the same time, that which perpetually defers
its completion as totality.
Thus the Romantic infinite is, like the spurious infinite, aligned to the
understanding, and fundamentally incomplete. But the Romantic infinite, in its
very designation as that which is pointed at by the operation of irony, cannot be
sublated into the dialectical movement towards the true infinite. It is not simply
a question of arresting the movement at will; rather, it is a question of the
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essential difference (which amounts to the whole of the difference of thought)
between the negation that is irony and the negation that is the Aufhebung,
between the process, economy, and operation of irony and those of the
speculative dialectic. The latter, as Hegel expressly states it in the Logic
"consists solely in grasping the opposed moments in their unity", whereas the
former, even by Hegel's admission, is an uncontainable negativity which seeks to
destroy and not preserve. Nevertheless, it is the dialectic which allows for the
sublation of the spurious into the true infinite, and which allows for infinity to be
grasped, in its unity, as totality. On the other hand, irony, even in its "dissolution
of the determinate and the inherently substantial alike" (A., .69), even in its
designation (by Hegel) as nothing short of a catastrophe, can only point towards
systematic incompleteness, to the limits of knowledge, to the "triviality" of the
"non-cognisability of the Absolute", in Schlegel's words. The Romantics,
without a shadow of a doubt, are not 'absolute' Idealists, in the precise sense that
they are Kantians. They assume, not the empty 'presuppositionless' beginning of
Hegel's Logic which, under the labour of the dialectic, results, not at the end, but
even by the end of the first section (of the Logic) in the totality of infinity - the
true is the whole, every time, everywhere - but the Kantian notion of the limits
of knowledge. Yet, and this is absolutely decisive, the Romantic position on the
'non-cognisability of the Absolute' has nothing whatsoever to do with the limits
of phenomenal knowledge, or the limitations of an empirical subject. The
Romantic infinite is not the spurious infinite to the extent that it cannot be
relegated to an empiricism which philosophy, rightly or wrongly, deems bereft of
seriousness. If Gasche is right to suggest that "such a regress or progress ad
infinitum implies indeterminateness and limitlessness, in short, the impossibility
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of knowing" (op.cit., p.136) it also, when seen as the result of the operations of
irony, implies the quasi-transcendental (Gasche's own termlls) conditions of
imlpossibility of knowing, the paradoxes of Schlegel's incomprehensibility. And
if Romanticism forbids 'philosophy' from ever attaining the goal of totality
achieved by Hegelian speculative reflection, if it prevents anyone from ever
assuming that the true is the whole, the Romantic incomplete Absolute, precisely
because it is incomplete, gives rise to something other than, something more than
philosophy, and which will come to be conceived - as literature (in the sense of
Poesie).
For the moment, let us pay closer attention to that 'limit' designated by
Romantic infinity. Even though progressive infinity is, as infinity, limitless, it
also is a limit, the limit, with regard to the difference between Hegel and the
Romantics. It is the limit of dialectical thought in its difference from the
operations of irony; it is the limit before the 'arrival' of totality, and, as such, it is
the limit which no thought other than Hegel's dialectic (which is itself the
thought of the totality, and because it is the thought of totality) can transcend. If
it is the limit of the understanding, it is nothing empirical. The limit is precisely
what Hegel deems incomprehensible, to wit, the perpetual separation, or the
deferral of unity, of determinations. Where the Aufhebung destroys and
preserves, sublates, ultimately unites oppositions, irony keeps them perpetually
opposed. This is paramount in Schlegel's fragments: irony is said to amount to
115 By this point it is, I hope, evident that I am attempting to use Gasche's own version of
'philosophical' deconstruction to counter his own 'philosophical' (Hegelian) dismissal of
Romanticism, and of the Romantic infinite as the spurious infinite in particular. For Gasche's
own use of the term 'quasi-transcendental' see his The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the
Philosophy of Reflection, Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1986, p.316. What is at stake in this attempt
will become more fully apparent in the concluding chapter but, for now, I must once again warn
that I am not thereby committed to a position which would straightforwardly align Romanticism
and deconstruction.
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"indissoluble antagonism" (Lyceum 108); irony is "permanent parabasis"; "an
idea is a concept perfected to the point of irony, an absolute synthesis of absolute
antitheses, the continual self-creating interchange of two conflicting thoughts"
(Athenaum 121). Hegel rightly saw this as a progress to infinity, as an infinity
resulting from the perpetual alternation of determinations, which is the same as
the perpetual deferral of unity in determination - and he called this 'spurious'.
But it is only spurious if looked at from the perspective of Hegel's position, the
position of unity and totality. Lest it be objected that this is not the position
Hegel begins with, it is necessary to compare what Hegel's and Romanticism's
'starting positions' are. Hegel's initial Being in the Logic is nothing other than
the indeterminate immediate, which, as known, is what allows it immediately to
turn into its opposite, nothing. I have no interest in questioning the validity of
this beginning, but, when compared to Schlegel's proclamation that "philosophy,
like epic poetry, always begins in medias res" (Athenaum 84), it suggests, as
does the unbridgeable difference between dialectic and irony, two fundamentally
different thoughts at work. It could be argued that Hegel's beginning in the
indeterminate immediate, coupled by the "essential movement of thought" as the
dialectic can only end up being a thought of totality, inasmuch as the
indeterminate immediate is so thoroughly empty of relation that it immediately
flips over into its dialectical opposite, establishing, from the very start, the
dialectic as "grasping the opposing moments in their unity". The flip-side of this
argument could be that Being as the indeterminate immediate is always already
also its opposite, nothing, it is always already doubled precisely because it is
indeterminate and immediate; for Hegel, explicitly, this means that it is the
doubling of the beginning which, under the form of the Aufhebung, always, and
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at every step, yields 'the whole' as double - this is only a sketch of an argument,
and I am not here concerned with 'proving' it further. What is undeniable,
however, is the essential difference between such a beginning and such a
movement of thought, on the one hand, and Romanticism on the other. For, if, as
I suggested earlier, a step back is necessary in order to show that there are ways
in which to prevent the Romantic Absolute, in its designation as spurious
infinity, from being sublated back into the dialectical system, that step back takes
us nowhere other than the 'beginning' of Romanticism itself - the thoroughly
relational ontology of differencing and hovering, analysed earlier in Chapter 1. If
irony, the Romantics' version of "the essential movement of thought" as against
Hegelian dialectic, is the thought of disjunction, it is also, just as essentially, the
thought of the primacy of reiationality, the 'effect' of the originary doubling at
the heart of Romantic metaphysics. The crucial distinction is that, as the
irreducibility of irony within Romanticism demonstrates, the originary doubling
with which Romanticism begins is always maintained as such, insublatable and
irreducible to a unified whole. And it is because of this ontology, because of this
primacy of relationality, that the Romantic infinite is, pace Hegel, decidedly not
spurious, but rather the inevitable culmination of such a beginning.
The aim of the preceding, lengthy comparison, or confrontation, between
the Romantics' thought and that of Schelling and Hegel has primarily been to
highlight what is radical, original, and often unaccounted-for in the philosophy of
early Romanticism. The full force of the Romantic project is thus grasped in its
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difference from the Idealist project. One, exemplary but not singular, way this
difference can be expressed is with the eccentric but decisive position of
Romanticism with regard to the idea of a philosophical system. It cannot be
doubted that Idealism, from Fichte through Schelling to Hegel, is concomitant
with such a thought of systematicity. Schlegel's infamous fragment, on the
contrary, states that: "It is equally fatal for the mind to have a system and to have
none. It will simply have to decide to combine the two" (Athenaum 53). What
must be stressed is that, contrary to the hasty disavowals of most commentators,
even those involved in a defence of Romanticism, this is a statement that has to
be taken seriously, and not as an expression of idiosyncratic wilfulness. Karl
Ameriks will serve me here as a case in point. In an article which is essentially a
defence of Romanticism against Hegel's misinterpretations, he nonetheless
writes, after citing Schlegel's fragment:
"To be memorable and provocative, Schlegel added, "we must have both"
- which is, of course, literal nonsense, but is intended this way: it is supposed to
make us think on our own about what is needed. The idea it is pointing to is not
that one can literally have a system and no system. Rather, what one can do, and
what the Early Romantics were doing and advocating, is to have a modest respect
for rationality and system, as exemplified in [a] non-foundational system of a
Kantian variety that accepts various "givens" from common sense and modern
science; and then one can combine this with a sharp rejection of the Idealist
notion of a "complete" system" (op.cit., p.79).
The problem with this assessment is that, even though Ameriks ends with
a perfectly valid point about the Romantic allegiance to Kant as opposed to
Idealism, it admittedly fails to take the fragment seriously and to treat it as
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anything but "literal nonsense". What the idea of combining system and non-
system means, as I hope my previous analyses have indicated, is that the
Romantics do indeed reject the possibility of a complete system, or of
philosophical thought as the thought of totality, but also, that the Romantics are
not completely devoid of a system, and that this 'system' is not entirely aligned
with the "givens" (or, in Hegelian terms, "presuppositions") of Kantian
philosophy. Romantic systematicity is precisely the thought of irony and
'spurious' infinity, a thought which bears the essential structural traits of a
system but which acts as a quasi-transcendental condition of imlpossibility of a
system as such. In other words, Schlegel's idea of a 'system' is that of the
necessary condition of possibility of a realised system, which, however, is such
that it prevents that system from ever becoming 'realised' in the complete,
Idealist sense. Irony, incomprehensibility, the transcendental schema - these are
all such conditions of possibility for systematicity, but they are also, at the same
time, the conditions which render impossible the construction or realisation of
one, total system.
Ultimately, this notion of systematicity without system can be said to
amount to a singular conception of the philosophical Absolute. The Romantic
Absolute bears some essential traits which need to be fully articulated In
contradistinction with the Schellingian or Hegelian Absolute. These are:
a) The Romantic Absolute is not accessible epistemologically, in and by
knowledge, it is non-cognisable. In this it differs fundamentally from
the Schellingian and the Hegelian conception; the Romantics must be
seen as essentially adhering to the earliest critique of Idealism
expressed in Holderlin's Seyn, Urtheil: the 'unity' of the Absolute as
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Being may be postulated as a condition, but it IS not as such
accessible.
b) The Romantic Absolute is fundamentally incomplete. It is not the
originary coincidence of subjective and objective (Schelling), nor is it
the true as the whole in the thought of totality of the Hegelian system.
This incompleteness is the direct and inexorable result of another
fundamental trait of Romantic metaphysics, that is relational
ontology. This ontology is the result of a conception of Being, further
to that in Seyn, Urtheil, as differencing-hovering activity, as
intrinsically relational. The primacy of relation has the effect that the
"essential movement of thought" is irony and not the dialectical
Aufhebung, and that infinity is progressive rather than total.
c) Because the Romantic Absolute is both non-cognisable and
incomplete, it prevents philosophical investigation, the thought that is
called philosophy, from achieving the Idealist goal of complete,
absolute knowledge. Hence, and because this Absolute is itself
understood as expansive, relational, and non-totalisable, Romanticism
opens the path of thought to something other than philosophy, but
which has intimate connections, within Romanticism, to philosophy -
and that is literature, Poesie, which will concern me next.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE INCOMPLETE ABSOLUTE AS LITERATURE
I: The coming of 'Literature'
There can be little doubt that what is chiefly recognised as the original
contribution of Jena Romanticism to the history of thought lies with literature;
more precisely, with the institution and theorisation of literature as an object of
critical inquiry. Such recognition is paramount in the most important writings on
German Romanticism from the 19th century to the present and appears
incontestable. What will concern me here, nevertheless, is a probing into what
makes such a claim incontestable, especially if taken in conjunction with my own
(and others') earlier claim that Romanticism is also through-and-through
philosophical. What exactly is this 'literature' that the Romantics are widely
claimed to have been the first to theorise? What is the nature of the relationship
between their philosophical endeavours, their arduous readings of Kant and
Fichte, their epistemological and ontological concerns, on the one hand, and their
obvious concerns with Poesie, on the other?
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A preliminary sketch of an answer must already, once more, encompass
the claim, visible everywhere in the texts of early German Romanticism, that
'literature' is not something alien to philosophy but rather rigorously co-
extensive with it: "Where philosophy stops, there poetry must begin", writes
Schlegel in Ideas 48. One of my concerns in what follows is to circumscribe
precisely where that point where philosophy stops and poetry begins may be, and
equally, why it is that Schlegel is able to make, and frequently repeat under
different guises, such a bold claim. The short-cut through both these related
questions would surely be to claim, as I already have intimated, that both the cut-
off point, as it were, and the reasons for its existence as such are matters of
philosophy and philosophy alone. In other words, Schlegel's statement must be
seen as a statement of philosophy, in both the subjective- and the objective-
genitive sense. And this should really come as no surprise. Whatever 'literature'
may be (up to this point, I am basing my statements on a purely 'intuitive' grasp
of the word), its definition, constitution, determination all arise from the
conceptual frameworks of philosophy. This is not simply the bequest of
Romanticism - far from it. It is a well-analysed fact that poetry, 'literature', the
product of what can be summarily called 'literary writing' is determined and
defined by philosophy ever since its inception, as even a cursory look at, for
example, Plato's Republic will easily prove. Moreover, this 'type' of writing
(and there will be ample scope to pursue the question of 'types' or genres of
writing from a philosophical perspective) is defined as literary or poetic precisely
and always in contradistinction with philosophy or the type of writing, the kind
of argument, that is the property of philosophy. What Romanticism contributes
to the endless 'quarrel' between philosophy and literature is neither a resolution
209
'in favour' of one or the other, nor, despite possible appearances to the contrary,
a resolution as the product of a harmonious 'union' of the two. Rather, what is
proposed is a radical reconfiguration of the very stakes of the argument, a
decisively modern (and this also necessarily means contemporary'i'"; conception
of the limit of philosophy as the bedrock of 'literature', and of the intricate
interrelation of one with the other.
First, it would be helpful to attempt to define 'literature'. In historical
terms, the usage of the word 'literature' which is still current today and of which
I am here using dates, not accidentally, from the end of the 18th century, just
before the period of early German Romanticism itself. This is the case with
German, English, French, and should point to a change in the conception of the
word, in all these languages, from its older (now obsolete) meaning of
humanistic learning to its current use to denote a set of literary works. Around
the end of the 18th century, then, 'literature' as we still know it is born.
According to Michel Foucault, this birth is due to a radical change in the
understanding of language, a "demotion" of language for which the emergence of
literature is a "compensation"; this change occurs, according to Foucault, "when
words cease to intersect with representations and to provide a spontaneous grid
for the knowledge of things", resulting in the creation of literature as "the
isolation of a particular language whose peculiar mode of being is 'literary'?'!",
Although Foucault does not mention this text, his description of the birth of
116 This notion of the modernity and contemporaneity of Jena Romanticism is, of course, not my
own invention. It forms the fundamental justification for Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe & Jean-Luc
Nancy's authoritative examination of Romanticism, The Literary Absolute, op.cit. It is even the
very notion with which their book ends. Throughout the course of this chapter I shall have the
opportunity to engage with Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's arguments on Romanticism and its
literary inception.
117 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, a translation of his Les mots et les choses, London,
Tavistock 1970, pp. 304 and 300.
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literature out of the effectuation of a rift between word and thing, out of the
death, if you like, of a conception of language which, as Hegel wished, would be
based around the name, is exactly what takes place within Novalis' Monolog, It
is what Novalis names ''the ridiculous mistake people make when they think they
speak for the sake of things", and it results, also within the confines of Novalis'
text, in the 'birth' of literature as the pure saying, the self-referential language
whose being Foucault terms 'literary'.
Thus, although it would be an exaggeration to claim the birth of literature
on behalf of Romanticism, it is unquestionable that the major paradigm shift in
the understanding of language which Foucault diagnoses for the end of the 18th
century finds an exemplary manifestation within Romanticism itself.
Furthermore, and following my analyses of the second chapter, we can see that
'literature' is born out of an epistemological crisis, the crisis attending what
Novalis perceives as the "ridiculous mistake" of thinking a sign coincides
unproblematically with its referent. 'Literature' results from a crisis within
philosophy, a crisis which Jean-Luc Nancy locates at the heart of the Kantian
enterprise, a crisis emanating from critique I lB. It is within this general context
that the oft-repeated assertion that Romanticism represents the attempt to
complete the philosophical (critical) project by way of literature must be
understood. Thus, when Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy state that with
Romanticism "philosophy must effectuate itself - complete, fulfil, and realise
itself - as poetry'"!", it is clear that they have this context in mind. Nonetheless, I
must take issue with the precise way in which this statement, and its incumbent
118 See Jean-Luc Nancy, Le discours de la syncope 1: Logodaedalus, Paris; Aubier-Flammarion
1976, where Nancy analyses the question of form in the Kantian critique as precisely linked to
the relation of philosophical discourse with that of literature, and where the claim about the birth
of literature with Kant at the end of the 18th century is also made.
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analysis in the hands of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, is made. Crucially, the
statement is made towards the end of the first chapter of The Literary Absolute
where the issue is the curious text given the name The Oldest System-Programme
of German Idealism, a text which Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy claim "opens"
Romanticism from a purely philosophical perspective. The authorship of the text
is altogether unclear; it could be written by Hegel, in whose writing it appears in
manuscript, or Schelling, whose later work it prefigures in many ways, or even
Holderlin, whose ideas commentators think it may well represent. The text
proclaims that "the highest act of reason [... ] is an aesthetic act", and
apocalyptically calls for a time when ''there no longer exists any philosophy, any
history; poetry alone will survive all other sciences and arts"120. I am not
concerned with the issue of the text's authorship, and would not be commenting
on it were it not for the fact that it seems to form the basis, the "overture" of
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's treatment of Romanticism and leads them to the
claim I want to take issue with. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy themselves point
out that the text "does not belong, strictly speaking, to the romantic corpus itself'
but suggest that its inclusion in their analysis forms the philosophical foundations
for the Romantic literary-theoretical project':". I have tried to demonstrate in
chapter 1 that there is ample scope for looking for those foundations elsewhere,
in the writings of Novalis and Holderlin themselves, and in their critique of
Fichte. To take the Earliest System-Programme as the philosophical bedrock of
Jena Romanticism is, in some respects at least, to conflate Romanticism with the
'aesthetic' idealism of Schelling, in particular, as Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's
1190 . 36p. CIt., p. .
120 The text is reproduced, among other places, in Pfau's translations of Holderlin's Essays and
Letters on Theory, op.cit., pp.154-156.
1210 . 2p.cit., p. 7.
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arguments in this instance show. The apocalyptic tone with which poetry is
exalted in the text is indeed akin to some of Schlegel and Novalis' proclamations,
and there is a lot that the text shares with Romantic philosophy, this much is
difficult to deny. However, the notion that the highest act of reason is an
aesthetic act, and the incumbent suggestion, in The Literary Absolute, that the
text calls for an "organon" of philosophy to be found within aesthetics is clearly,
as I hope the last chapter has already shown, an Idealist, more precisely a
Schellingian one.
This is in essence my main bone of contention with The Literary
Absolute, and it warrants inclusion in this discussion not simply because the book
is still the single most accomplished overview of German Romanticism, but also
because, as it forms the basis of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's analyses, it casts a
long shadow over what in my mind is, for this reason alone, a misrepresentation
of the Romantic project. In what follows I shall often refer to the arguments of
The Literary Absolute, more often than not in order to appropriate them for my
own analysis - but the question of whether, as Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy assert
at the end of their 'overture', Romanticism represents a shift from Platonic
eidetics to aesthetics, whether their coinage "eidaesthetics" "traces, within the
landscape of idealism in general, the horizon proper to romanticism [,] the
philosophical horizon of romanticism,,122is a crucial one. It is Schelling, and in
particular the Schelling of the System of Transcendental Idealism, who best fits
this description, not Novalis, Schlegel, or Holderlin. Art (or poetry) as the
organon and the completion, the effectuation of philosophy is Schelling'S idea,
not the Romantics'. There certainly is room for comparison, there certainly are a
122 Ibid., p.37.
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lot of common elements, but the crucial notion that poetry could complete
philosophy is not a Romantic one, however often it has been seen that way. As I
have shown in the previous chapter, incompletion is, for the Romantics, an
essential trait of the Absolute itself, and if I tried to suggest that it is this
incompletion of the Absolute which opens the space for literature, in an analogy
with Foucault's suggestion that the 'gap' between word and referent gives birth
to literature, I do not mean to suggest that literature, as the Romantics conceive
it, comes to fill that gap and complete the Absolute. Schlegel's fragment may
well state that poetry begins where philosophy stops, but does not state that
thereby poetry completes philosophy's incomplete project. The Romantic theory
of literature which is my concern in these pages and which Lacoue-Labarthe and
Nancy themselves have brilliantly set out is arranged and established within a
framework of concepts such as genre, fragment, and criticism which, all in their
own way, point to an essential incompletion also within literature and its theory.
Literature does not complete philosophy, but rather gives explicit expression to
the incompleteness that is philosophy itself. Philosophy, as the thinking of the
incomplete Absolute, is already intrinsically 'poetic' (in the sense of Poiesis) and
must therefore become explicitly poetic or 'literary'. It is therefore wrong to
suggest that if the Romantics conceive of an essentially incomplete Absolute via
philosophy, they seek its completion via literature. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy
themselves suggest as much towards the end, or the "closure" of The Literary
Absolute, where their notion of 'Romantic equivocity' serves as a cipher for the
radical incompletion at the heart of the Romantic project, as I will have the
chance to discuss later.
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Romanticism's assumption of an essentially incomplete Absolute, an
assumption which, as I showed in the previous chapter, stems from philosophical
considerations, finds its counterpart in their theory of literature as well. Thus,
when Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy r.efer to the Romantic theory of literature as
"the literary absolute", it is vital to circumscribe the nature of this Absolute.
According to them, Romanticism approaches literature "as a new genre, beyond
the divisions of classical (or modem) poetics and capable of resolving the
inherent ("generic") divisions of the written thing. Beyond divisions and all de-
finition, this genre is thus programmed in romanticism as the genre of literature:
the genericity, so to speak, and the generativity of literature, grasping and
producing themselves in an entirely new, infinitely new Work. The absolute,
therefore, of literature123." Already, as I will show in more detail in a following
section of this chapter, there are problems with assuming that the 'absolute of
literature' arises with the inception of a total, all-encompassing genre "beyond
divisions" which Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy locate in the programmatic
statement of Athenaum 116. However, they are perceptive in insisting on the
"genericity" or "generativity" of literature as conceived with Romanticism, that
is, the productive extensiveness of a class of writing which does seek to
transcend divisions and boundaries, albeit not necessarily yielding a conception
of totality. The productive essence of the literary is captured, as Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy cannot fail to mention, by the employment of Poesie as
opposed to 'mere' Dichtung: "The absolute of literature is not so much poetry as
it is poiesy ... Poiesy or, in other words, production. The thought of the "literary
genre" is thus less concerned with the production of the literary thing than with
1230 . 1p. CIt., p. I.
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production, absolutely speaking'r"." I have already showed that this, along with
all of the Romantics' literary-theoretical notions, stems form a thorough
reconsideration of the idea of philosophical (ontological) production, and it
remains the case that Poesie, even if considered as the total uber-genre, so to
speak, is always a conception which highlights the production of itself as such,
what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy call "autopoiesy". Further more, this (auto)-
production must be seen as the auto-production of the Romantic incomplete
Absolute, the progressive infinity which is the unmistakable hallmark of
Athenaum J J 6, and a clear demarcation from the notion of the total Absolute of
Idealism must be made - and again, this is where Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy do
not go far enough. They write: "And if it is true (as Hegel will soon demonstrate
entirely against romanticism) that auto-production constitutes the ultimate
instance and closure of the speculative absolute, then romantic thought involves
not only the absolute of literature, but literature as the absolute. Romanticism is
the inauguration of the literary absolute" (ibid.). But it cannot simply be the case
of a parallel between speculative Idealism and Romanticism, in which the
Absolute is conceived as the auto-production of Spirit for the former, or the auto-
production of literaturelPoiesis for the latterl2S. If there is a crucial and all-
pervasive difference between SchellinglHegel on the one hand, and
SchlegellNovalis on the other, it is that the Romantic Absolute (and that is also
124Ib·d1 ., pp.11-12.
12S Strangely, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy themselves warn off such concrete parallelisms
between Idealism and Romanticism throughout the book, as, for instance, with this comment:
"The difference in the setting-to-work - or, as one could just as well say, the difference in
operation - between Schelling and the Athenaeum, ... , does not amount to the difference
between the philosophical and the literary." (op.cit., p.39). Ultimately their position on what they
call 'Romantic equivocity' seems to suggest that it is Romanticism itself that is ambiguous about
its own project and position vis-A-vis the major currents of German Idealism. It has been a
significant part of my efforts throughout this thesis clearly to demarcate where it is that
Romanticism parts company with Idealism, where Schlegel and Novalis forsake Schelling and
Hegel, so that it may not be possible to claim the sort of general parallelisms at stake here.
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the literary Absolute) does not correspond to the thought of totality but to that of
progressive expansion within production - the literary absolute of the Romantics
remains, as Athenaum 116 makes perfectly clear (the "real essence" of Romantic
poetry is "that it should forever be becoming and never be perfected"), an
essentially incomplete one, and is thus clearly, even programmatically removed
from the speculative cycle.
So what becomes of literature? What of the Romantic literary absolute?
Foucault's prognosis of the birth of literature out of the rift in signification and
the crisis of representational language, especially as this can be seen in Romantic
texts such as Novalis' Monolog remains true, as does Lacoue-Labarthe and
Nancy's analysis of Romanticism as thinking the absolute of literature as a
response to the philosophical (epistemological) crisis of post-Kantianism. With
Romanticism 'literature' comes to signify the auto-production of a language
which is no longer securely representational, as well as the auto-production of a
progressively infinite, expansive Absolute allowed for by such a notion of
language -literature is not so much the 'other' of philosophy than that which the
incompletion (perhaps even the failure) of philosophy gives birth to, and which
works and is organised in tandem with philosophy as long as one allows the
incomplete Absolute. Thus, no less than Romanticism qua philosophy,
"Romanticism (literature) is that which has no essence, not even in its
inessentiality", as the authors of The Literary Absolute pithily put it126• In the
end 'literature', in this conception, the conception of its inception, and thus a
conception which Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy rightly stress is still incumbent
upon us necessarily after more than two centuries, this 'literature' is nothing
1260 .p.cit., p.83.
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more or less than its own generative expansion, the Absolute as it infinitely
engenders and produces itself.
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II. Poetry and Prose.
The preceding characterisation of literature, although essentially true to
the Romantic project, lacks specificity. If the literary Absolute ultimately has
exactly the same characteristics of incompletion, progressivity, inessentiality and
so on, as the Romantic Absolute in philosophy, what remains unaccounted for is
what makes for 'literature' in the sense that was born with Romanticism, the
current sense of literary writing. Does Romanticism have an answer to what
constitutes literary writing as opposed to philosophical, legal, or any other kind?
It should be said at the outset that in strict terms, if one follows the programme of
Athenaum J 16 to the letter, the answer to that question is no. And yet, I want to
maintain that the Romantic conception of literature is one which also allows for
the greatest possible degree of specificity about what literature is. How can this
be possible? If "in a certain sense, all poetry is or should be romantic" as
Schlegel tells us, and if, even further, this romantic poetry is also connected with,
co-extensive to philosophy, the sciences, the arts, what remains of the specificity
of literature? Even further, what remains of the specificity of poetry as Dichtung,
when Schlegel's fragment switches seemingly randomly between Poesie,
Dichtung, and the generic Dichtart? The answer lies, again, with the peculiar
conception of the Romantic Absolute, this time the literary Absolute, and, in
particular, with how, according to Schlegel, Navalis, but also, in a similar way,
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Holderlin, this Absolute comes to be instantiated in particulars. If everything
falls under the rubric of the Romantic Absolute as progressive Universalpoesie,
the question then becomes: what is the relation of the particular work, the poem,
drama, or novel, in all its specificity, to the Absolute that encompasses them all?
It becomes, therefore, a question of genre, or, more precisely of the generation of
(literary) genre, a question of the relation between particular and universal.
Before broaching that question in detail with an investigation of the Romantic
theories of genre, it is important to assess the ways in which this relation between
particular and universal are to be broached, and to ask the question in yet another
mode: what is the criterion with which such a relation between particular and
universal is to be addressed? In other words, what will guide the investigation
that the Romantics undertake into the theory of genre, what is the vantage point
from which judgments about particulars are to be made?
This is a question that has been most successfully answered by Walter
Benjamin, in his dissertation on the German Romentics". In asserting that "the
Romantic theory of the artwork is the theory of its form" (Benjamin, p. 155)
Benjamin traces precisely this criterion or vantage point - in the idea of form.
The form of literary works becomes the 'medium' through which the analysis of
different genres, or of the very difference between a particular work and the
universal of 'literature' can be staged. All genres, all particular works, even the
universal of literature have a form, and it is by this form that the Romantics, as
Benjamin sees, will undertake their investigations. That the Romantics, and in
particular Schlegel, were preoccupied by the notion of form in connection with
127 Walter Benjamin, Der BegrifJ der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik, in Gesammelte
Schriften, I-I, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Herman Schweppenhauser, Frankfurt; Suhrkamp, 1974.
English translation in Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings Volume 1, ed. Marcus Bullock and
220
literature can easily be ascertained by even the most cursory look at, for example,
the Athenaum fragments. What Benjamin brings to bear on this discussion
however, and what should be recognised as perhaps his most original and
profound contribution to the literature on Romanticism, is the notion that form
itself is absolutised as what he calls "the medium of reflection". Basing his
analysis on a painstaking examination of the difference between the Romantics'
and Fichte's conception of reflection, Benjamin arrives at the conclusion that
"reflection constitutes the absolute, and it constitutes it as a medium"{ibid.,
p.132). I also tried to show the role that reflection plays in Romantic philosophy,
and have tried to establish mediation, the notion of a universal medium as a
cornerstone of Romantic thinking, especially in connection with Novalis'
transcendental schema, but also, as should be evident, in Schlegel's Romantic
irony as the all-pervasive (and eminently reflexive) medium through which
understanding passes. Here, it is a case of understanding mediation, the medium
of reflection, and the reflexive, mediating form of the Romantic Absolute, with
Benjamin, from the perspective of literary analysis. If the literary Absolute is
best seen as Schlegel's "progressive universal poetry", it is simply a matter of
understanding that the universality and 'absoluteness' of this 'concept' is a
universality and 'absoluteness' ofform. Form, in this case poetic or literary form,
is the absolute medium through, and in which particular literary works stand in
relation, not just with one another but also with the whole, the universal itself.
Thus, when Schlegel or Holderlin discuss individual works in relation to their
common genre (say, the tragedies of Sophocles in relation to those of
Shakespeare), or genres in relation to one another, the mediating term allowing
Michael W. Jennings, Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1996. All references will be to the
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comparison and differentiation is form. And because such a mediating term is
precisely a necessary condition for any such comparison or differentiation, and
because any particular work or genre must be referred to it in any judgment, form
as the mediating term, the medium of form is absolute.
This Absolute, in keeping with the Romantic notion of Absolute, is
absolute as medium, as incomplete "continuum of forms", as Benjamin calls it
(ibid., p.l73), and shares with The Romantic Absolute as expounded in the
previous chapter the fundamental mark of difference from the Idealist Absolute
of unity in totality128. 'Progressive universal poetry' is an infinitely expanding
continuum of different poetic/literary forms (genres or particular works), all of
which are related to the universal absolute, that is to 'progressive universal
poetry', through being forms. Curiously, although initially it may appear that
through this conception of the literary absolute we have gained nothing in
specificity, or that we are no nearer in determining the nature, if you will, of the
Absolute form, Benjamin is able to characterise precisely and definitively exactly
this nature of the Absolute form - it is prose. Another vital and strikingly
original insight of Benjamin's is his celebrated statement that "the idea of poetry
English translation.
128 It must be noted that Benjamin thinks of the Romantic notion of infinity in a way which may
appear contradictory to mine. He notes: "The Romantics define the relation of artworks to art as
infinity in totality - which means that the infmity of art is fulfilled in the totality of works.
Goethe defines it as unity in plurality - which means that the unity of art is found again and again
in the plurality of works. This infinity is that of pure form; this unity is that of pure content"
(Op.cit., p.183). In the first instance it may appear that Benjamin's use of the word 'totality'
contradicts my own assertion that Romantic infinity is not a totality. However, as the crucial
distinction he makes here between Romanticism and Goethe, and which, from a purely
philosophical perspective pertains almost to the letter to my distinction between Romanticism
and Idealism (Hegel) shows, the main issue at stake is that whereas for Goethe or Idealism
totality also and always means unity, the Romantics conceive of their infinite as an ever-
expanding 'totality' (here of literary works). There can be no mistaking Schlegel's definitive
statement that "Romantic poetry ... should never be perfected". As I aim to show in the following
section on the fragment, the relation between a particular work and the 'totality' of literature is,
for Romanticism, never one which simply subsumes the former's particularity to the latter's
universality, and this fmds its exact counterpart in the Romantic denial of the Hegelian notion
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is prose"(ibid. p. 173). Itmay appear counter-intuitive to suggest that a theory of
art, such as Romanticism, which employs the notion of the poetic with such
emphasis, should also want to claim that the Absolute 'idea' of poetry should be
what is commonly perceived as its opposite, but herein lies another ingenious
twist in the Romantic conception of literature and its Absolute. Benjamin
expresses it thus: "The reflexive medium of poetic forms appears in prose; for
this reason, prose may be called the idea of poetry"(ibid., p.174). For the
Romantics, prose represents the IndifJerenzpunkt of poetic forms, if you will -
that is to say, the formal medium in which and through which all poetic forms
combine and relate to one another. Novalis comes the closest in formulating this
idea clearly when, in an excerpt from his "logological fragments", and utilising
his favourite conceptual method of ordo inversus, states: "It is a good (artige)
question, whether the lyric poem would properly be poem (Gedicht), plus-poetry,
or prose, minus-poetry. Just as the novel has been taken for prose, so the lyric
poem has been taken for poetry - both unjustly. The highest, most authentic
prose is the lyric poem" (II, p.536, 51). The inversion of the ordinary
characterisations is significant for the entire Romantic literary-theoretical project.
The novel, as I will have the chance to discuss in more detail, represents a truly
and authentically poetic form, whereas the lyric poem is extolled for being ''the
highest most authentic prose" - this is because the lyric poem, the distillation, as
is commonly perceived, of the poetic form, is for Novalis what he calls "minus
poetry", by which I take him to mean poetry divested of the particularity of any
of its incumbent forms, distillation of form in the sense of absence of form, or
rather, in the sense that all later particular or generic formal characterisations are
that the Absolute of speculative reason is always already there, as a whole, in each of its
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or should be missing from it - poetry as prose. This may indeed appear
counterintuitive, given an 'ordinary' understanding of the meaning of 'prose' and
'poetry; but it should be clear that for the Romantics who have elided distinctions
between poetry and language as such, ordinary discourse, as was seen in Novalis'
own Monolog, is the basic form of poetry - 'ordinary discourse', which is the
OED definition of 'prose' is, from the Romantic viewpoint, 'mere' poetry.
Schlegel's praise of the novel in general, and of Goethe's Meister in particular,
also rests on the inversion of commonly-held views on what constitutes the
poetic and the prosaic: "This marvellous prose is prose, and yet it is poetry,,129.
The literary Absolute therefore appears curiously Janus-faced. It is,
unmistakeably, progressive Universalpoesie on the one hand, and on the other, it
is 'mere' prose. This is because us form, distilled to the 'essentials' of Novalis'
'minus poetry' and divested of any particular poetic form, this form in its most
abstract and universal, in its Absolute, is the form of prose. Again, Romanticism
does not seem to have a specific answer to what makes literature, other than to
say that its Absolute form is that of prose, a form which, it can be claimed, it
shares with other 'prosaic' writing such as philosophy and the sciences.
However, if Romanticism stubbornly refuses to characterise literary writing in its
specificity, this does not mean that it has lost touch with the distinctions and
differentiations which, within the universal formal medium of 'prose', make up
the genera with which literary theory, then as now, likes to concern itself.
r:articular 'phases of development'.
29 I am quoting Schlegel's essay Uber Goethe's Meister, from the translation published in
Kathleen Wheeler, German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism; the Romantic Ironists and Goethe,
Cambridge; Cambridge university Press, 1984, pp. 59-73.
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III. The Noveland other Genres.
The constitution and dissolution of a theory of poetic-literary genres
forms one of the major cornerstones of Romantic literary theory. But the
question of genre is not merely a literary question. Classification, definition, and
systematic arrangement of a body of writing (what is called 'literature') has
always been one of the major philosophical concerns about the study of
literature, and it has always been, or at least ever since Plato's Ion and Republic
and, in the most exemplary fashion, Aristotle's Poetics, a question addressed to
'literature' by philosophy. It is, after all, a philosophical demand par excellence
to ask for definitions and ordering, and, furthermore, to insist that this ordering
somehow follows after the internal ordering of philosophy in the categories. The
Greeks were able to leave posterity with a complete framework of genre theory
in essence because they were able to formulate such a theory after the
philosophical organon of the categories, and Aristotle's procedure in the Poetics
unmistakably demonstrates this. If Romanticism has anything to add to the
discussion, this addition takes the form of a complete overhaul of the ancient
categories and the ancient genres, an overhaul which is neither a reconfiguration
of the ancient genres for the modem age, like Schiller's momentous essay On
Naive and Sentimental Poetry of 1795-96 which greatly influenced the
Romantics (especially Holderlin), nor a complete forgetting of the ancient
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taxonomy in favour of some radically new system. 'Hovering' between these
two alternatives, the Romantic theory of genre, especially as it is to be glimpsed
from Schlegel's notes and fragments but also in the tantalisingly complex
arguments of Holderlin's poetological work, performs a radically critical
reconfiguration of genre-theory, which means it seeks not only to replace or
reconfigure existing divisions but critically (in the transcendental Kantian sense
of the word) to delve into the conditions of possibility for the very generation of
genre, what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy aptly call "generativity". At the outset,
however, we can begin by seeing the Romantics' dissatisfaction with the ancient
taxonomy, and thus to see their own re-working as a reaction. Schlegel's
Lyceum Fragment 60 is most succinct: "All classical poetic genres have now
become ridiculous in their rigid purity". It is simply inexorable, from the modem
perspective which must accommodate Dante, Cervantes, or Shakespeare (not to
mention Tieck, Richter, or Goethe), that the ancient triumvirate epic-lyric-drama
is insufficient. The answer, at least in the hands of an experienced classicist such
as Schlegel, is already seen at work in the latter, decadent phase of antiquity:
"behind the confusion of all the artistic genres by the poetic eclectics of late
antiquity there lies the demand that there should be only One Poetry and One
Philosophy" (AF 239). Thus, even though it is clearly correct to view
Romanticism, and its theory of genre in particular, as the inauguration of the
modem age in explicit contradistinction with classical Greece, Romanticism as
modernity has always already complicated issues just as inescapably by insisting
that even the modem be contained within antiquity'j".
130 These are merely preliminary remarks to what could have developed into an investigation of
the relation between Romanticism and modernity, the notion of modernity and antiquity within
Romanticism, or even the overall concept of history in Romanticism, all of which can be
expounded utilising the Romantic theory of genre, and for none of which there is scope in the
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What Schlegel identifies in the Alexandrians and Romans is also a major
Romantic exigency - the demand for the union of genres, the union of
philosophy and poetry, so frequently found among the fragments. Genre, as the
German word for it, Gattung clearly indicates, primarily signifies marriage,
union, and Romantic genre theory often takes the aspect of a demand for unity,
for a comprehensive single genre - the literary absolute. But this demand should
never be taken merely at face value, for it is accompanied by a critical
questioning of he grounds for such a unity. In other words, in Romanticism it is
not a question of assimilating divided genres into one, but rather of examining
the grounds for the division, what makes for the possibility of genre. As
Schlegel puts it: "We already have so many theories of poetic genres. Why do
we not yet have a concept of poetic genre? Perhaps then we should have to make
do with a single theory of poetic genre" (LF 62). As Peter Szondi shows, the
rhetorical form this fragment takes is highly significant; first, the slightly weary
statement of fact - there already exist many theories of genre; second, the
essentially critical question, seeking after the ground for the constitution of such
theories in the concept of genre; and finally, the seemingly half-hearted,
irresolute hypothesis bearing on the possibility of answering the question, the
half-glimpsed possibility of a single. unifying theory of genre. The rhetorical
form of this fragment should be enough of an admonition against an all-too-hasty
characterisation of the Romantics as seekers after a single complete genre, or a
single complete theory of genre. The Romantics do seek, as Lacoue-Labarthe
and Nancy put it, ''the union, in satire (another name for mixture) or in the novel
course of this thesis. Any further investigation into this field should have to take into account,
apart from The Literary Absolute where such issues are frequently (if somewhat perfunctorily)
broached, Peter Szondi's work on Holderlin as well as his essay 'Friedrich Schlegel's Theory of
Poetical Genres" in Szondi, On Textual Understanding, op.cit., pp. 75-94.
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(or even in Platonic dialogue), of poetry and philosophy, the confusion of all the
genres arbitrarily delimited by ancient poetics, the interpenetration of the ancient
and the modem" (op.cit., p.91) but they are also acutely aware that the union of
divided parts is a synthesis, a mixture, a Mischung of Gattungen, and that the
resulting union is a confused, murky one.
Thus, even when genre appears to be theorised by the Romantics as a
totality, or even as unity in totality, even when "progressive universal poetry"
appears to be the genre of genres uniting all divisions within it, this cannot be left
unqualified. Even in Atheneum 116, which remains a pivotal instance of
Romantic genre theory, Schlegel writes that Romantic poetry is "the only one
that is more than a kind (Art)", it is the one genre that is more than one genre. In
effect, this is the Romantic diagnosis for genre theory in general - there is always
more than one genre, and, what is more, if one is to seek, critically as Schlegel
would demand, the ground or the concept of poetic genre, this will be, like
Romantic poetry, the single genre which is more than one genre, genre in excess
of itself. Thus, with the proposed and projected union of genres comes the
dissolution of genre. It is no coincidence that, in one of the fragments most
concerned with genre, Athenaum 434, Schlegel will again berate the rigid
existing classifications inherited from Greece, contrast them with the Romantic,
modem notion of an ever-changing system of classifications ("in the universe of
poetry nothing stands still, everything is developing and changing and moving
harmoniously", a clear repetition of the idea of romantic poetry being "always in
becoming"), only to project into the future the possibility of discovering "the true
world system of poetry" in a manner strikingly reminiscent of the ironic
prophecies of Ober die Unverstandichkeit. We are still lacking the concept of
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poetic genre, the concept that would perhaps allow us to formulate a single
theory of genre, but it is this very lack of a concept, this very lack of a theory,
which essentially marks the concept of genre as the absence of concept. This is
why the single unifying Romantic genre will never be single or unifying in any
comforting sense. In his Literary Notebooks Schlegel states this in exemplary
fashion: "One can just as well say that there exist infinitely many as that there
exists only one progressive poetic genre. Therefore there really exists none; for a
genre cannot be conceived without an accompanying genre"!". Beyond unity
then, and beyond even the dissolution of unity, genre is really theorised as the
impossibility of transcending what Werner Hamacher has called "an irreducible
duality"132. There is always more than one genre, and even when one tries, as
Schlegel programmatically did, to conceive of a single genre encompassing all
others, this can only be done by conceiving of a single genre in excess of itself.
Romantic poetry as a genre and yet more than one genre, in excess of itself. It
should be clear that this is also the essential trait of the literary absolute,
expansively always in excess of itself, a 'genre' which, in being more than one
genre, manages to find the sought-after 'concept' of genreI33.
Apart from Schlegel, it is Holderlin who offers us a comprehensive
theory of genre which can be analysed along similar lines. Peter Szondi has
already shown, and Walter Benjamin much intimated, the similarities and
connections between Schlegel and Holderlin's projects for genre theory, but I
131 Fragment 72 from Schlegel, Literary Notebooks, edited by Hans Eichner, London 1957.
132 Hamacher, Premises, op.cit., p.230.
133 I have to note, if only in passing, that this consideration of genre and its 'concept' arising from
Romantic texts is exceedingly close to Jacques Derrida's investigation into "The Law of Genre"
(as seen in his 'La loi du genre' in Parages, Paris; Galilee, 1986). Curiously, while Derrida
approvingly mentions what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy have to say about genre in relation to the
German Romantics, there is nowhere a mention of Schlegel himself - but the theorisation of
genre that has been at stake here is not performed by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy but by
Schlegel, and Romanticism in general.
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need to state from the outset that there are also significant differences. For one,
Holderlin does not seek a 'concept' of genre, nor does he arrive at the conclusion
reached by Schlegel, that genre is indeed its own dissolution, or that genre
always means more than one genre. What Holderlin does do is attempt a
comprehensive, complex and involved theory of genre which stops short of the
'deconstruction', if you will, of the concept but which nevertheless bears the
hallmarks of Romanticism in theorising genre as mixture, confusion, and which
significantly advances the 'rigid' classifications of the ancients in the eminently
modem direction of infinite becoming and transformation. This can be seen in
his essay 'On the Difference of Poetic Modes', written around 1800, at the same
time as 'On the Operations of the Poetic Spirit' of which it can be said to form a
companion piece134• As it has been observed by Holderlin's editors as well as
numerous critics, the key influence on the essay is Schiller's 'Natve and
Sentimental Poetry', but where Schiller can be said simply to redefine ancient
classifications and to give them a 'modem twist', accounting for the difference
between ancient and modem to be reconfigured as that between naive and
sentimental in the process, Holderlin' s operation is more profound and more
radical. Although the genres he is dealing with are still the ones prescribed by
the Greeks (lyric, epic, and tragic), Holderlin radically redefines them and, most
crucially, sets them in a perpetual relation with each other by delimiting them
according to basic characteristics that appear in different permutations between
them. Thus, to quote merely the beginning of the essay:
"The lyric, in appearance idealistic poem, is naive in its significance.
134 The title, again, is that proposed by the editors of the Grofte Stunganer Ausgabe. A
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The epic, in appearance naive poem, is heroic in its significance.
The tragic, in appearance heroic poem, is idealistic in its significance"
(Pfau, op.cit, p.83).
An in depth analysis of the particular meaning of Holderlin's designations
(heroic, idealistic, naive) cannot be undertaken here, and their precise
significance is not what is important. Rather, what needs to be stressed is the
manner in which Holderlin sets the genres in motion, animates them, if you will,
by ascribing them traits (which themselves are traits of genre) that can be
exchanged or modulated in order to produce different generic combinations. By
operating with a 'grid' of three genres (epic, lyric, tragic), three generic traits
(idealistic, naive, heroic) and, further more, two distinct aspects of a poem (its
'appearance' (Schein) and its 'significance' (Bedeutung), Holderlin renders
classification, the essence of genre theory, mobile, and, as he explains, poems are
to be 'classified' according to the different combinations of the elements on the
grid. Among his notes and fragments of the same period are found numerous
'poetological schemata,135 with various permutations of the grid elements,
showing the great versatility that the new classificatory schema allows Holderlin.
Even further, Holderlin utilises yet another distinction, that between the 'basic
mood' or 'ground tone' (Grundstimmung and Grundton) on the one hand, and
the art-character (Kunstkarakter) on the other, a distinction which, as Peter
Szondi observes, finds its parallel in Schlegel's generic distinction between form
translation, which I am here using, is to be found in Pfau, op.cit., pp.83·88.
135 This time this is the 'title' given to such fragments by the later editors of the Franlcfurler
Ausgabe. I have taken these fragments and the editorial remarks on them from Holderlin,
Theoretische Schriften, Hambur; Felix Meiner, 1998,pp. 63·73.
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and content, or 'material' and 'expression'l'", Apart from the correspondence
between Schlegel and Holderlin's poetological thoughts, in itself no small
coincidence, what is of note here is that, despite the fact that Holderlin only
appears to mobilise the ancient genres, the genres as he conceives them become
far less static, "rigid in their purity", as Schlegel would have it; they become
mixed, even, amidst the chaos of Holderlin's notes, confused, in essence agile
and undulating, "in becoming". Thus, even though Holderlin does not theorise,
as Schlegel does, the problematic of classification and of the dissolution of genre,
he arrives at a practical, even pragmatic, elaboration of genre theory which sees
classifications as essentially mobile, conforming entirely with the Romantic
notion that poetry be forever in becoming'r". Genre is no longer a static, rigid
entity but a changeable becoming obtained by differing permutations of the agile
elements of the grid, and it should not be surprising to find that, even though
Holderlin has nothing to say on a 'genre of genres', his qualifications of existing
genres bring his position, as Peter Szondi notes, very close to Schlegel's; where
for Holderlin (and in this, it would seem, he stands alone), the modern genre par
excellence is the lyric poem, for Schlegel, but with a description and definition
which aligns itself exactly with Holderlin's description of the lyric poem, this
distinction falls on the novel' ".
"A novel is a romantic book", Schlegel writes in his 'Letter on the
Novel', part of what, along with the fragments, remains his most sustained
136 S di . 93zon I, op.cit., p. .
137 It should also be noted that it is, at the very least, entirely possible to see in Holderlin's use of
what I here called a 'grid' yet another nascent application of a fundamentally dialectical method.
This would also connect this essay with its sister piece, On the Operations of the Poetic Spirit,
which, as I showed in chapter two, is also a piece of poetological theory which transforms
existing literary defmitions and classifications by setting them in motion, in becoming.
138 See Szondi, op.cit., p.92.
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theoretical work, the Dialogue on Poetry (Gesprach uber die Poesie)139. He is, of
course, playing on the etymology of the German Roman, but the play is serious.
The novel is a Romantic book, in fact it is the Romantic book, because in it
Schlegel saw the embodiment, the real, living example of the genre of genres, the
genre which combines all other genres and is a theory of genre itself; as Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy, among a host of others, have observed, the novel is
precisely what Athenaum 116 calls 'progressive universal poetry' 140. In the
Dialogue Schlegel specifies that he can "hardly think of a novel but as a mixture
(gemischt) of storytelling, song, and other forms,,141. The novel is in essence a
mixture, a combination, it is the genre of genres because it betrays more
evidently than any other form of writing the fundamental 'law of genre', which is
that there is always more than one genre, that genre is always to be mixed.
Novalis, very often the 'wilder' thinker among the Romantics, expresses the
same view on the novel as a great, inclusive genre, in the following excerpt from
one of his Logological Fragments: "The novel is about life - (re)presents life
(stellt Leben dar) .... The novel as such contains no definite result - it is not the
image and fact (Factum) of a proposition. It is the visible execution - the
realisation of an idea. But an idea cannot be comprehended in a proposition. An
idea is an infinite series of propositions" (II, 212, p. 570). The novel is the
Darstellung of life, in all its complexity, confusion, and, it is implied, resistance
to rigid classifications; it is not a simple proposition but an infinite series of
propositions, or an idea, " a concept", as Schlegel would say, "perfected bis zur
139 I am reading the 'dialogue' from the German of the KFSA, or, to be more precise, in its
transposition in the second volume of the Studtenausgabe, Paderbom; Schoningh, 1988, pp. 186-
222. Translations are my own, although a translation of the 'letter on the novel' exists in
Wheeler, op.cit..
140 "The "Letter" contents itself with transposing to the novel what Athenaum fragment 116 says
of poetry", op.cit., p.97.
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Ironie", it is a genre posited to infinity, inclusive of itself and all other genres,
and emblematic of the very generativity of genre, its infinite generation. The
reason, therefore, why the novel is "the romantic book" is not simply because the
novel ultimately can be shown to 'contain' all other genres, but because it can
also be shown, transcendentally, as one would say, to contain the containing
itself. Schlegel, again in the "Letter", writes: "when one thinks of a book. one
thinks of a work, a whole existing for itself,142. For the Romantics, it should be
clear, a "whole existing for itself' can only be such if it contains all its
components but also the very act of containment, transcendentally - this is the
novel, and this is why the novel can only be theorised through and by the novel:
"a theory of the novel should itself be a novel,,143. Once again, as with the
proclamations on the genre of genres as progressive Universalpoesie, one must
pay attention to the full scope of the Romantic conception, and to note that this
"whole" is only ever an expanding, infinite whole in becoming, and not a
completed, perfected whole. The novel is the genre of genres not just because it
can be shown to contain all other genres alongside the very act of containment
itself, but also because it is in the "continuum of forms" as Benjamin would have
it, the most poetic (in essence) and the most prosaic (in appearance). It is the
zero degree of genre at the same time as being the ultimate genre of genre.
But if genre is thus dissolved, thus analysed to the point where its infinite
propagation and the genre which represents it (the novel) become at the same
time the ultimate genre of mixture (Mischung), and the 'no-genre', the "pas de
genre" of sheer prose - what, then, remains of the particularity, the specificity
that genre belongs to, serves, and aims to protect? Does Schlegel, and
141 Studienausgabe, vol.2, p.213.
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Romanticism in general, dissolve all specificity in the menstruum universale of
''the Romantic book"? Perhaps curiously, the answer is a resolute no. To begin
with, it is a matter of cardinal importance that the theorisation of the Romantic
book does not take the form of a utopian project, and even if it may appear to do
so in Athenaum 116 (though, even there, I would argue that it is only a matter of
appearance - "progressive universal poetry" is not a vision of a vague utopian
future), it certainly takes the flesh and blood of a very specific literary form in
the "letter on the novel". The Romantic book, in all its expansive, infinitised
glory is, according to the Schlegel of the Dialogue, the novel. And this is the
ultimate paradox of the Romantic theory of genre - that in its attempt to get at a
"concept" of genre, at a formulation of the grounds for genre theory itself as they
would be transcendentally included in that theory, and whilst it reaches the
greatest, most infinite degrees of generality, it still does not lose sight of the
specificity, the particularity that a theory of genre is really all about. Schlegel's
most ambitious attempt at showing how the universality of Romanticism is also,
at the same time, respectful of the greatest possible particularity within it, can be
seen in the rightly famous Athenaum 252, which can be viewed as a
crystallisation of his genre theory. A "philosophy of poetry", he writes:
"would hover (schweben) between the union and the division of
philosophy and poetry, between poetry and practice, poetry as such and the
genres and kinds of poetry; and it would conclude with their complete union. Its
beginning would provide the principles of pure poetics; its middle the theory of
the particular, typically modem kinds of poetry, the didactic, the musical, the
142 IbOd1 0, po213o
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rhetorical in a higher sense etc. The keystone would be a philosophy of the
novel, of which the first outlines are contained in Plato's political theory of art."
A real "philosophy of poetry", a real theory of literature that is, and by extension
therefore a real theory of genre, would "hover" (not accidentally the verb here)
between union and separation, once againl44 - but this we have read before. What
is not so tried, and quite vital, is that Schlegel, not for the first time it must be
said, goes into specifics: this "philosophy of poetry" would concern itself with
pure poetics, but also with the particular modem genres of poetry, and will
culminate in a theory of the novel, first glimpsed with Plato's dialogical
imagination'V, The highest, most general theory therefore, according to
Schlegel, must also be a consideration respectful of the greatest particularity, and
will culminate in something which not only has a particular form, but also a
particular historical provenance. Particularity, for Schlegel, at least when it
comes to literary forms and genres, is always of historical provenance, and
Romanticism's respect for particularity is tantamount to a concern with the real
specificity of history. Back in the "letter on the novel", we read: "in my historical
investigation I encountered several originary forms which are not further
reducible to one another. In the sphere of Romantic poetry, it seems to me that
novellas and fairy tales are, ifI may say so, infinitely opposed,,146. This is a clear
assertion, coming scarcely a paragraph after the definition of novel as a "mixed"
143Ib'd1 ., p.214.
144 I must acknowledge that here Schlegel rings the utopian note, perhaps, by including the
statement "will conclude with their complete union". As a corrective to the idea that this union is
postulated as realisable, it is sufficient to be reminded of the resolute phrasing of Athenaum 116-
there is no reason to believe that if Romantic poetry should forever be in becoming and never be
p,erfected, then its theory and philosophy could or should desire to do so.
4S Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy make the interesting point that the theory of the novel represents,
in effect, the definite tendency within Romanticism, and the thought of Schlegel in particular, to
'go back' to Plato. See op.cit., p.88.
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genre, of the irreducibility of originary genres, and, what is even more striking,
of the irreducibility of modern genres such as the novella or the fairy tale.
Why is this so important? Not just as a corrective to the mistaken
identification of Romanticism with the dissolution of specificity in a vague
universality, but precisely because the very universality of the Romantic
conception of genre is ultimately what makes Romanticism respectful to the
utmost specificity of genre as such. This is the paradox of genre: its most
universal essence - that is: there is more than one genre - is also the clearest
index of the strictest particularity - there is more than one genre, no one
universal solvent is possible within which the specificity of particular genres may
be dissolved, as this specificity always survives in the 'more than one' genre.
Dissolution into universality is impossible, because the universality of genre
entails the greatest particularity. And, I am compelled to note at this point, there
can be no clearer indication that, even within the realm of what should by rights
be literary theory par excellence, Romantic thought is a thoroughly philosophical
thought; the theory of genre is nothing other than a theory of universals and
particulars, parts and wholes. Schlegel's Lyceum Fragment 14 is typically
succinct: "In poetry too every whole can be a part and every part really a whole".
Even more than genre theory, however, the aspect of Romantic thought that most
clearly corresponds to a thinking of universality and particularity is the practice
(and theory) of the fragment.
146 S di btu ienausga e, p. 213.
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IV. The System-Fragment.
The fragment, another renowned Romantic legacy, is not quite what it
seems. It may be a favourite form of writing for Schlegel, but, as is well
documentedi'", his brother August as well as other members of the group were
not quite so happy with it. Novalis deliberately practiced the form for his
Atheneum publications, but neither his nor Holderlin's notes can be taken to be
fragments in the programmatic sense that Schlegel's are. Yet, it is incontestable
that the greatest majority of the material I have been dealing with, and indeed the
majority of Romantic textual material, are, de/acto if not dejure, fragments. My
argument here will be that, deliberately or not, Romanticism could only ever
have survived, in its essence, in fragments. Consequently, the notion that
Romanticism radically fails to produce a body of work worthy of that name,
bequeathing a motley heap of torsos and ruins instead, completely misses the
essential characteristic, indeed the essential tendency and the very heart of the
Romantic project. It may be the case that only Schlegel seriously managed to
theorise the fragment, but the Romantic fragments, whether they be intentional or
not, are the only way in which Romanticism could have expressed itself. Far
from an index of failure, which may indeed be what it appears to be, the
Romantic fragment, is the specific and quintessential Romantic way of
147 Among others, by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, op.cit., p.40.
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expressing, and thinking about, specificity and particularity, and as such, it is
also the quintessential Romantic expression of the opposite, of universality.
The fragment is not a genre. It may be said to be one inasmuch as it is a
type, a form of writing practice, and especially since Schlegel consciously
mobilises it as such a type - but it is not. It is never talked about, as are the
traditional genres or even the novel and 'progressive universal poetry', as one
genre among many. It is not even the genre of genres - at least not if what one
understands by this expression is what I have tried to elucidate in the preceding
section, namely the exemplary genre which would encompass all others whilst
also containing within itself, transcendentally, the 'act' of containing or
encompassing. But the fragment may well be said to be the strict formal
appearance of the Romantic theory of genre. If genre theorises the peculiar
relation between universality and particularity that Romanticism sought to bring
to life, then the fragment is the not necessarily deliberate practice of it. To be
sure, it can be claimed that the novel, as the privileged genre, is the practice of its
own theory, and Schlegel will say as much of Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, the
exemplary novel, and one could even, with a fair degree of sympathy, push for
Schlegel's own Lucinde or, less obviously, for Novalis' Heinrich von
Ofterdingen or Holderlin's Hyperion being such examples of the Romantic genre
of genres. But in the very strict sense of the infinitisation, consequent
dissolution, and persistent survival of the essence of genre (as more than one
genre), of this sense of 'genre' or of 'genre of genre' it is the fragment which is
the sole true and necessary survivor - the inexorable ruin of genre theory. This is
because the fragment is an exemplary (re)presentation (Darstellung) of the
relation between particularity and universality that Romantic genre theory sought
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to investigate. The exemplary fragment on the fragment is, of course, the famous
Athenaum 206, the 'porcupine' fragment: "A fragment, like a miniature work of
art, has to be entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be complete in
itself like a porcupine". At first glance this may appear innocuous enough,
stating only the absolute independence of a fragment, its standing or being
posited alone. But this is already a paradox - a fragment is, at least
conventionally, a fragment of a greater entity, a broken-off piece of a once-
complete whole. Schlegel insists that a fragment is isolated, on its own, a whole
in itself - and yet, to complicate matters more, it is entirely isolated "from the
surrounding world", which means it is not, strictly speaking, isolated, but exists,
however curled-up and protected by porcupine thorns, in a world, at once
complete unto itself and in relation with an outside. The paradox is precisely this
relation: the fragment is a part of a whole to which it is related precisely by not
being in relation to it; it is a part only inasmuch as it is itself whole, its own
singular universal, if the oxymoron be allowed.
Schlegel, for instance in Athenaum 22 and 77, calls fragments
"individuals" (and vice versa, which amounts to the same), and what he means is
certainly nothing to do with any ideas of 'personhood' or subjectivity. Rather, his
stress is that fragments and individuals are indivisible wholes, micro-totalities
that form their own world and stand apart from it at the same time, much like the
metaphorical porcupine. Fragments and individuals are equated with each other,
but also, crucially, with the third term that illuminates them both - system.
Athenaum 242 ("Aren't all systems individuals and all individuals systems ... ?")
equates individuals with systems, and the 930th fragment from the Literary
Notebooks equates fragments with systems ("even the greatest system is merely a
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fragment"). The equations are left tantalisingly unqualified in the fragments
themselves (they are themselves fragments, as befits them) but the thought
behind them is unmistakable, and a hallmark of Schlegel's conceptual powers. A
fragment is a system in the sense exemplified by the porcupine metaphor - it is a
part which stands alone in a singular disjunctive relation with the whole, a whole
unto itself and a part of its own whole at the same time. Schlegel writes of "a
chain or garland of fragments", even "a system of fragments"(Athenaum 77). A
system, then, is only one if it is made up of fragments, that is of systems - herein
lies the singular conception of systematicity at the heart of Romanticism, and, as
I showed in the previous chapter, it is a conception which, in its radical
difference with the systematic thought of Idealism, must be taken in its full force.
A system, etymologically a compound of connected parts, is not the Idealist
vision of the whole, but rather its ruin, its fragment - every one of the connected
parts is itself ruin, and the overall totality is a fragment. To ask whether it is the
whole that is fragmented first, or its parts, is to miss the point entirely - Schlegel
can only think of the system as a fragment, and this means also that he can only
think of the fragment as a system; in his thought, the whole is always a part, and
the part is always whole.
This would merely be an interesting, if arcane, exhibition of contradictory
logic, of the kind that would surely be imbued with Schlegelian irony, were it not
for the fact that the fragment, as I suggested earlier, is the chief Romantic form
for the literary as well as the philosophical work, and were it also not for the fact
that this peculiar articulation of system and fragment (or system and individual,
or individual and fragment, Schlegel virtually invites us to take our pick) is one
of Romanticism's quintessential elaborations of its own singular (literary and
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philosophical) Absolute. Both these points require further elucidation. First: as I
explained earlier, the Romantic concept of a literary work, conceived from
within the horizon of genre theory, paradoxically allows for particular works, or
particular genres, to be thought of not as belonging to a universal whole, the
literary Absolute, if you will, but as themselves constituting the Absolute anew,
each and every time. This is why Schlegel will heap praise on Goethe's Meister
for "the manner of representation, which endows even the most circumscribed
character with the appearance of a unique, autonomous individual, while yet
possessing another aspect, another variation of that general human nature which
is constant in all its transformations, so that each variation is a small part of the
infinite world", or for the manner in which "each essential part of the single and
indivisible novel becomes a system in itself"!" - in brief, Schlegel commends
Goethe for making every part a whole, that is a fragment, like the porcupine.
The literary Absolute, therefore is only such because each and every one of the
particular parts it contains is itself absolute, in the sense of isolation implied by
the porcupine fragment. A particular is only a particular inasmuch as it is also, at
the same time, universal, inasmuch as it befits what can be called the universal
form of particularity. And this can also be read in reverse. The universal is only
ever articulated through an infinite series of particulars, the "infinite series of
propositions" Novalis used for his notion of the novel. Moreover, it should be
noted that this is not a conception akin to Schelling's indefensible version of the
two "equal" philosophical Absolutes; the absoluteness here in question is totally
different to Schelling's: each 'absolute' particular is the bearer of the same
incomplete 'absoluteness' as the 'absolute' universal, and not a totality split in
148 In Wheeler, op.cit., p.60, and pp.65-66.
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two. We are at many removes from the traditional notion of the fragment; the
fragment is nothing negative, nothing simply 'detached' from a greater whole as
it signifies the whole itself, each and every time. As Rodolphe Gasche puts it:
"fragments are not leftover pieces of an integral whole, broken parts of an
anticipated totality; they are the whole itself in actualitas - the only way in
which the supersensible substrate [ie: the Absolute] occurs, or becomes present.
Fragmentation, consequently, rather than implying some loss or lack of presence,
represents the positive mode in which presentation of the whole occurs,,149.
As it should be evident, this theorisation of the fragment is inextricably
linked with the Romantic Absolute as an incomplete, indeed fragmentary
Absolute. Even though the fragment is the presentation of the whole, this could
only be the case if the whole itself is fragment - and, once again, to ask the
question of causality, namely whether Schlegel arrives at a notion of an
incomplete Absolute because of his theory of the fragment or vice versa, is
notionally akin to asking the question about the chicken and the egg. In Lyceum
103, Schlegel is, for once, very clear about his notion of incompletion, from the
specific perspective of the literary work: "Many a work of art whose coherence is
never questioned is, as the artist knows quite well himself, not a complete work
but a fragment, or one or more fragments, a mass, a plan." At this stage this
reads merely as an indictment of world literature, along the same lines of
Atheniium24: "many of the works of the ancients have become fragments. Many
modem works are fragments as soon as they are written". But, by positing the
condition of "many" modem works as fragmentary from their inception, Schlegel
elevates this fragmentariness into a necessity - ancient works may have become
149 Gasche, "Foreword" to the English translation of Schlegel's Philosophical Fragments, op.cit.,
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fragments, but modem works are born as fragments. The fragment thus lies in a
paradoxical but inexorable relation to incompletion, summarized effectively in
The Literary Absolute: "the fragment combines completion and incompletion
within itself, or one may say, in an even more complex manner, it both completes
and incompletes the dialectic of completion and incompletion"(op.cit., p. 50).
Or, in other words: the fragment is essentially incomplete, but it is also
essentially the only possible instantiation and actualisation of an Absolute that is
itself incomplete.
p. xxvii.
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v. Criticism: the final Incompletion of Literature.
The notion of criticism can be seen in many ways as the completion, at
least the final part, of the Romantic theory of literature, but this claim has to be
qualified to suit the overarching exigencies of the incomplete Absolute. Thus, in
a variation of the same paradox of completion by incompletion that we have
encountered in the Romantic theories of genre and the fragment, criticism is
postulated as the element in the literary work which allows for its extension,
reconfiguration, and development, and which thus points towards the incomplete
kernel of the particular. It should be noted, from the outset, that the notion of
criticism one encounters in Schlegel, who is, without doubt, the principal 'critical
theorist' among the Romantics, is almost entirely divorced from the traditional,
and still current, idea of the critic as judge. Criticism aims not at the judgment of
a particular literary work for the posterity of readers and future critics, but rather
at the ever-continuing expansion of the meaning (the sense, the Bedeutung) of
the work, and is thus an instrument, perhaps the chief instrument, of a work's
infinitisation, its approximation to the progressively universal infinity of the
literary Absolute. Criticism, evidently, at least for a thinker so imbued in the
principles of transcendental philosophy, is directly related to the Kantian notion
of critique. When Schlegel writes of critical (re)presentations of literary works,
which, as we shall see, ought themselves to be literary works, he intends this to
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signify a representation raised to the second power, a transcendental critique
which would reflexively represent ''the producer along with the product", as
Athenaum 238 would have it. Thus, when Schlegel, in the same fragment,
introduces his idea of transcendental poetry, its designation as "poetry of poetry",
its characteristics of "artistic reflection and beautiful self-mirroring" enjoining
the "transcendental raw materials", and his final imperative that "in all its
(re)presentations (Darstellungen) , this poetry should (re)present itself, and
always be simultaneously poetry and the poetry of poetry" - these are all
indications of the transcendental and critical nature of this second-power Poesie
der Poesie. In other words, the poetry of poetry, although it obviously remains
essentially poetry also bears the fundamental traits of criticism.
Already, then, criticism is theorised as something occurring not strictly
outside but within poetry itself; criticism is not an exterior addition to the literary
work, but a reflexively necessary part of it. This takes on an even more radical
form when Schlegel explicitly, and on several occasions, writes that the criticism
of poetry is to be thought of as being in a continuum with poetry itself, or, even
more resolutely, that criticism of literature should be itself literature. "Poetry can
only be criticised by way of poetry. A critical judgment of an artistic production
has no civil rights in the realm of art if it isn't itself a work of art, either in its
substance, as a representation (Darstel/ung) of a necessary impression in the state
of becoming, or in the beauty of its form and liberal tone, as in the Roman
satires", he writes, in Lyceum J J 7. What is noteworthy in this statement is not so
much the notion that criticism of literature should itself be literature, but the
precise demarcation of the manner in which it is possible. Thus, a critical
appreciation or judgment of a literary work may count as being itself literature by
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sharing the "beauty" of its form with the literary work, which Schlegel will
expound on in his essay on Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, or, and this is much more
interesting, by being a "representation of a necessary impression in the state of
becoming", which unmistakably suggests that the critical judgment is itself only
a step, a phase in the infinite becoming of the work, and points further to the
element of essential incompletion and infinite becoming in the work - the critical
judgment is not a complete evaluation of an already whole work, but another step
in the continuum of its becoming. This is why Schlegel often appears inimical to
the notion of critical judgment, at least as that is traditionally conceived. The
judgment of a work is not left to the critic but is an integral part of the process of
the work itself, its 'completion', not in the ordinary sense but in the sense of its
ascension to a further step on the path of its becoming - which is why Walter
Benjamin is extremely perceptive when he writes that ''the critic does not pass
judgment on the work; rather, art itself passes judgment, either by taking up the
work in the medium of criticism or by rejecting it and thereby appraising it as
beneath all criticism,,150.
It is in his essay on Goethe's Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre where Schlegel
most appositely and precisely captures the essence of what he takes criticism,
and criticism as literature, to mean. He finds, in Goethe's novel, not simply the
example of "the Romantic book", but of one of the chief elements of what makes
the novel the paradigmatic genre, and Goethe's novel the exemplary novel, of
Romanticism - and that is the fact that the book criticises itself. It is, as
Athenaum 238 would have it, "simultaneously poetry and the poetry of poetry".
The book, Schlegel writes, "turns out to be one of those books which carries its
ISO B " . 16enjamm, op.cit., p. 1.
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own judgment within it, and spares the critic his labour. Indeed, not only does it
judge itself; it also (re)presents itself (es stellt sich auch selbst dar)"ISl. Thus,
the book is not only critical of itself in the common use of the term (it ''judges''
itself, it is its own review) but also, and far more importantly, in the
transcendental sense with which Schlegel always understands the notion of
criticism: it represents itself, it sets its own mode of production alongside the
finished product, it is thoroughly critical. Of course, Schlegel does not expect
this of any ordinary work of criticism, it is the privilege and the boon of what he
calls "poetic criticism", and he makes this distinction only shortly after, in the
same essay, in a discussion of the criticism of Shakespeare's Hamlet, found in
Goethe's novel. The passage is worth quoting at length:
"The view of Hamlet to be found scattered partly here and partly in the
next volume is not so much criticism as high poetry. What else but a poem can
come into being when a poet in full possession of his powers contemplates a
work of art and represents (darstellt) it in his own? This is not because his view
makes suppositions and assertions which go beyond the visible work. All
criticism has to do that, because every great work, of whatever kind, knows more
than it says, and aspires to more than it knows. It is because the aims and
approach of poetic criticism are something completely different. Poetic criticism
does not act as a mere inscription, and merely say what the thing is, and where it
stands and should stand in the world. For that, all that is required is a whole
and undivided human being who has made the work the centre of his attention
for as long as necessary. If he takes pleasure in communication, by word of
I~I In Wheeler, op.cit., p.64, translation modified.
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mouth or in writing, he will enjoy developing and elaborating an insight which is
fundamentally single and indivisible. This is how a critical characterisation of a
work actually comes into being. The poet and artist on the other hand will want
to represent the representation anew (die Darstellung von neuem darstellen), and
form once more what has already been formed; he will supplement the work,
restore it, form it anew. He will only divide the whole into articulated parts and
masses, not break it down into its original constituents, which in respect of the
work are dead things, because their elements are no longer of the same nature as
the whole; however, in respect of the universe they are certainly living, and could
be articulated parts or masses within it,,152.
Schlegel's notion of criticism finds here its most acutely articulated
expression. 'Ordinary' criticism is shown to be already a continuation and a re-
shaping, a reconfiguration of the literary work, merely by saying "what the thing
is". This is expressly because the work "knows more than it says, and aspires to
more than it knows", the work is always in excess of itself. Even when,
admittedly, the work is "single and indivisible", it constitutes a unity and a
totality of sorts, it is only that unity and totality if it admits of "developing and
elaborating", it is a unity which exceeds itself at the very least in potentia. This
is the element that Walter Benjamin captures excellently in his dissertation when
he distinguishes between the Romantic notion of the artwork and that found in
Goethe himself: "the entire art-philosophical project of the early Romantics can
therefore be summarised by saying that they sought to demonstrate the
criticizability of the work of art. Goethe's whole theory of art proceeds from his
152 Ibid., p. 69, translation slightly modified.
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view of the uncriticizability ofworks"IS3. 'Criticizability' is a direct result of the
fact that the work of art, on its own, whole and indivisible as Schlegel says,
nevertheless is fundamentally incomplete, and admits further elaboration.
Criticism is therefore not an activity operating from outside the literary work but
a phase in the continuum, as Benjamin has it, of its becoming. Further more,
what Schlegel calls poetic criticism, by which he presumably not only means the
criticism of existing works found amidst the pages of other literary works, as is
the case with Wilhelm Meister and Hamlet, but also the kind of literary criticism
that would assume the same level of "beauty" as the literary work that occasions
it, this 'other' type of criticism goes even further in (re)presenting the existing
(re)presentation of the literary work anew, re-shaping it, supplementing it in the
precise sense of transforming it. And, Schlegel adds, this can only be done if the
poet-critic pays exact attention to the precise articulation of the elements within
the work, treats them as "articulated parts", which is to say as wholes, as
universal-particulars - to cut the list short, as fragments. The work of this type
of criticism is thus less practically to demonstrate the fundamental
incompleteness of the literary work (any "whole and undivided human being",
that is, any individual, can do that if s/he pays the requisite attention to the work,
Schlegel says), and more to demonstrate an astute understanding of the
essentially fragmentary form of the work, which is to say, a creative (poetic)
understanding that takes entirely into account the nature of the elements of the
work, and of the work itself, and consequently also of itself, as fragments.
Criticism is thus exemplary of the Romantic notion of literature in many
ways: it exemplifies and, what is more, effectively demonstrates the essential
1S3 B .. . 1enjarrun, op.ctt., p. 79.
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incompletion of the particular work; it forms a continuum with the work itself,
working as a transcendental critique of the work, a raising of it in the reflexive
second power; it stands in relation to the work as genres stand in relation to one
another, since the fundamental incompletion of the work necessarily allows for
the possibility of its criticism, like one genre allows, by the law of genre, for
another - more than one genre; it effectively produces the infinite continuation
and reconfiguration of the work, allowing the work to be re-presented, re-
produced, to continue to become, progressively and expansively; and, finally, it
exemplifies the form of incompletion, as well as the form of particularity-as-
universality that is the fragment, by taking the work itself as well as individual
elements of the work as themselves fragments. Criticism, then, is the
'completion' of the work only in the sense that it reflects, mirrors the work's
essential incompletion, and belongs, right alongside literary works themselves, in
the incomplete and infinitely progressive literary Absolute. This Absolute,
which 1 have tried here to theorise under the 'categories' of genre, fragment, and
criticism, essentially presents and produces itself ("literature") in the same
fundamental manner of infinite becoming and essential incompletion in all these
'categories'. But this is the 'same' of auto-production, of an infinite becoming
which can never be identical to itself as it is not yet, and will never be, complete,
an idea expressed also by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy very near the end of The
Literary Absolute, where they capture the essential thrust of Romanticism
perfectly: "[I]n this auto-manifestation, it is not only the identity of philosophy
with literature and of literature with philosophy that never takes place, for the
identity of literature with itself and philosophy with itself are absent as well. The
251
Same, here, never reaches its sameness"IS4. But this is because there was never
really a question, with Romanticism, of the production of 'the same', or of 'the
idea' in the sense given to it at roughly the same time by German Idealism - it
was never, in other words, even within the confines of the question of literature,
of an "eidaesthetics", regardless of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's earlier
assertion a propos of The Oldest System-Programme. Rather, it has always been
a question of auto-production as the auto-production of difference, as the
ontological concerns of the Romantics find their parallel, perhaps with even
greater force, in their theory of literature; it has been, to adapt and also to alter
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's term, a question of literary "eidopoetics", the
creation, the infinite becoming of an immutable yet ever-changing idea, or
Absolute.
IS4 Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, op.cit., p.l23.
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CONCLUSION: ROMANTICISM EXPOSED
I: Exposition.
My aim throughout this thesis has been to present what I take to be the
central theses of Early German Romanticism, what I take to be the radical
contributions of Holderlin, Novalis, and Friedrich Schlegel to the history of ideas
in modernity. As thinkers, all three share a position in the history of European
thought which can, with some justification, be qualified as eccentric; they have
only relatively recently begun to be considered as thinkers, and in this case that
primarily means as philosophers, in their own right, although of course their
literary output, especially that of Holderlin and Novalis, has continued to attract
critical attention. They can also be qualified as eccentric in the sense that, at
least until recently, they have been largely forgotten, their thought ascribed a
particular, secondary place in the development of German Idealism, themselves
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mainly assigned the role of the poor cousin to Kant, Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel.
In part, therefore, my aim has, at least minimally, been polemical. 'Minimally',
because it has never been my intention to overthrow the giants of Idealism from
their thrones and replace them with these three 'alternative heroes' - quite the
contrary. If Schlegel, Novalis, and Holderlin can genuinely be called 'eccentric'
or 'alternative', this is because their thought presents an alternative to the
traditional conception of German Idealism, and because the path that
Romanticism carves out in the history of philosophy is a genuinely eccentric one.
It is genuinely a divergence from the main path.
Having admitted that, however, it also seems crucial to me to establish
that Romanticism is also relevant now, that the thought of Holderlin, Schlegel,
and Novalis is with us at the beginning of the 21st century, perhaps more than it
had ever been in the past. This is not because Romanticism is slowly ceasing to
be eccentric, quite the opposite. It is because its eccentricity is starting to be
recognised as such, and from this perspective, my aim in presenting it is to
attempt to establish Romanticism as an alternative route, at a time when
philosophy may perhaps be in need of one. To achieve this it would be
impossible, not to mention simply hypocritical, to claim that the presentation, the
exposition (both possible translations for the German DarstellungJ55) of
Romanticism in these pages is neutral, or 'objective'. It is my own claim that
Romanticism presents such an eccentric alternative, and I have consequently
inflected my presentation of the Romantic positions accordingly. As a result, I
hope it would not appear too arrogant to suggest, this presentation of
Romanticism bears, in some weak sense, the 'transcendental mark' that the
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Romantics themselves espoused and analysed, the mark of the producer on the
product, and thus becomes - quite deliberately though, I hope, not forcibly - a
(re)presentation, in the sense of my own translation of Darstellung in the course
of this thesis.
My (re)presentation of Romanticism has consisted in highlighting those
traits in the thought of Schlegel, Holderlin, and Novalis which I take to be tracing
out the eccentric Romantic path within the history of philosophy. To begin with,
I aimed to show that Romanticism should be conceived as having not simply
philosophical but first-philosophical, metaphysical, or ontological foundations.
Starting from the Romantic reading and reconfiguration of Fichte, I tried to trace
a Romantic line of thought which sought to establish ontological grounds for the
transcendental-idealist project, and to show that, in the process, Holderlin and
Novalis both, in their own ways, arrive at a criticism of Fichte which yields the
ontological foundations of the whole Romantic philosophical enterprise.
Holderlin establishes that the entire Fichtean operation has to be seen as
emanating from the horizon of what he calls Urtheil, the original separation of
subject and object, whilst at the same time postulating the necessity of
presupposing a pre-originary unity of subject and object in what he calls Seyn.
Thus, and this is already a departure from, and a critique of, Fichte, Romanticism
establishes an absolute ontological domain as the ground for any further
philosophical investigation. I have then tried to show that, with Novalis' Fichte-
Studien, Romanticism's critique of Fichte develops into an ontological critique,
along the lines initiated by Holderlin, so as to make it possible for me to claim
that Romanticism is philosophically grounded in ontology. Yet this is no
155 I need to acknowledge that the translation of Darste/lung as 'exposition', which I am now
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ordinary ontology, and it is even from here that one can see the radical
eccentricity of the Romantic path. The ontology of the Fichte-Studien, the most
sustained exploration of ontology anywhere within Romanticism and the most
pivotal text for establishing Romantic metaphysics, is a dynamic, differential
ontology, where Being is designated as the activity of hovering (schweben -
Novalis' word, but also a key topos in the writings of Schlegel), or differencing.
Being is not a static element, however originary, but rather a dynamic,
productive relation, and the Romantic ontology establishes Being as the
Absolute relation, on the ontological level, which is productive of fixed ontic
determinations and categories. Furthermore, both Holderlin with his notion of
Urtheil, and Novalis with his own notion of Schein, postulate a horizon which is
inescapable to thought just as it is inexorably linked to the Absolute of Being,
and which determines that any 'approach to Being', any thought of Being is but
an endless approximation, or, in other words, that Being as such is inaccessible
to thinking which is always already tied within the horizon of separation (for
Holderlin), or appearance (for Novalis).
This leads me to the form that this endless approach to Being takes.
Conventionally speaking, this would be nothing other than the realm of
epistemology, the mode of inquiry after Being, or knowledge of Being. In the
second chapter I dealt with precisely these aspects in the thought of the
Romantics which are concerned with such an approach, and it should be
expected that, at least in my (re)presentation, Romantic epistemology traces yet
another eccentric path. To begin with, what has already been circumscribed as a
limited horizon from within which the approach is to be made (the horizon of
using for strategic reasons which will, I hope, become apparent, comes form A.V. Millers'
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Urtheil and Schein), now gets further circumscribed as the Romantics,
particularly Novalis, come upon a significant determination of the medium in
which knowledge of Being, any knowledge, takes place: language. Novalis is
among the first in a long line of thinkers for whom language becomes much more
than a simple medium of human knowledge, and can be seen as an important
precursor to what has often been called 'the linguistic turn' in modem philosophy
and theory. In the Fichte-Studien he expounds a truly radical linguistic theory,
expressed precisely in the terms of a theory of knowledge, and a theory of
knowledge as and through signs. He proposes what he calls "the transcendental
schema" as lying at the basis of language, a schema which is undeniably
influenced by Kant's schematism, but which transports Kantian concerns onto
the realm of a semiotic theory, the schema acting as the absolutely inexorable
medium for the production and communication of signs/words. The truly radical
nature of Novalis' semiotics is that this schema is not simply a theoretical basis
for the construction of signs, but is imprinted, marked upon every sign, every
word, language as such, in a specific way which Novalis terms 'hieroglyphic'.
True to their transcendental heritage, the Romantics' view of language is one
wherein every word, every sign, bears the hieroglyphic mark of the
transcendental schema mediating it; this is the mark, not of the empirical
subject/producer upon the product/word, but of a wholly impersonal, a priori
transcendental schema which, in my reading, is the direct parallel or mirror-
image of the Absolute relation that is Being. Thus, just as Being as productive
relation produces particular ontic determinations whilst retaining its ontological
status as production, Romantic semiotics, which is nothing other than Romantic
translation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.
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epistemology, is also a theory of production, with the transcendental schema
acting as the a priori element of productivity that yields particular signs.
This conception of language and semiotics has important consequences,
not least of all the fact that words cease to correspond unproblematically with
their objective referents; language is no longer a transparent medium but a
medium in which every word, every 'linguistic entity', so to speak, refers only to
another one, or where words only refer to themselves, as Novalis puts it in his
Monolog. A further consequence is that, apart from the simple relation between
word and thing which has been deprived of its correspondence certainty,
language displays its own transcendental mark as the very act of linguistic
production, what Novalis calls both the "inanity" and the "efficacy", the self-
referentiality which, nevertheless, and crucially, is thought of as the principal
element in language, the 'true being' of language, if you like. It is Schlegel who
takes up the theme of the paradoxical combination of inanity and efficacy in
language, the Romantic linguistic double bind, and theorises it as irony.
Schlegel's notion of irony is far removed from being a mere trope, and comes to
mean the very linguistic condition by which understanding (of words or
concepts) on a simple correspondence level is impossible; yet the reflexive
understanding of understanding is eminently possible if one admits, through and
with irony, the necessary possibility of what Schlegel calls 'incomprehensibility'.
Irony thus becomes the major Romantic appellation for the (re)presentation, the
Darstellung of the epistemological double bind. Nevertheless, even within the
necessary limitations of language and the epistemological double bind,
Romanticism's view of language and knowledge through language is far from
bleak. In keeping with their ontological concerns with production, and as can be
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glimpsed from the exalted tones of both Schlegel and Novalis even when they
write about inanity and incomprehensibility, the production of linguistic
Darsetllungen, however inane or incomprehensible, is viewed as production in
the sense ofpoiesis. In my own (re)presentation of Romanticism, this is seen as
the transformation of the philosophical 'discipline' of epistemology into
poetology, the theory of poetic production, the chief examples being Schlegel's
theory of transcendental poetry and Holderlin's theory of the operations of the
poetic spirit. In such works, Romanticism manages completely to transform the
'conventional' transcendental-idealist story about the production of knowledge
into a theory of production exemplified aspoetic production. And, what is more,
in this way, and according, again, to my (re)presentation, what in the texts of the
'mature' German Idealism (Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism or
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit) is conceived of as the narrative of the
formation of consciousness, and thus of subjectivity, is reconfigured by
Romanticism as a theory of poetic production, directly related to the ontology of
production analysed in chapter 1.
By this stage what I have called the eccentric path traced by Romanticism
should perhaps already be apparent, but in order to bring it into better relief, I
proceeded to contrast, or confront, Romantic thought with the thought of the
'royal route' in the philosophy of the time, thus with Holderlin, Novalis, and
Schlegel's 'big cousins', Schelling and Hegel. What Romanticism offers as an
alternative to their undeniably influential systems and conceptions can best be
seen in direct comparison with them. Thus, I have analysed in a third chapter
what I see as the major points of philosophical divergence between Romanticism
and Idealism, chief amongst which is undoubtedly that, at least in my
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(re)presentation, subjectivity and the development of consciousness as this
largely figures in the work of Schelling and Hegel is absent (although, of course,
not totally) from Romantic philosophy. Yet, perhaps even more crucially, the
Romantics arrive at an utterly different idea of the philosophical kernel of
thought, the notion of the Absolute, from that seen in Schelling or Hegel. The
most pivotal difference is that the Romantic Absolute, in what I take to be a
direct consequence of both the centrality of relational ontology within Romantic
thought, and the epistemological-linguistic double bind which they discover, is
essentially an incomplete Absolute. Following the lines of divergence between
the Romantic and Idealist conceptions of the Absolute in areas such as the role of
art as revealer of the Absolute in Schelling versus the Romantic conception of art
as an infinite series of productive approximations of the Absolute; the semiology
of immediacy and the privileging of the name in Hegel versus Novalis' thought
of signs inexorably mediated by the transcendental schema; and the movements
of dialectical sublation aiming at a thought of totality in Hegel versus the
uncontainable, abyssal negativity of Romantic irony, the difference of thought
between Romanticism and Idealism can best be seen in their conflicting notions
of infinity. Hegel's infinite is the thought of infinity as totality, in accordance
with the procedure of the Aujhebung, whereas, for the Romantics, infinity is
abyssal in structure, progressive, as Schlegel would maintain, in the sense of
always necessarily admitting of further infinite proliferation. An Absolute which,
like Schlegel's "progressive universal poetry" can never be perfected, though
admittedly paradoxical, is entirely consistent with the key elements of Romantic
thought in that it allows for an essential incompletion which forbids the closure
of a unitary, total philosophical system (the ultimate desideratum of Idealism)
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whilst nevertheless maintaining the necessity of a structural systematicity, the
necessary quasi-transcendental condition of imlpossibility for a system.
But perhaps the most visible consequence of the philosophical
incomplete Absolute of Romanticism - which, I would maintain, has been
neglected or misconceived by critics and commentators - is that it has opened a
second space beside philosophy, another, separate but related filed of
productivity for the theory of which Romanticism has often been feted: this is
literature. In a final chapter I attempt my own (re)presentation of the Romantic
achievement in the theory of literature, taking into account this time the several
unquestionably prominent critical accounts of this achievement. Whilst
Romanticism cannot, in the final analysis, circumscribe the space of literature
with anything like the precision and specificity that traditional philosophical
analysis would demand, this is perhaps less of a problem and more of a gift -
after all, the space of literature (what I call, after Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy,
Romanticism's Literary Absolute) is entirely concomitant and coextensive with
the 'space' they explored in philosophy, and it shares the central characteristic of
being incomplete. If poetry and its theory is formulated within Romanticism as
an epistemology, and if the field of inquiry opened by Romantic epistemology
yields and is dependent upon a necessarily incomplete Absolute, then it follows
that their theory of poetry or literature is equally committed to incompleteness, to
infinite, progressive proliferation. Thus, as I analyse it under the conceptual-
theoretical 'categories' of genre, fragment, and criticism, incompleteness,
abyssal reflexivity, essential relationality above and beyond particular conceptual
determinations and identities, again make up the conceptual framework of
Romantic literary theory. Romantic theory of genre is thus seen as essentially
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relational, allowing for a particularly modem problematisation of the concepts
and tools of literary-critical division and stratification, and yielding a 'law of
genre' which can be succinctly formulated simply as +1, or: more than one
genre, evidently an idea with fundamental affinities to the incomplete Absolute.
The Romantic theory (and practice) of the fragment, much like the theory of
genre, is read as an inquiry into the relation between particular and universal
which is also the bearer of the mark of the incomplete Absolute: the part is
always also the whole, to paraphrase Schlegel. And the Romantic notion of
criticism also allows for the essential incompleteness of the literary work, and
produces an endless series of reflexive progressive additions to it, rendering each
and every particular literary work as essentially incomplete as the literary
Absolute itself. As is evident, even in this second space opened up by the
incomplete Absolute, literature is not something alien to philosophy; the two
'spaces' operate co-extensively with each other, each is the distension of the
other, along the continuum of the incomplete (and thus necessarily distended)
Absolute. My exposition, or (re)presentation of Romanticism can thus best be
summarised as centring on the notion of the incomplete Absolute, a notion which
sets Romanticism radically apart from Idealism and transcendental philosophy
alike, despite the obvious common provenance and historical congruity between
them.
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II: Ex-position.
My ambition in writing this thesis has not only been to provide what I
take to be my own exposition of Romanticism, but also to expose Romanticism
to what remain central issues in contemporary philosophical and literary-
theoretical debate. In other words, I have aimed at a presentation of Romantic
thought which would not merely treat it as an incident, however interesting, in
the history of ideas in Europe, but which would demonstrate the modernity,
indeed the contemporaneity of Romantic thought, its survival in the critical
debates of today and thus its continuing importance. This ambition has,
however, proven to be far too big for a PhD thesis, and the constraints of time
and, especially, space have proven too strenuous for it to be realised in full. This
is because the exposition of Romanticism that has preceded these words must be
seen as the minimum prerequisite for the ex-position, the sending off of
Romantic thought into the contemporary arena; if I want to show how
Romanticism is still, not simply relevant, but, to use a thoroughly Romantic
metaphor, essentially alive today, breathing in the same space and time as the
debates about postmodernity and the 'loss' of reason, the era 'after' the subject,
literary interpretation and the question of truth, and many others, then I first need
to present the elements of Romanticism which constitute its survival - and this is
what, I hope, the previous exposition has done. Nevertheless, throughout the
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course of this exposition I have attempted at least to hint at the possible ways in
which Romanticism figures in contemporary debates, by incorporating, wherever
necessary, contemporary critical responses to the Romantic project which
themselves reach out to, are exposed to, the contemporary.
In what follows I aim merely to present some facets of this contemporary
survival of Romanticism, and my remarks are meant to be read in the spirit of
possible further avenues of research, impossible to be embarked on within the
confines of the main body of the thesis, if I am to do justice both to the
complexity of the Romantic thought I wish to expose, and to the relevance of the
debates I wish to ex-pose it to. What is more, I will be further constraining
myself in considering only some of the possible avenues leading on from the
exposition of Romanticism here undertaken, and will have to leave others
unmentioned. I will concentrate on discussing, in a simple descriptive manner
and admittedly without recourse to protracted argument, or sustained referencing,
what I take to be Romantic bequests in the work of a handful of contemporary
thinkers, and on situating myself (which is to say, my own exposition or
(re)presentation of Romanticism) in the context of contemporary critical
responses to the Romantic project. The structure of this, my final (for the
moment) ex-position of Romanticism will address, in brief, what I take to be
points of divergence between my own presentation of Romanticism and those
recently undertaken, firstly, on its behalf, or at least with an avowed debt to
Romantic thought, that is to say where Romanticism figures as a precursor, an
instance of the same; and secondly, in strategic contradistinction with Romantic
thought, that is to say, where Romanticism figures as something from which to
differentiate oneself, an instance of the other. Finally I will briefly examine a
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case that I take to be manifestly consistent with (my own (re)presentation of)
Romanticism, but which does not situate itself either as a friend or a foe of
Romantic thought.
In the first instance, I am thinking particularly of the work of Manfred
Frank, a thinker who, ever since his doctoral thesis156, has consistently thought to
situate himself in the context of an 'aftermath' to Romanticism, and who can be
justifiably called a (self-appointed, perhaps) successor to the Romantic project.
My interest in Frank lies not simply, or not so much, with the fact that, as a
commentator on Romanticism, he is near-indispensable (in actual fact, his direct
engagement with Romanticism more often than not touches on issues, such as
time, left undisturbed by my own presentation) but also, and much more, with the
fact that he astutely reconstructs Romantic arguments and ex-poses them to
contemporary debates, especially those concerning meaning and subjectivity, and
the seemingly endless 'war' between analytic rationalism and post-structuralist
(or, in Frank's terms "neostructuralist") anti-rationalism. I am perhaps already
being too hasty in my characterisations: the appellations 'rationalist' and 'anti-
rationalist' belong not to Frank himself, but to Martin Schwab, in his foreword to
Frank's monumental What is Neostructuralism?, and what is curious is that
Schwab assigns Romanticism a place in the 'anti-rationalist' camp, whilst at the
same time praising Frank for his 'rationalism'P". Frank's reading of
Romanticism appears to me to be, in a crucial sense, strategic, in that it, on the
one hand, portrays Romanticism as a precursor to the contemporary debate about
meaning and subjectivity, and often results in a presentation of Romanticism as
IS6 Frank, Das Problem 'Zeit' in der deutschen Romantik, Munich: Winkler, 1972, and
Paderbom: Schoningh, 1990.
IS7 Frank, What is Neostructuralism?, translated by S.Wilke & R.Gray, Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1989, p. xii.
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(almost) deconstruction avant la lettre158, but, on the other hand, wishes to retain
a notion of the subject and to 'cull' it from Romanticism itself. Thus, in What is
Neostructuralism?, which fundamentally is a treatise on post-structuralist notions
of subjectivity and semiotics, he uses Novalis as prefiguring the critique of 'the
metaphysics of presence' in Derrida by stating that "self-consciousness,
according to this [ie: Romanticism], is not and cannot be grounded on
presencing" 159, whereas in his "Philosophical Foundations of Early German
Romanticism" he writes, again a propos of Novalis, that "like Kant and Fichte,
he does concede to self-consciousness an eminent position and thus distinguishes
himself, e.g, from 'post-modern' detractors of subjectivity,,16o.I am here less
interested in whether Frank is right or wrong in his views about Romanticism
and subjectivity or self-consciousness, as I have demonstrated elsewhere in the
thesis (especially chapters 1 and 2) what my own notion of Romantic notions of
subjectivity is, and more in the fact that Frank seems to want to use Romanticism
in the context of a key contemporary debate, and to use it in a double way, both
as a precursor to, say, deconstruction, and as an alternative to it.
Frank's fundamental position, as his translator Andrew Bowie (whose
own work I take to be in a continuum with that of Frank's) has it in his
introduction to Frank's The Subject and the Text, is the following: "The
meaningfulness of the differential marks in which language is manifested cannot
be explained without involving the consciousness which renders those marks
intelligible as language, as opposed to their being just natural phenomena'l'?'.
This makes whatever sense it makes and has whatever value it has, but, at least
158 This is especially evident in his article The Infinite Text, op.cit.
159 F ank .r , Op.CIt.,p.194.
160 Frank, In Ameriks & Sturma, op.cit., p. 76.
161 In Frank, The Subject and the Text, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
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according to my own exposition or reading of Romanticism, it has little to do
with Romantic thought about language - after all, Novalis explicitly has the
transcendental schema operating prior to and independent of empirical subjects.
And this is no mere particular difference of opinion, for Frank, and Bowie in his
wake, misconstrues what I have presented as the most fundamental element in
Romanticism, the incomplete Absolute. In his Einfuhrung in die
fruhromantische Asthetik, Frank writes of the Romantic Absolute: "It exists as
that which, in the divisions and fragmentations of our world of the
understanding, yet creates that unity, without which contradiction and difference
could not be shown as suCh,,162,which may almost be true of Holderlin's Seyn,
(except for the fact that in my reading nowhere in the fragment does Holderlin
maintain that the unity of Seyn is what makes possible the differentiation of
Urtheil, see supra chapter 1, section II), but is certainly not the case with the
Absolute as it is theorised in the Fichte-Studien, or in the Athenaum, and which,
in any case, proposes a version of the Romantic Absolute which renders it
unified and total in the Hegelian-Idealist sense and misses the crucial element of
incompleteness which I have tried to highlight.
Again, I must stress that what interests me here is not the disagreement I
may have with Frank and Bowie'", but rather the fact that this notion of the
unity of the Absolute is strategically utilised by Frank alongside the concomitant
argument about self-consciousness, to counter post-structuralist 'anti-rationality',
and to ground the project of a decentred subjectivity which nonetheless, as I
indicated earlier, is still the bearer of meaning through language. And what is
really interesting is that this is the same mis(re)presentation of Romanticism that
162 Frank, Einfohrhung in die friihromantische Asthetik; Frankfurt: Surhkamp, 1989, p. 340, also
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is utilised by Rodolphe Gasche in his otherwise wholly admirable attempt to
claim the work of Jacques Derrida for the history of philosophy, and away from
such charges as 'anti-rationalism'. Again, I am aware that I may be
oversimplifying matters, and I must, at the very least, concede that Gasche's
project is not to counter criticism such as Frank's but to wrest deconstruction
away from its more 'fanciful' embodiment in the hands of the Yale critics.
Nonetheless, for what interests me here, for the survival of the Romantic project
and its ex-position in the context of contemporary philosophy and literary theory,
the crucial fact remains that both the defenders and the detractors of
deconstruction utilise the same mis(re)presentation of Romanticism for utterly
opposed purposes. With Gasche, the purpose is expressly the demarcation of
deconstruction from Romanticism, since the latter is seen as forming part of 'the
philosophy of reflection' - which is particularly interesting when one compares
it to Frank's contention that Romanticism, on the contrary, problematises
reflection, at least as a model for self-consciousness. Whether it be in the service
of a model of subjectivity and self-consciousness which is thought of as
impervious to the charge of Derridean deconstruction, or in that of a seemingly
imperious attempt to demarcate deconstruction from any such notions of
subjectivity as modelled on reflection, Romanticism, or rather, the
mis(re)presentation of Romanticism I am here concerned with assumes an
exemplary role.
In The Tain of the Mirror, his undoubtedly authoritative book on the
philosophy of Jacques Derrida, Gasche (whom I take, perhaps all too
quoted in Frank, The Subject and the Text, p. xxxv.
163 I have dealt with this disagreement as such in the main body of the thesis, especially chapter 3.
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straightforwardly'I", as a 'stand-in' for Derrida himself, who has, curiously,
hardly ever written a word on Romanticism) takes great pains to differentiate
deconstruction as a philosophical enterprise from what he sees as the pitfalls of
Romantic 'abyssal' thinking. This he does, as I also tried to show in greater
detail in chapter 3, by proposing an eminently Hegelian interpretation of
Romantic thought, especially with regard to Romantic notions of infinity and the
Absolute. Thus, he is able to state that "the Romantic idea of the medium of
reflexivity, as well as that of the text as a medium of neutralisation and
annulment of concepts and strata, fails to achieve what it seeks: a unitary ground
or essence in which all self-subsistent opposites dissolve in order to ground
themselves't'"; or, in an explicit attempt to demarcate deconstruction from
Romanticism by way of his notion of 'infrastructure': "the reserve of the
infrastructure as the medium of all possible differentiation is also distinct from
the Romantic medium of reflexivity, in which everything communicates with
everything within the full presence of the soul of the world,,166. What I take to be
wrong in such statements about Romanticism I have already indicated earlier;
what is of more interest is that this mis(re)presentation rests, again, entirely on
the Romantic Absolute being divested of what I take to be its chief element -
radical incompleteness, which prevents it from ever being thought of as a
"unitary ground", much less as ''the full presence of the soul of the world". What
164 Gasche's work has elicited some engaging critical responses on the part of Derrideans who do
not necessarily think it such a good idea to locate Derrida so rigidly in the field of philosophy,
and in such explicit contradistinction with his 'appropriation' in literary criticism. A prominent
example is Geoffrey Bennington, who has written two perceptive and thought-provoking review
articles on Gasche's work. See Bennington, 'Deconstruction and the Philosophers (The Very
Idea)' in his Legislations: The Politics of Deconstruction, London: Verso, 1994, pp.II-60; and
'Genuine Gasche (Perhaps), in Bennington: Interrupting Derrida, London: Routledge, 2000,
pg.15S-161.
5 Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection, Cambridge, mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1986, p. 141.
166 Ibid., p.IS3.
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IS more, as I indicated earlier, this is none other than the same
mis(re)presentation, undertaken, as I understand it, in a similarly strategic vein,
as that of the opposite 'side' of the battlefield. Again, as I have been at pains to
show especially in chapter 3, I am not suggesting that Romanticism should be
seen as deconstruction avant la lettre. Gasche's meticulous list of the 'chain of
infrastructures' (retrait, supplement, iterability, and so on) in Derrida's work
finds no direct counterpart in Schlegel, Novalis, or Holdlerlin, and this for many
(some evident) reasons which I cannot possibly do justice to here. Perhaps one
should heed the words of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, who,
on the one hand insist, for instance, that Romantic "fragmentation is not a
dissemination" in the Derridean sense167, but also suggest, in a careful
formulation, that even though "never for a moment did the Romantics imagine" a
thought such as Derrida's, they also were "able, in time, by maintaining [their]
proper equivocity, to make [it] possible,,168.
With this I, or rather the exposition of the Romantic project that I have
undertaken, can rest. Romanticism as I have sought to present it appears to be at
the crux of debates raging in the very present of European philosophy and
literary theory, and the curious misreadings, misappropriations and misgivings
that it has engendered are, if anything full proof of its continuing life. However,
I do not wish to end with such a seemingly 'negative' highlighting of such
mis(re)presentations of Romanticism, if only because I do not wish to suggest
that it is only this exposition which does justice to Romanticism: I merely
proposed an exposition, in the modest sense of the presentation of the arguments
in this thesis, and have left the ex-position, in the modest sense of the continuing
167 Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, The Literary Absolute, p. 49.
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involvement of Romanticism in contemporary debates, for this final, incomplete
and incompletable, sketch. Finally, therefore, I want to present, even if just as
sketchily, as a preparatory series of notes, an example of a (near-)contemporary
theorist whom I believe to be entirely aligned to my own exposition of
Romanticism, and who, furthermore and cardinally, can also be taken as ex-
posing the Romantic project to a thoroughly contemporary context - Paul de
Man. I am not so much concerned with de Man's own reading of Romanticism,
the theory of Romantic irony in particular, which, suffice to say, I find
exemplary, nor can it be claimed that de Man uses Romanticism solely to situate
himself within a current debate - if anything, German Romanticism has been one
of many favourite platforms for de Man's work. My contention is that de Man
appropriated the Romantic incomplete absolute in his theoretical writings, and
also transformed the radical implications of Schlegelian irony by transposing
them in his own 'definition' of theory. The text I have in mind is 'The
Resistance to Theory"69, which can, in this instance hastily, be read as his own
Ober die Unverstandlichkeit, a theory of the essential inability to theorise a
complete, perfected reading. If the whole essay bears uncanny resemblances
with Schlegel's closing statement of the Athenaum, the tour de force that is the
last paragraph of the essay seems to me to stem directly from Athenaum 116.
How can 'progressive universal poetry' be assimilated to "the universal theory of
the impossibility of theory"? The theory de Man has in mind, resulting from
what he calls "rhetorical readings" 170, is the theory he came to defend in this
programmatic essay, the generalised, indeed universal theory of the
168 Ibid., p.124.
169 In de Man, The Resistance to Theory, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986,
Pfo.3-20.
o Ibid., p.19.
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epistemologically unreliable yet rigorously necessary process of the formation of
allegorical/tropological systems which are supported and yet, at the same time
always break down under the weight of what, after Schlegel, he calls irony; a
theory which, therefore, and in striking resemblance to the Romantic notion of
systematicity, necessarily resists its own theorisation as theory, a theory which
rests on the notion of incompleteness and non-totalisability just as much as it
relies on the notion of structural systematicity as a quasi-transcendental condition
of imlpossibility for a complete system. de Man writes: "Nothing can overcome
the resistance to theory since theory is itself this resistance" (ibid.), The gesture
is familiar to anyone with a passing acquaintance with Schlegel's
Incomprehensibility essay - there is no theory to end theory, just as there is no
irony to end irony. In yet another striking parallel, just as progressive universal
poetry, the Romantic Absolute, resists its own completion and totalisation, de
Man's theory does the same: it systematically undoes and denies the possibility
of its own closure into a system, which is precisely what constitutes its
systematicity. Theory as de Man understands it is nothing other than the
manifestation, within the rhetorical field of criticism just as within that of
philosophy, of the Romantic incomplete Absolute.
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